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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays studying economic agents with non-standard
reactions to information. The standard model is often inadequate because it permits
neither inattention nor ambiguity aversion. This dissertation provides both pure and
applied theoretical analyses of these two phenomena.
The first essay models an agent who has a limited capacity to pay attention to
information and thus conditions her actions on a coarsening of the available informa-
tion. An optimally inattentive agent chooses both her coarsening and her actions by
constrained maximization of an underlying subjective expected utility preference re-
lation. The main result axiomatically characterizes the conditional choices of actions
by an agent that are necessary and sufficient for her behavior to be seen as if it is
the result of optimal inattention. The agent’s utility index, cognitive constraint and
prior are uniquely identified.
The second essay analyzes the implications of advertising in a model where con-
sumers are optimally inattentive. Firms compete by choosing both prices and ad-
vi
vertising levels. Consumers easily observe price but have a limited capacity to pay
attention to information about quality. Advertisements increase consumer capac-
ity for attention. An increase in capacity for attention results in more information
processed by each consumer, which raises the likelihood that a high quality good
is purchased but leads to an increased price. An exogenous decrease in the cost of
advertising has a positive impact on equilibrium price but an ambiguous effect on
equilibrium profit and surplus. Advertising generates some effects documented in the
literature through a single mechanism.
The third essay studies strategic voting when voters have pure common values
but exhibit Ellsberg-type behavior as modeled by maxmin expected utility prefer-
ences. The Condorcet Jury Theorem states that given subjective expected utility
maximization and common values, the equilibrium probability that the correct can-
didate wins goes to one as the size of the electorate goes to infinity. In contrast, this
essay provides sufficient conditions so that the equilibrium probability of the correct
candidate winning the election is bounded above by one half in at least one state. As
a consequence, there is no equilibrium in which information aggregates.
vii
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Chapter 1
Foundations for Optimal Inattention
1.1 Introduction
1.1.1 Objectives and Outline
Individuals often appear not to process all available information. This phenomenon,
documented in both psychology and economics,1 is usually attributed to agents’ lim-
ited capacity to pay attention to information (Sims [2003]). When the available infor-
mation exceeds their capacity, agents exhibit inattention, i.e. condition their choices
on coarser information. This inattentiveness has significant economic consequences.2
This paper models agents who respond optimally to their limited attention. An
optimally inattentive agent has a constraint that limits the information to which
she can pay attention, and she chooses both her coarsening and her actions (or acts)
conditional on that coarsening by maximizing a subjective expected utility preference
relation. I axiomatically characterize the conditional choices of actions (acts) by a
decision maker (DM) that are necessary and sufficient for her behavior to be seen as if
it is the result of optimal inattention. These axioms clarify the model’s implications
1See Pashler [1998] for a book-length treatment of attention in psychology. Economists have also
empirically documented that agents, e.g. restaurant patrons (Luca [2011]), stock traders (DellaVigna
and Pollet [2009]) and professional forecasters (Coibion and Gorodnichenko [2011a,b]), fail to process
all available information.
2For instance, it can imply delayed response to shocks (Sims [1998, 2003]), sticky prices (Mack-
owiak and Wiederholt [2009]), under-diversification (Van Nieuweburgh and Veldkamp [2010]), sticky
investment (Woodford [2008]), coordination failure (Hellwig and Veldkamp [2009]), specialization
(Dow [1991]), exploitation (Rubinstein [1993]) and extreme price swings (Gul et al. [2011]).
1
2for choice behavior and provide a choice-theoretic justification for it.
The modeler observes an objective state space and a partition describing the
objective information. In contrast, the DM’s tastes, her prior beliefs, her capacity for
attention, and the information to which she pays attention (which I call her subjective
information to distinguish it from the finer, objective information) are taken to be
unobservables that must be inferred from choices. I assume a rich set of choice data,
namely the DM’s choices from each feasible set of acts and conditional on each state
of the world.3
The rationale for assuming that the indicated range of behavior is observable
is easily understood. First, with a narrower range of behavior, the model cannot be
characterized. Choice out of a single feasible set cannot reveal much about underlying
behavior for the reasons familiar from standard choice theory. Furthermore when
the state space is unobservable and choice is observed conditional on a single state,
earlier work by Van Zandt [1996] shows that optimal inattention has no testable
implications.4,5 Second, my setting allows analysis directly in terms of the economic
object of interest – namely, the agent’s chosen action, such as setting a price, selecting
a bundle of goods, or deciding from which firm to purchase. Finally, this range of
behavior permits unique identification of the unobservables, even though the DM’s
3This data is an extension of that considered by the papers cited in Footnote 2, which study all
conditional choices from a single feasible set. It is easily obtainable in a laboratory environment,
and it could, in principle, be gathered from a real-world setting where both the realized state and
the information received by the agent are independently and identically distributed across time.
4Van Zandt [1996] studies hidden information acquisition, which is readily reinterpreted as op-
timal inattention. Specifically, he takes as given any choice correspondence on a finite collection of
alternatives. He shows that one can construct a state space and an information acquisition prob-
lem so that for every choice problem, the alternative selected in a fixed state matches the choice
correspondence if the DM chooses information optimally.
5The model’s implications when the state space and choice conditional on only one state are
observable an open question. A partial answer is given by the axioms Monotonicity and ACI (below):
conditional choices in a fixed state satisfy WARP when the problem contains only state-independent
acts. However, they violate WARP (as well as many weaker properties implied by it) in general, and
although identification of the utility index is possible, the attention constraint cannot be identified.
3choices violate many of the well-understood properties that permit identification in
other models, including the Weak Axiom of Revealed Preference (WARP).
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. In the next subsection, I use an
example to illustrate my setting, the behavior of interest and how I achieve identifi-
cation. Section 1.2 presents the model in detail. In Section 1.3, I formally describe
the behavior of interest through five axioms. Theorems 1 and 2 show that these
axioms characterize an optimally inattentive DM’s choices. I also characterize two
special cases: a DM who processes all information and a DM who processes the same
information, regardless of the menu faced. In Section 1.4, Theorem 3 shows that
the utility index, the attention constraint and, in many circumstances, the prior are
uniquely identified by the agent’s conditional choices.
In Section 1.5, Theorem 4 gives an intuitive, behavioral comparison equivalent to
one optimally inattentive DM having a higher capacity for attention than another.
I then argue that an optimally inattentive DM values information differently than
a Bayesian DM because the former may not process all available information. Even
if one information partition is objectively more valuable than another (in the sense
of Blackwell [1953]), it may not be subjectively more valuable. That is, because
of information overload a DM may reject an objectively more valuable information
partition in favor of a coarser one. After generalizing my setting to allow the objective
information to vary, Theorem 5 characterizes the subjective value of information to
an optimally inattentive DM in terms of her choices.
In Section 1.6, I analyze a market where firms compete over optimally inattentive
consumers. Intuition suggests that firms can exploit these consumers, and previous
work (cf. Rubinstein [1993]) focuses on that aspect. Fixing prices, consumer sur-
plus increases as capacity for attention increases. However, if strategic effects are
4taken into account, then lower consumer capacity for attention may lead to higher
equilibrium consumer surplus. In fact, firms may benefit from facing more attentive
consumers. The key difference from earlier work is that consumers perceive the price
perfectly, but they are inattentive to information about the quality of the products.
Intuitively, if consumers allocate their attention optimally, then a firm attracts at-
tention only if it offers the consumer more surplus. This induces competition among
firms who would not otherwise compete, which lowers prices and increases consumer
surplus.
Section 1.7 concludes by discussing the relationship with other models of inatten-
tion. Proofs are collected in the remaining sections.
1.1.2 Example
Consider a benevolent doctor who treats patients suffering from a given disease.
Glaxo, Merck, and Pfizer all produce pharmaceuticals that treat the disease, but
the doctor knows that one of the three drugs will be strictly more effective than the
other two. The one that works best for each patient is initially unknown, and the
doctor can, in principle, determine it; for instance, by constructing a very detailed
medical history. Uncertainty is modeled by the state space Ω = {γ, µ, φ}, and the
objective information by the partition
P = {{γ}, {µ}, {φ}}.
The state indicates whether the most effective drug is produced by Glaxo (γ), by
Merck (µ) or by Pfizer (φ), and P indicates that the doctor can determine which
state obtains.
Suppose there are two patients who are identical except that they have different
5Table 1.1: Conditional choices
γ µ φ
c({g,m, f}|·) {m} {m} {f}
c({g,m}|·) {g} {m} {m}
insurance plans: one’s covers all three drugs, and the other’s does not cover Pfizer’s
drug. Each patient is a choice problem, in which prescribing a drug corresponds to
choosing an act (g, m and f represent prescribing the drugs produced by Glaxo, Merck
and Pfizer respectively). The drug prescribed to each patient conditional on each
state of the world is given by a conditional choice correspondence, a family of choice
correspondences indexed by the state of the world. Table 1.1 lists the conditional
choices of a doctor when facing {g,m, f} (the problem associated with unrestricted
insurance) and {g,m} (the problem associated with restricted insurance).
Under the assumption that the doctor’s choices result from optimal inattention,
what can be inferred from them? One complication is that the doctor’s choices violate
WARP in state γ: she chooses g but not m from {g,m} and chooses m but not g from
{g,m, f}. Although WARP violations prevent identification of preference through the
usual methods, the doctor’s tastes, subjective information, and attention constraint
can nevertheless be inferred from her choices. To begin with, the above choices reveal
that the doctor cannot pay attention to all the objective information. If she did, then
her choice when Glaxo’s drug is effective from the first menu would reveal that she
strictly prefers to prescribe it rather than to prescribe Merck’s drug. Therefore, if
Glaxo’s drug is available in the larger problem and it is the most effective, then she
should not prescribe Merck’s. But because she chooses to prescribe the latter when
facing {g,m, f} in state γ, she does not pay attention to the objective information.
Since the doctor does not pay attention to the objective information, I turn to
inferring her subjective information, i.e. the information to which she does pay at-
6tention. When facing {g,m}, she chooses differently conditional on γ than she does
conditional on either µ or φ, so her subjective information must be at least as fine as
{{γ}, {µ, φ}}. Moreover, it cannot be strictly finer because it would then be the ob-
jective information. Consequently, her subjective information is exactly {{γ}, {µ, φ}}
when facing {g,m}. Similarly, her subjective information must be {{φ}, {γ, µ}} when
facing {g,m, f}. Therefore, the doctor chooses as if she knows the answer to the ques-
tion “Is Glaxo’s drug the most effective?” when facing {g,m} and “Is Pfizer’s drug
the most effective?” when facing {g,m, f}. With her subjective information known,
her choices reveal her conditional preferences, which can then be aggregated to reveal
her underlying unconditional preferences.
How can one tell if the doctor’s choices have an optimal inattention representation?
Theorems 1 and 2 show that a set of properties characterizes a doctor whose choices
can be seen as if they result from optimal inattention. The doctor’s choices do not
violate any of these properties, so they are compatible with optimal inattention.
However, consider a second doctor who chooses according to c′(·), where c′(·) is the
same same as c(·) except c′({g,m, f}|φ) = {m}. Although both doctors select the
same prescription from each choice problem in state γ, when the other conditional
choices are considered, c′(·) cannot have an optimal inattention representation. To
see this, note that the second doctor chooses Merck’s drug when the patient has good
insurance, regardless of the state of the world. As above, the modeler infers that
the doctor knows whether Glaxo’s drug is the most effective when facing {g,m}, so
her choice of g in state γ reveals that she strictly prefers prescribing it to prescribing
Merck’s in that state. However, this implies that her choices from the smaller problem
yield a better outcome in every state of the world than those from the larger problem,
an impossibility if her subjective information is optimal when facing both problems.
71.2 Setup and Model
1.2.1 Setup
I adopt the following version of the classic Anscombe-Aumann setting. Uncertainty
is captured by a set of states Ω and a set of events Σ, a σ−algebra of subsets of Ω.
Consequences are elements of a separable metric space, Z. Let the set X consist of all
finite-support probability measures on Z, endowed with the weak* topology. Objects
of choice are acts, Σ−measurable simple (finite-ranged) functions f : Ω→ X. Let F
be the set of all acts, endowed with the topology of uniform convergence. Since F is
metrizable, let d(·) be a compatible metric.6
The DM must choose an act from a compact set, i.e. her choice problem is a non-
empty, compact subset of F . Let K(F) be the set of all choice problems, endowed
with the Hausdorff topology generated by the metric d(·). She has access to objective
information, represented by P , a finite partition of Ω.7 I require every element of the
partition be an element of Σ. Knowing the objective information allows the modeler
to distinguish imperfect information from limited capacity for attention.8
Choice results from a three-stage process. In stage 1, the state is realized but
remains unknown to the DM. In stage 2, the DM chooses an act. Although in principle
she observes the realized cell of P before making this choice, she instead acts as if she
observes the realized cell of her subjective information. In stage 3, all uncertainty is
6X is metrizable by Theorem 15.12 of Aliprantis and Border [2006]. Let dˆ : X × X → R+
be a compatible metric. Since F has the topology of uniform convergence, fn → f ⇐⇒
supω dˆ(fn(ω), f(ω))→ 0. Therefore d : F ×F → R+ given by d(f, g) = supω dˆ(f(ω), g(ω)) is a com-
patible metric on F ; since F contains only simple acts, the supremum is attained and d(f, g) < ∞
for any f, g ∈ F .
7With minor additional assumptions, P can be taken to be countable rather than finite.
8Because the modeler knows the objectively available information, inattention can be distin-
guished from imperfect information. For instance, if the modeler observes that the DM never
distinguishes between states ω1 and ω2, then this is interpreted as inattention only if the objective
information distinguishes ω1 from ω2.
8Figure 1.2.1: Timeline
{Ω}
E1
E2
E3
{Ω}
E1
E2
E3
vs.
Objective information set Subjective information set
resolved and the DM gets the consequence specified by her chosen act and the realized
state. The tree on the left in Figure 1.2.1 illustrates the timing. If the DM exhibits
inattention, she acts as if facing a different tree than the objective one; for instance,
the one on the right in Figure 1.2.1.
The modeler observes the DM’s choices in stage 2 (or later) and the realization
of the objective information, but does not observe the DM’s subjective information.
The choice data generates a conditional choice correspondence c(·), such that the
DM is willing to choose the acts in c(B|ω) from the problem B when the state is ω.
Formally, this is a set-valued, P -measurable function c : K(F) × Ω → K(F) with
c(B|ω) ⊂ B for all B ∈ K(F) and all ω ∈ Ω.
I adopt the following notation throughout. Identify X with the subset of acts
that do not depend on the state, i.e. x ∈ X corresponds to the act x ∈ F such
that x(ω) = x ∀ω ∈ Ω, and let K(X) be the set of compact, non-empty subsets of
X, noting that K(X) ⊂ K(F). For any partitions Q and Q′, write Q  Q′ if Q is
finer than Q′. For any acts f, g ∈ F and any event E ∈ Σ, define fEg to be the
act that yields f(ω) if ω ∈ E and g(ω) if ω /∈ E. For any α ∈ [0, 1] and any two
f, g ∈ F let αf +(1−α)g ∈ F be the state-wise mixture of f and g, or the act taking
9the value in state ω of αf(ω) + (1− α)g(ω), defined by the usual mixture operation
on lotteries. For any A,B ∈ K(F) and α ∈ [0, 1], let αA + (1 − α)B ∈ K(F) be
{αa + (1 − α)b|a ∈ A, b ∈ B}. Any act in αA + (1 − α)B is an α mixture of an act
in A with a (1− α) mixture of an act in B.
1.2.2 Model
An optimally inattentive agent is a tuple (u(·), pi(·),P∗, Pˆ (·)), where:
• u : X → R is continuous and affine,
• pi : Σ→ [0, 1] is finitely-additive and pi(E) > 0 for every E ∈ P ,
• P∗ ⊂ {Q : P  Q} has the property that if Q ∈ P∗ and Q Q′, then Q′ ∈ P∗,
and
• Pˆ : K(F)→ P∗.
The utility index u(·) and prior pi(·) have familiar interpretations. Neither varies with
the problem, so an optimally inattentive DM has stable tastes and beliefs. I focus
on interpreting the two new objects, the attention constraint P∗ and the attention
rule Pˆ (·). The former describes to what the DM can pay attention, while the latter
describes to what she does pay attention. The attention constraint P∗ is a set of
partitions, all of which are coarser than the objective information. If Q ∈ P∗, then
the DM has the capacity to pay attention to Q. I assume that P∗ satisfies free disposal
of information, in the sense that whenever she can pay attention Q, she can also pay
attention to any Q′ that is coarser than Q. Depending on the problem, the DM may
have different subjective information, given by the attention rule Pˆ (·). That is, Pˆ (B)
is her subjective information when facing the problem B.
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Definition 1. A conditional choice correspondence c(·) has an optimal inattention
representation if there exists an optimally inattentive agent so that for every problem
B,
Pˆ (B) ∈ arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E∈Q
pi(E)[max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E)], (1.2.1)
and for every problem B and state ω,
c(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Pˆ (B)(ω)). (1.2.2)
The DM’s choices have an optimal inattention representation if they satisfy two
properties. Equation (1.2.1) requires that her subjective information gives at least as
high expected utility as any other partition in P∗, i.e. it is chosen optimally. Equation
(1.2.2) requires that the DM’s choice from B in state ω maximizes expected utility
conditional on the realized cell of her subjective information.
An optimally inattentive DM considers all available acts. In contrast, Masatlioglu
et al. [2012] studies an agent who does not pay attention to the entire set of available
actions. Although both models are motivated by the same underlying mechanism,
neither nests the other: there are choices compatible with optimal inattention but not
inattention to alternatives and vice versa.9 While DMs conforming to either model
may violate WARP, the reason for such violations is different.10 In fact, an optimally
inattentive DM may exhibit inattention yet satisfy WARP (Corollary 2).
One special case of optimal inattention is a DM who processes all available infor-
mation. I call such a DM Bayesian, and say that c(·) has a Bayesian representation
if
c(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|P (ω))
9See Section A.3.6 and A.3.7.
10In Masatlioglu et al. [2012], removing unchosen alternatives may affect the options considered by
the DM; in this paper, removing alternatives not chosen in a given state may alter the information
processed.
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for every B and ω. In the model, this corresponds to an optimally inattentive agent
with P∗ = {Q : Q P} and Pˆ (B) = P for every problem B.
Another special case is a DM who always pay attention to the same information
(which may differ from the objective information), regardless of the problem faced. I
say that such a DM has fixed attention, and that c(·) has fixed attention representation
if there is a partition Q satisfying P  Q so that
c(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))
for every B and ω. In the model, this corresponds to an optimally inattentive agent
with P∗ = {Q′ : Q′  Q} and Pˆ (B) = Q for every problem B.
In addition to the above special cases, the model admits many others considered
in the literature. For instance, P∗ could equal the set of all partitions that are both
coarser than P and have at most κ ≥ 1 elements (Gul et al. [2011]). Alternatively,
P∗ could equal the set of all partitions that have mutual information with respect to
P less than κ (similar to Sims [2003]).11
1.3 Foundations
1.3.1 Axioms
I impose the following axioms. The quantifier “for all f, g ∈ F , A,B ∈ K(F), ω ∈ Ω
and α ∈ (0, 1]” is suppressed throughout.
A DM satisfies WARP, sometimes referred to as Independence of Irrelevant Acts,
if for any A ⊂ B, whenever c(B|ω) ∩ A 6= ∅ it follows that c(A|ω) = c(B|ω) ∩ A.
If an inattentive DM’s choices from problems A and B are conditioned on the same
11The mutual information is a measure of the information provided about the realization of one
random variable by another. It corresponds to the reduction in entropy and is used by the rational
inattention literature.
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subjective information, then her choice in each state maximizes the same conditional
preference relation, so these choices do not violate WARP. Therefore, if she violates
it, then her choices from A and B must be conditioned on different subjective infor-
mation. The first axiom, Independence of Never Relevant Acts or INRA, gives one
situation where the DM should not violate WARP.
Axiom 1. (INRA) If A ⊂ B and c(B|ω′) ∩ A 6= ∅ for every state ω′, then
c(A|ω) = c(B|ω) ∩ A.
Within the context of Section 1.1.2, INRA says that if two patients differ only in
that one’s plan drops the drug h but the doctor never prescribes h to the patient with
better insurance, then she prescribes the same drug to both patients. To interpret
the axiom, consider a problem B and a “never relevant” act f (i.e. f /∈ c(B|ω′) for
all ω′), and let A = B\{f}.12 Suppose that her choices from B are conditioned on
the subjective information Q. Because she never chooses f from B, the benefit of
paying attention to Q when facing A is the same as it is when facing B. If Q is
optimal when facing B, then Q is still optimal when facing A. Therefore, the DM
should have the same subjective information when facing B as when facing A, so
her choices from A and B should not violate WARP. More generally, the statement
c(B|ω′) ∩ A 6= ∅ for every state ω′ implies that the entire set of acts that are in B
but not in A is “never relevant” and removing them would not decrease the benefit
of her subjective information when facing B. As above, if her subjective information
is optimal when facing B, then it is still optimal when facing A. Consequently, the
DM’s choices should not violate WARP.
12Whenever B is finite, INRA is equivalent to “if c(B|ω′) 6= {f} for all ω′, then c(B|ω)\{f} =
c(B\{f}|ω).”
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In the present context, a DM satisfies Independence if
f ∈ c(A|ω) and g ∈ c(B|ω) ⇐⇒ αf + (1− α)g ∈ c(αA+ (1− α)B|ω).
That is, if the DM chooses f over each h in A and g over each h′ in B, then she chooses
αf +(1−α)g over each αh+(1−α)h′ in αA+(1−α)B.13 If an optimally inattentive
DM pays attention to the same information when facing the problems A, B and
αA+(1−α)B, then her choice in each state maximizes the same conditional preference
relation. Because her conditional preferences are expected utility, her choices do not
violate Independence. This implies that whenever the DM violates this property for
A, B and αA+ (1− α)B, she must not pay attention to the same information when
facing all three problems. The second axiom, Attention Constrained Independence or
ACI, gives one situation where the DM should not violate Independence.
Axiom 2. (ACI) f ∈ c(B|ω) if and only if αf + (1− α)g ∈ c(αB + (1− α){g}|ω).
In my example, this says that if there is a state-independent chance that the
patient will take some drug h regardless of what the doctor actually prescribes, then
her choice of prescription is unaffected by both the identity of h and the magnitude
of that chance. To interpret the axiom, fix problems B and {g}. Because {g} is
a singleton, the DM makes the same choice from it no matter what her subjective
information is. Therefore, the relationship between the benefits of any two subjective
information partitions is the same for the problem B as it is for the problem αB+(1−
α){g}.14 If paying attention to Q is optimal when facing B, then paying attention
13This follows from the standard formulation of Independence for a binary relation: f  g ⇐⇒
αf + (1− α)h  αg + (1− α)h.
14One can think of αB + (1 − α){g} as flipping a (possibly biased) coin, choosing from B if the
coin comes up heads and otherwise choosing from {g}, where the DM must choose her subjective
information before observing the outcome of the coin-flip. Since information only has value if the
coin comes up heads, a partition is optimal when facing αB + (1− α){g} if and only if it would be
optimal when facing B for sure.
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to Q is also optimal when facing αB + (1 − α){g}. Consequently, an optimally
inattentive DM conditions her choices on the same subjective information when facing
αB + (1 − α){g} as she does when facing B. Because her conditional preferences
satisfy Independence, she chooses the mixture of her choices from B with g from
αB + (1− α){g}.
The next axiom adapts the standard Monotonicity axiom to the present setting.
It also implies that tastes are state independent. For any lotteries x and y, say that x
is revealed (resp. strictly) preferred to y if x ∈ c({x, y}|ω) (resp. and y /∈ c({x, y}|ω))
for some ω.15
Axiom 3. (Monotonicity) (i) If A ∈ K(X), then c(A|ω) = c(A|ω′) for all ω′ ∈ Ω.
(ii) If f, g ∈ B and f(ω′) is revealed preferred to g(ω′) for every ω′ ∈ Ω, then g ∈
c(B|ω) =⇒ f ∈ c(B|ω). Moreover, if f(ω′) is revealed strictly preferred to g(ω′) for
each ω′ ∈ P (ω), then g /∈ c(B|ω).
In my example, this says that the doctor cares only about the realized consequence
of her choice, and if one drug gives a better consequence in every state than another,
then she never prescribes the inferior drug. For interpretation, consider B = {x, y}
where x and y are lotteries. If the DM’s tastes are state independent and she chooses
x over y in state ω, then she also chooses x over y in state ω′. This reveals that the
DM prefers x to y, i.e. considers x to be a better consequence than y. Now, consider
acts f and g so that f yields a better consequence than g in every state of the world.
Even if the DM received information revealing that the state on which g gives the
best consequence would occur for sure, she would still be willing to choose f over g.
Consequently, she never chooses only g when f is available. In addition, if f yields
a strictly better consequence than g in every state in P (ω), then the DM does not
15Recall that K(X) is the set of problems that contain only lotteries.
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choose g. Thus, Monotonicity limits the scope of inattention; an inattentive DM will
never pick a dominated act.
Another common property satisfied by most models of choice under uncertainty
is Consequentialism: if f, g ∈ B and f(ω′) = g(ω′) for all ω′ ∈ P (ω), then
f ∈ c(B|ω) ⇐⇒ g ∈ c(B|ω).
A DM who satisfies Consequentialism respects the objective information, in the sense
that whenever two acts give the same outcome on every objectively possible state,
then one of the acts is chosen if and only if the other is. A DM whose subjective
information differs from the objective information will violate this property. The
next axiom, Subjective Consequentialism, weakens Consequentialism to take this into
account.
Axiom 4. (Subjective Consequentialism) If f, g ∈ B and ∀ω′[f(ω′) 6= g(ω′) =⇒
c(B|ω′) 6= c(B|ω)], then f ∈ c(B|ω) ⇐⇒ g ∈ c(B|ω).
Subjective Consequentialism implies that choice between any two acts is unaf-
fected by their outcomes in states that the DM knows did not occur. To see this,
fix B, f , and g as above, and suppose that the DM faces the problem B and that
the realized state is ω. Whenever ω and ω′ are in the same cell of her subjective
information when facing B, the DM’s choices in those states maximize the same con-
ditional preference relation, so c(B|ω) = c(B|ω′). Consequently, if c(B|ω′) 6= c(B|ω),
i.e. the DM makes different choices in states ω and ω′, then these two states must
be in different cells of her subjective information. By hypothesis, if f and g give a
different consequence in state ω′, then c(B|ω′) 6= c(B|ω), so the DM must know that
ω′ did not occur. Therefore, the DM knows that she receives the same consequenence
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from choosing either f or g, so she chooses f if and only if she chooses g.16
My final axiom is a technical condition ensuring the continuity of the underlying
preference relation. Complicating its statement is that the DM’s choices from different
menus may be conditioned on different information. Consequently, her choices may
appear discontinuous to the modeler, and the axiom must take into account that the
underlying preference is revealed by choices that are not conditioned on the same
subjective information. To state the axiom, I need two preliminary definitions. First,
say that f dominates g if f is chosen from {f, g} in every state of the world. If the
DM has optimal inattention and f dominates g, then f must be (weakly) preferred
to g conditional on every cell of every feasible subjective information partition. The
second definition is:
Definition 2. The acts in A are indirectly selected over the acts in B, written
A IS B, if there are problems B1, ..., Bn ∈ K(F) so that B1 = A and Bn = B
and for each i ∈ {1, ..., n− 1} and every ω, c(Bi+1|ω) ∩Bi 6= ∅.
Suppose that the DM faces B and chooses an act in A regardless of the state of
the world. Since her choices from B are available in A, her set of choices from A is
selected over her choices from B. Moreover, if she chooses an act from B in every
state of the world when facing C, then her set of choices from B is selected over any
choices in C. Since the acts in A are selected over the acts in B that are in turn
selected over the acts in C, the acts in A are indirectly selected over the acts in C.
Write A IS B if there are sequences (An)
∞
n=1 and (Bn)
∞
n=1 so that An → A, Bn → B
and An IS Bn for all n, i.e. IS is the sequential closure of IS.
The final axiom, Continuity, requires that each c(·|ω) satisfies a weak continuity
condition and that sequences of indirect selections do not contradict domination.
16Consequentialism implies Subjective Consequentialism: since c(B|·) is P -measurable, P (ω) ⊂
{ω′′ : c(B|ω′′) = c(B|ω)} for every B and ω.
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Axiom 5. (Continuity) For any {Bn}∞n=1 ⊂ K(F):
(i) If fn ∈ c(Bn|ω) and
{ω′ : c(B|ω′) = c(B|ω)} = {ω′ : c(Bn|ω′) = c(Bn|ω)}
for every n ∈ N, then Bn → B and fn → f imply that f ∈ c(B|ω).
(ii) If {f} IS {g} and g dominates f , then f dominates g as well.
The first condition of Continuity is a restriction of upper hemi-continuity.17 It
requires that this property holds only if the DM reveals that her choice is conditioned
on the same information along the sequence and as it is at the limit. Both parts of
Continuity are implied by combining WARP and upper hemi-continuity.
To interpret the second condition of the axiom, note that INRA suggests that the
DM’s set of choices from problem A is better than her set of choices from problem
B whenever she chooses an act in A when facing B conditional on every state of the
world. This direct ranking is incomplete but can be extended using finite sequences
of choices to allow for indirect comparisons as well. These indirect comparisons are
captured when the acts in A are indirectly selected over the acts in B. Because this
ranks many more sets of choices, indirect selections are important for characterizing
optimal inattention. Continuity insures a minimal consistency between these indirect
comparisons and her direct comparisons. Specifically, suppose that f dominates g
and g does not dominate f . Continuity implies that if B is sufficiently close to {g}
and A is sufficiently close to {f}, then the DM does not indirectly select the acts in
B over the acts in A.
17This follows from Aliprantis and Border [2006, Cor 17.17].
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1.3.2 Characterization Result
I can now state the main result: if the DM’s choices satisfy the five axioms above,
then she acts as if she has optimal inattention.
Theorem 1. If c(·) satisfies INRA, ACI, Monotonicity, Subjective Consequentialism
and Continuity, then c(·) has an optimal inattention representation.
Theorem 1 shows that the above axioms are sufficient for the DM to have optimal
inattention. For a discussion of the key ideas in its proof, see Secion A.1. Necessity is
more complicated because I have not restricted attention to well-behaved tie-breaking
rules. Consider two conditional choice correspondences, c(·) and c′(·), that both have
optimal inattention representations with the same prior, utility index, and attention
constraint. When their attention constraint is not a singleton, it is possible that the
former has subjective information Q when facing the problem B, while the latter has
subjective information Q′ when facing B. This arises when a problem has multiple
optimal subjective information partitions (i.e. the right hand side of (1.2.1) is not
a singleton) and the DM must break ties between them. If she breaks these ties
non-systematically, then the DM may violate ACI or INRA.18 Though the axioms
become necessary if I impose some conditions on tie-breaking when defining the model,
Theorem 2 shows that the set of problems for which an optimally inattentive DM fails
to satisfy either INRA or ACI is non-generic even without any such conditions.19
Theorem 2. If c(·) has an optimal inattention representation, then c(·) satisfies
Monotonicity, Subjective Consequentialism and Continuity. Moreover, there is a con-
18A similar issue exists for random expected utility (Gul and Pesendorfer [2006]) with a finite state
space. If ties are broken using a “regular” random expected utility function, then choices satisfy
linearity, but if ties are broken differently, then linearity may fail.
19Say that an optimal inattention representation is regular if for any A,B ∈ K(F) and g ∈ F ,
Pˆ (B) = Pˆ (αB + (1 − α){g}) and arg maxf∈A Epi[u ◦ f |Pˆ (A)(ω)] = arg maxf∈A Epi[u ◦ f |Pˆ (B)(ω)]
for all ω whenever c(B|ω) ∩ A 6= ∅ for all ω. Given Theorems 1 and 2, one can verify that c(·) has
regular optimal inattention if and only if c(·) satisfies all six axioms.
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ditional choice correspondence c′(·) satisfying INRA, ACI, Monotonicity, Subjective
Consequentialism and Continuity as well as an open, dense K ⊂ K(F) so that
(i) c(·) and c′(·) have optimal inattention representations parametrized by
(u(·), pi(·), Pˆ (·),P∗) and (u(·), pi(·), Qˆ(·),P∗), respectively, and
(ii) c(B|ω) = c′(B|ω) for every ω ∈ Ω and B ∈ K.
Theorem 2 implies that INRA and ACI are generically necessary. This is because
the set of problems for which ties can occur is “small.” Consequently, INRA and ACI
capture the economic content of optimal inattention. Though not strictly necessary,
for any given prior, utility index and attention constraint, there are always attention
rules that satisfy INRA and ACI.
1.3.3 Special cases
To understand the role of the axioms in the characterization, I characterize the two
special cases of optimal inattention mentioned at the start of this section, the Bayesian
model and the fixed attention model.
Corollary 1. c(·) satisfies Consequentialism in addition to INRA, ACI, Monotonic-
ity, and Continuity if and only if c(·) has a Bayesian representation.
Intuitively, Consequentialism requires that the DM respects the objective infor-
mation structure. For an optimally inattentive DM, this implies that she processes
all information and chooses the act that maximizes expected utility. Since Con-
sequentialism implies Subjective Consequentialism, c(·) has an optimal inattention
representation and must have a Bayesian representation.
Corollary 2. The following are equivalent:
(i) c(·) satisfies Independence in addition to INRA, Monotonicity, Subjective Con-
sequentialism and Continuity.
(ii) c(·) satisfies WARP in addition to ACI, Monotonicity, Subjective Consequen-
tialism and Continuity.
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(iii) c(·) has a fixed attention representation.
It immediately follows that WARP and Independence are equivalent for an opti-
mally inattentive DM. The intuition behind Corollary 2 is that an optimally inatten-
tive DM’s choices from A and B violate Independence or WARP only if her subjective
information differs at A, B or αA + (1 − α)B. If her subjective information never
changes, then she never violates either condition. Consequently, she has fixed atten-
tion if she satisfies either WARP or Independence.
1.3.4 Counter-examples
To help understand the role of the axioms, I provide a series of counterexamples
showing what may go wrong if one or more of the axioms are not satisfied. An
alternative model of particular interest is the inattention model. An inattentive
DM maximizes expected utility conditional on her subjective information, but her
subjective information is not necessarily optimal. Although she has stable tastes and
beliefs, the information to which she pays attention varies with the problem in a
general manner. Formally, c(·) has an inattention representation if Equation (1.2.2)
holds for all problems B and states ω but the source of Pˆ (·) is left unspecified.
Proposition 1. If c(·) has an inattention representation, then c(·) satisfies Mono-
tonicity, Subjective Consequentialism and Continuity (i).
In particular, an inattentive DM’s choices may violate INRA, ACI or Continuity
(ii). Consequently, these three axioms reflect the optimality of her subjective informa-
tion. They capture her reaction to her attention constraint but not that she exhibits
inattention in the first place.20
20A characterization of the inattention model is available as supplementary material.
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ACI reflects that the DM has an attention constraint. Consider the alternative
model is costly attention. In this case, rather than being subject to a constraint on
the information to which she can attend, the DM incurs a cost if she pays attention
to a given partition. A function ρ : {Q : Q  P} → [0,∞] is a cost function if
ρ({Ω}) = 0 and Q  Q′ implies ρ(Q) ≥ ρ(Q′). Formally, c(·) has a costly attention
representation if there is an optimally inattentive agent and a cost function ρ(·) so
that
Pˆ (B) ∈ arg max
Q
∑
E∈Q
pi(E)[max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E)]− ρ(Q) (1.3.1)
for every problem B and Equation (1.2.2) holds for every problem B and state ω.
Given appropriate tie-breaking, this model satisfies all of the axioms except ACI. In
fact, it satisfies the following weaker version of ACI:
αf + (1− α)g ∈ c(αB + (1− α){g}|ω) ⇐⇒ αf + (1− α)h ∈ c(αB + (1− α){h}|ω)
for a fixed α ∈ (0, 1].21
INRA reflects that the DM’s subjective information is optimal. If her subjective
information cannot be represented as maximizing behavior, then the DM’s choices
violate INRA. For instance, suppose that Equation (1.2.1) holds when a minimum
replaces each maxima and Equation (1.2.2) is satisfied. In this case, the DM’s choices
violate INRA but satisfy the remaining axioms.22
I now turn to Monotonicity, Subjective Consequentialism, and Continuity. If the
utility index depends on the state, then the DM satisfies all axioms except Mono-
tonicity. Fix a set of full support probability measures {piω}ω∈Ω that containing at
21A full characterization of this model is work in progress.
22It is possible that Continuity (ii) is also violated. This is not surprising the interpretation of
Continuity (ii) relies on INRA.
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least two distinct measures. If
c(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpiω,
then the DM violates Subjective Consequentialism but satisfies the other axioms.
The counter-example for Continuity involves lexicographic preferences. I defer it to
Section A.3, which also contains details on the above counter-examples.
1.4 Identification
To interpret a model, it is important to understand how precisely the parameters are
identified, i.e. what are the uniqueness properties of the representation. For instance,
if certain parameters of the representation are not unique, then doing comparative
statics is impossible. How much identification is possible within the current frame-
work, given that the modeler does not directly observe ex ante preference, subjective
information, or capacity for attention and that the DM’s choices violate WARP?
Of the four components that characterize an optimally inattentive agent, Theorem
3 shows that three are suitably unique, and in many cases of interest, all four are
unique.
Before stating Theorem 3, one issue deserves elaboration. In general, many atten-
tion rules represent the same choice correspondence; for instance, if B contains only
constant acts, then Pˆ (B) could be any partition. However, there is a unique canonical
attention rule, given by the coarsest attention rule that represents choice. That is,
Pˆ (·) is canonical if (u(·), pi(·),P∗, Pˆ (·)) represents c(·) and for any (u′(·), pi′(·),P′∗, Qˆ(·))
that also represents c(·), Qˆ(B) Pˆ (B) for every B. The canonical attention rule is
the partition
ˆˆ
P (B) = {{ω′ : c(B|ω′) = c(B|ω)} : ω ∈ Ω}. (1.4.1)
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To interpret this normalization, if paying attention to a finer partition has an arbitrar-
ily small but positive cost, then the DM would always choose a canonical attention
rule – she can make the same conditional choice in every state but avoid paying the
cost. On the one hand, her subjective information may be finer than that given by
her canonical attention rule. That is, she may pay attention to a partition strictly
finer than it but make the same conditional choices on at least two cells. On the other
hand, her subjective information must be at least as fine as it because otherwise, she
does not pay attention to information that distinguishes two state on which she makes
different conditional choices.
Theorem 3. If c(·) is non-degenerate and represented by the optimally inattentive
agents (u1(·), pi1(·),P∗1, Pˆ1(·)) and (u2(·), pi2(·),P∗2, Pˆ2(·)), then:
(i) u1(·) is a positive affine transformation of u2(·),
(ii) there is a partition Q P so that pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E) for any E ∈ Q,
(iii) P∗1 = P∗2, and
(iv) Pˆ1(·) = Pˆ2(·) whenever Pˆ1(·) and Pˆ2(·) are both canonical.
Theorem 3 establishes that an optimally inattentive DM’s utility index, attention
rule and attention constraint are unique. However, her prior probability measure may
not be. Because ex ante preference is unobserved, the DM’s choices only reveal the
likelihood of events that are relevant for choosing either her act or her subjective
information. For this reason, the modeler can uniquely identify the DM’s prior only
up to conditioning on a partition Q, which will be characterized below. Note that
a coarser Q implies more precise identification, in the sense that fewer probability
measures represent choices for given “true” prior beliefs. Since P  Q, the prior of
an optimally inattentive DM is identified at least as precisely as that of a Bayesian
DM.
In many cases, Q = {Ω}, and the prior is uniquely identified. For instance,
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Q = {Ω} whenever P∗ is all partitions coarser than P with at most κ elements and
κ is less than the number of cells in P . One notable case where uniqueness does not
obtain is when the DM is Bayesian; in this case, the coarsest Q is equal to P .
I now turn to characterizing the coarsest Q. This partition is the set of “minimal
isolatable events.” Intuitively, E is an isolatable event if any choice problem can
be partitioned into two distinct problems – one that depends on E and one that
depends on Ec – so that either of the two can be varied without changing the DM’s
conditional choices of acts. The relative likelihood of events contained in different
isolatable events is not relevant for her choices.
To define an isolatable event formally, first let
BE,xB
′ = {fEx : f ∈ B} ∪ {gEcx : g ∈ B′}
for any problems B,B′ and any consequence x. The problem BE,xB′ is formed by
combining the two problems B and B′ into a single problem containing modifications
of the acts in B so they differ from each other only on E and of the acts in B′ so they
differ from each other only on Ec.
Definition 3. E is an isolatable event if for any B so that the right hand side of
Equation (1.2.1) is a singleton and any B′, whenever z /∈ c({g(ω′), z}|ω′) for any
g ∈ B ∪B′ and ω′, both
f ∈ c(B|ω) =⇒ fEz ∈ c(BE,zB′|ω)
for all ω ∈ E and
f ∈ c(B|ω) =⇒ fEcz ∈ c(BEc,zB′|ω)
for all ω ∈ Ec hold.23
23One can define this condition from choices without referring to P∗, but it is simpler to define it
this way.
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That is, whenever z is a bad enough outcome, the modifications of the DM’s
choices from B are still chosen from the problems BE,zB
′ and BEc,zB′, regardless of
the contents of B′. Say that an isolatable event is minimal if it does not contain any
other non-empty isolatable events. Note that Ω is always an isolatable event, but
may not be minimal.
Lemma 1. If Q is the coarsest partition satisfying (ii), then E is a minimal isolatable
event if and only if E ∈ Q.
If the DM is Bayesian, then each E ∈ P is a minimal isolatable event. However in
the introductory example, the only isolatable event is Ω. When the DM is Bayesian,
each element of the objective information is a minimal isolatable event, so it follows
that her prior is only identified up to its conditional probabilities on every element of
P .
1.5 Comparative Attention and the Value of Information
There are two comparatives of interest. The first is to compare two distinct DMs that
have the same information. The second is to compare a single DM with two different
objective information partitions.
Consider DM1 and DM2 with conditional choice correspondences given by c(·)
and c′(·), respectively. Denote by ˆˆPc(B) the canonical subjective information of c(·)
when facing B and by
ˆˆ
Pc′(B) the canonical subjective information of c
′(·) when facing
B using Equation (1.4.1). Note that these are defined from choices alone.
Definition 4. c(·) is more attentive than c′(·) if for any B, there exists a B′ so that
ˆˆ
Pc(B
′) = ˆˆPc′(B).
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To understand this comparison, suppose that the modeler observes that c′(·) pays
attention to Q when facing B, i.e. her canonical subjective information is Q. If c(·)
is more attentive than c′(·), then there is a B′ so that the modeler observes that c(·)
pays attention to Q when facing B′. That is, whenever the modeler observes DM2
using information Q, the modeler also observes DM1 using Q, though possibly when
facing a different choice problem. Theorem 4 shows that this comparison is equivalent
to comparing their attention constraints when both DMs have optimal inattention.
Theorem 4. If c(·) and c′(·) are non-degenerate and have optimal inattention repre-
sentations, parametrized by (uc, pic,P∗c , Pˆc) and (uc′ , pic′ ,P∗c′ , Pˆc′) respectively, then:
c(·) ismore attentive than c′(·) ⇐⇒ P∗c′ ⊂ P∗c .
That is, c(·) is more attentive than c′(·) if and only if her attention constraint is
larger. Note that their representations may have different priors and tastes. There-
fore, P∗ reflects the DM’s capacity for attention: whenever P∗c′ ⊂ P∗c , DM1 has a
higher capacity for attention than DM2.
Another interesting comparative is how a DM reacts to changes in the available
information. Up to now, I have considered a fixed information structure. I modify
the primitives in order to allow the objective information to vary. This generaliza-
tion allows me to consider the value of information to an optimally inattentive DM.
Consider a set of finite partitions, P , that represent the possible objective informa-
tion. Suppose the DM’s choices given objective information P are represented by a
conditional choice correspondence indexed by P ∈ P , i.e. cP : K(F) × Ω → K(F)
where cP (B|ω) ⊂ B and cP (B|·) is P -measurable. I assume throughout that each
cP (·) has an optimal inattention representation parametrized by (u, pi,P∗P , Pˆ (·)). In
Section A.2.3, I provide a sufficient condition for this specification.
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I now consider the value of inattention to an optimally inattentive DM. The typical
formulation (for instance, Blackwell [1953]) says that Q1 is objectively more valuable
than Q2 if the expected utility that a DM can obtain by choosing from any problem B
is higher when she conditions her choices on Q1 than when she conditions her choices
on Q2, regardless of her utility index and prior. To state this formally, define
V (Q,B, u, pi) =
∑
E∈Q
pi(E) max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E)
for every Q ∈ P , problem B, utility index u and probability measure pi. Say that Q1
is objectively more valuable than Q2 if and only if
V (Q1, B, u, pi) ≥ V (Q2, B, u, pi)
for every problem B, utility index u and prior pi.
This definition only makes sense if the DM in the absence of inattention because an
inattentive DM may not be able to condition her choices on the objective information.
Instead, I propose the following alternative: Q1 is subjectively more valuable than Q2
if and only if
max
Q′∈P∗Q1
V (Q′, B, u, pi) ≥ max
Q′∈P∗Q2
V (Q′, B, u, pi)
for every problem B, utility index u and prior pi. A key difference between the two
notions is that whether Q1 is subjectively more valuable than Q2 depends on the DM
under consideration – DM1 may regard Q1 as subjectively more valuable than Q2
while DM2 reverses the ranking.
Theorem 5 relates this comparison to comparative capacity for attention. Note
that “more attentive than” is defined for a fixed information structure, but can be
easily adapted to our present context where the information structure varies. I omit
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a formal restatement.
Theorem 5. For any Q1, Q2 ∈ P, Q1 is subjectively more valuable than Q2 if and
only if cQ1(·) is more attentive than cQ2(·).
One case where objectively and subjectively more valuable agree is if the DM is
Bayesian. Another case where the equivalence between (i) and (iii) holds is if
P∗P = {Q′  P : Q′ has atmost κ elements}
for every P ∈ P . In general, however, the equivalence fails.24 This accords with
some real-life evidence on information overload. For instance, when choosing between
health care plans, DMs may become overwhelmed by the sheer amount of information
available and make decisions based on less information as more is provided. The
contrast between objective and subjective valuation of information is one step towards
analyzing information overload.25
1.6 Application: Markets with Optimally Inattentive Con-
sumers
This section argues that inattention may increase competition among firms and ben-
efit consumers. I use a simple model to show that, in equilibrium, more attentive
consumers may have less expected consumer surplus. The key idea is that in order
for firms that produce differentiated products to exploit their market power, con-
sumers must pay attention to the differences between the products. If consumers are
optimally inattentive, then firms must compete with each other for attention, even
24Suppose that Ω = {a, b, c, d}, P = {{a, b}, {c, d}}, Q = {{a}, {b}, {c}, {d}} and P∗Q′ = {{E,Ec} :
E ∈ Q} for Q′ ∈ {P,Q}. Then for B = {(100, 100,−100,−100), (−100,−100, 100, 100)}, facing P
yields a higher ex ante expected utility than facing Q.
25Further work along this line is in progress.
29
if their products would not compete given that consumers were Bayesian. This re-
sult contrasts with several papers demonstrating that firms benefit when consumers
exhibit inattention; for instance, Rubinstein [1993].
To illustrate the model, I return to the example in Section 1.2, but suppose now
that the drugs are non-prescription, the patient must pay out of pocket, and the
patient has access to the same information that the doctor did. The patient purchases
at most one of the drugs and observes the price of all three drugs before deciding which
to purchase. If she processes all available information and the three firms compete by
setting prices, then each firm picks a price that extracts her entire surplus whenever
its drug is most effective.26 In contrast, if the patient cannot process all of her
information and is optimally inattentive, then consumer surplus must be positive in
equilibrium. To see this, suppose that one firm sets a price that would extract all
surplus. The patient has no incentive to pay attention to information revealing if
that firm’s drug is effective. Consequently, to induce the patient to pay attention
to information about its drug’s effectiveness, each firm must set a price that gives
positive consumer surplus.
1.6.1 Model
There are n risk-neutral firms. Each costlessly produce one of m ≥ 3 distinct, non-
divisible goods. A market φ is an element of {1, ...,m}n with the interpretation that
firm i produces product φi. Let nµ(φ) be the number of firms who have a monopoly
on producing a good of a given type, and nc(φ) be the number of goods produced
competitively, i.e. by at least two firms. All consumers and firms know the type of
product that each firm produces.
26Similarly, if the consumer has fixed attention, then any firm whose information she distinguishes
can extract all surplus.
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A risk-neutral consumer purchases at most one unit of the good. The state space
is Ω = {1, ...,m}, and the consumer values a good at 1 if its type matches the state
and otherwise values it at 0. She initially assigns equal probability to each state
and has access to information that reveals the state of the world perfectly, i.e. her
objective information is P = {{ω} : ω ∈ Ω}. She has optimal inattention with an
attention constraint parametrized by κ where
P∗ = {Q P : #Q ≤ κ}.
The timing of the game is as follows. First, the state of the world is determined.
Then, firms simultaneously choose a price without observing the state. Next, each
consumer observes the price. Finally, each consumer chooses her subjective informa-
tion, observes its realization, and purchases from one of the firms.
Let φi(q) be the act of buying from firm i in market φ at price q, so that
u(φi(q))(ω) =

1− q if ω = φi
−q otherwise
.
A pair (φ, p), where φ is a market and p ∈ Rn+ is a price vector, corresponds to the
problem {φi(pi) : i ≤ n} ∪ {∅}, where ∅ is not buying from any firm. An equilibrium
for a given market φ is a price vector p ∈ Rn+ so that each firm j in φ maximizes
expected profit given p−j and the choices of the consumer.
1.6.2 Equilibrium
In any equilibrium where there are more products available than the consumer has the
capacity to differentiate between, i.e. attention is scarce, then the effective equilibrium
price is zero.
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Proposition 2. For any market φ, if p is an equilibrium for φ and the consumer
purchases from firm j, then nc(φ)+nµ(φ) > κ implies that pj = 0, and nc(φ)+nµ(φ) ≤
κ implies that for any j, either pj = 1 or pj = 0, where pj = 1 if and only if j has a
monopoly.
To illustrate, consider first the case where there are n = 6 firms, m = 3 products
and the market is φ = (1, 2, 3, 1, 2, 3). Two firms produce each type of product. If
κ = 3, then the consumer is Bayesian and a firm makes a sale only if the product
it produces matches the state of the world. Since consumers know the state of the
world, in every state j, the two firms of type j play the Bertrand duopoly game with
marginal cost equal to zero. Consequently, the only equilibrium is p = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0).
Consider the same market where κ = 2. The same price vector is an equilibrium,
but the consumer behaves differently. The consumer pays attention to {{j}, {j}c} for
some j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, and in state j, she is indifferent between purchasing from either of
the two firms with type j; in any other state, she is indifferent between purchasing
from any of the four remaining firms. WLOG, assume that the consumer’s subjective
information is {{1}, {2, 3}}.
Now, suppose firms 5 and 6 exit the market, so there are n′ = 4 firms and the
market is φ′ = (1, 2, 3, 1). If κ = 3, then firms 2 and 3 have monopolies on producing
goods of type 2 and 3, respectively, so both these firms charge 1. In contrast, firms
1 and 4 both produce good 1, so they compete as a Bertrand duopoly. The unique
equilibrium price vector is (0, 1, 1, 0), and consumers get expected consumer surplus
equal to 1
3
.
But if κ = 2, then an equilibrium price vector is (0, 0, 0, 0). Firms 1 and 4
compete as a duopoly; if either charged a positive price and made a sale, the other
could undercut the price and make a larger profit. Since firm 1 sets a price equal
to zero, the consumer must decide whether to pay attention to information that
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distinguishes either state 2 or state 3. To attract the customer, firms 2 and 3 must
offer the consumer surplus conditional on paying attention to the information that
reveals whether their product is optimal. Again, if either charged a positive price
and made a sale, the other makes zero profit. The firm without a sale could undercut
the other’s price, causing the consumer to pay attention to different information and
make a sale.27
Though the above equilibrium is not unique, in any equilibrium to the game, no
firm that charges a positive price makes a sale with positive probability in equilibrium.
Intuitively, if two firms share a type, and the first charges a positive price and makes
a sale with positive probability, then the second can undercut its price to capture
the whole market. Competition between the two firms drives the price to zero. If no
other firm shares a type with a firm that charges a positive price, then the consumer
does not pay attention to information about that firm’s product. Consequently, if
any firm charges a positive price, then no consumer purchases from it.
For a given market φ and price vector p, expected consumer surplus weakly in-
creases with κ. However, equilibrium consumer surplus is non-monotonic in κ for the
27This can also be seen using Monotonicity and INRA. Define B(p2, p3) = (φ, (0, p2, p3, 0, 0, 0)) and
B′(p2, p3) = (φ′, (0, p2, p3, 0)) for p2, p3 ≥ 0. Identify B′(p2, p3) as the natural subset of B(p2, p3),
i.e. φ′i(p) is φi(p) for i ≤ 4. Suppose p3 = 0 and that p2 > 0. Because φ5(0) dominates φ2(p2),
c(B(p2, p3)|ω) = c(B(0, p3)|ω)\{φ2(p2)}
for every ω ∈ Ω by Monotonicity and INRA. Since
c(B(p2, p3)|ω) ∩B′(p2, p3) 6= ∅
for every ω ∈ Ω, INRA implies that
φ2(p2) /∈ c(B′(p2, p3)|ω)
for every ω. Consequently, firm 2 is indifferent between charging 0 and any other price. Repeating
the above arguments but swapping p3 with p2 and firm 2 with firm 3 shows that the same holds
for firm 3, so (0, 0, 0, 0) is an equilibrium. In this equilibrium, the expected consumer surplus is 23 ,
larger than with κ = 3.
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Figure 1.6.1: Expected Consumer Surplus with n = m = 5 and
nc(φ) = 0
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above market – it is maximized at κ = 2. Proposition 3 characterizes equilibrium
consumer surplus for any market.
Proposition 3. In any equilibrium for φ, expected total surplus is equal to
1
m
min(nµ(φ) + nc(φ), κ),
and expected consumer surplus equals 1
m
κ if κ < nµ(φ) + nc(φ) or
1
m
nc(φ) if κ ≥
nµ(φ) + nc(φ).
Figure 1.6.1 illustrates Proposition 3 graphically. In a market with five firms that
each produce different products, expected consumer surplus is maximized at κ = 4
and minimized at κ = 5. Similarly, expected profit is maximized when κ = 5 and
equals 0 for any other value of κ. Proposition 3 shows that this non-monotonicity
occurs whenever nc(φ) < κ.
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1.7 Conclusion
In this paper, I have axiomatically characterized the properties of conditional choices
that are necessary and sufficient for the DM to act as if she has optimal inatten-
tion. These axioms provide a choice-theoretic justification for the theory that agents
respond to their limited attention optimally. The optimal inattention model is a ver-
satile model with interesting implications: Dow [1991], Rubinstein [1993], and Gul
et al. [2011] all consider consumers who conform exactly to the optimal inattention
model.
Related papers by de Olivera [2012] and Mihm and Ozbek [2012] study rational
inattention as revealed by a DM’s ex ante preference over menus of acts.28 Their
representation of preference is similar to my own, but the primitives are very different.
The DM chooses a menu in the anticipation that she will receive information and can
choose what information to process at some cost.
Caplin and Martin [2012] study a related model, optimal framing. If frames are
interpreted as states, then their analysis can be interpreted similarly to mine. Our
papers are complementary, as their framework is designed for testing in the laboratory
but does not achieve as precise identification. Moreover, Caplin and Martin relate
choices to one another only through the existence of a utility function that solves a
system of inequalities. In contrast to this paper, their primitive is stochastic choice,
and their DM’s prior is known to the modeler.
By way of conclusion, I compare the optimal inattention model with some other
models of inattention that have been considered by the literature. The most promi-
nent example is the rational inattention model, due to Sims [1998, 2003]. In this
model, the constraint on attention takes the form of restricting the mutual infor-
28Ergin and Sarver [2010] can also be interpreted in this way, but it is not their focus.
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mation, i.e. the reduction in entropy, between actions and the state of the world.
This constraint implies that conditional choices are stochastic.29 One interpretation
is that the agent has access to arbitrarily precise, and arbitrarily imprecise, signals
about the state of the world, but the modeler does not observe the realization of
this information. Another, offered by Woodford [2012], is that the agent’s percep-
tion of information is stochastic. Both these interpretations are outside the scope
of my model: the objective information is known, and the agent’s perceptions are
deterministic.
Mankiw and Reis [2002] introduce the sticky information model. It postulates
that agents update their information infrequently, and when they update, they obtain
perfect information. The key difference between this model in a static setting and
optimal inattention is that agents do not choose the information to which they pay
attention.30
29Recently, Matejka and McKay [2012] have studied this model’s implications in the context of
discrete choices. Their focus is on solving the model in a discrete setting, and in the course of
analysis, they provide testable implications in terms of choices from a suitably rich feasible set
of actions. A full behavioral characterization of the model, even in this setting, remains an open
question.
30The subjective learning literature, e.g. Dillenberger et al. [2012] and Natenzon [2012], studies
an agent who has or anticipates receiving information (which is unobserved to the modeler) before
making her choice. Though they do not focus on interpreting this behavior as inattention, these
models have the same relationship to mine as does Mankiw and Reis [2002].
Chapter 2
Advertising and Inattention
2.1 Introduction
Introspection suggests, and psychologists have confirmed, that individuals often fail
to pay attention to all available information. This paper explores how consumer
inattention affects market outcomes and studies the effect of advertising that in-
creases consumer capacity for attention. I analyze a market with consumers who
easily observe prices but may fail to pay attention to match-specific quality informa-
tion. Advertisements make it easier for consumers to pay attention to information
about match quality. Each individual firm has an incentive to advertise because an
increase in consumer capacity for attention has two effects, both of which increase
profit. First, it increases the probability that a consumer knows that its good matches
her preferences, increasing the chance of a sale. Second, it decreases the elasticity
of substitution between the different products, so the firm can charge a higher price.
Consequently, inattention leads to lower firm profits but may increase consumer sur-
plus in the absence of advertising.31
Firms often benefit from providing information to consumers, e.g. Lewis and
Sappington [1994]. However, if all firms provide information and consumers have a
31Most previous work focuses on cases where limitations on consumer information processing have
the opposite effects. For instance, Rubinstein [1993], Piccione and Rubinstein [2003] and Spiegler
[2006] provide situations where similar limitations either benefit firms or harm consumers.
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limited capacity to pay attention, then the volume of available information can over-
whelm their ability to process it, depriving firms of these benefits. Advertisements
may increase consumer capacity for attention through several mechanisms. First,
advertisements may change the presentation of the available information. Second,
advertising may divert the consumer’s capacity from other industries. Third, adver-
tisements make the consumer aware of information available elsewhere. Note that the
latter two mechanisms do not require that the ads themselves contain much, or any,
information.
US advertising revenues reached $144 billion in 2011,32 and the literature study-
ing it has documented several effects that existing models struggle to explain with
a single mechanism.33 I show that the model of advertising studied herein generates
the following effects holistically. First, advertising has a positive effect on price (e.g.
Tremblay and Tremblay [1995] for US brewery industry). Second, advertising in-
creases industry-level demand (e.g. Fischer and Albers [2010] for direct-to-consumer
advertising in the US pharmaceutical industry). Third, advertising can have posi-
tive spillover effects (e.g. Kwoka [1993] for the US automobile industry). Fourth, if
prices are sufficiently low, advertising can decrease the likelihood that a given con-
sumer purchases from the advertiser (e.g. Anand and Shachar [2011] for US television
programming).
Moreover, this theory of advertising has desirable features independent of the
model. First, the theory is explicitly based on the idea that agents are boundedly
rational. Bounded rationality is particularly appealing when considering advertising,
which “is one of the topics in the study of industrial organization for which the tradi-
32Source: Kantar Media Reports (http://kantarmediana.com/intelligence/press/us-advertising-
expenditures-increased-08-percent-2011)
33It should be noted that advertising has different effects in different industries.
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tional assumptions (especially those with regard to consumer behavior) are strained
most” (Tirole [1988, p115]). Second, it applies to experience goods, i.e. goods whose
value can be learned precisely only after purchase. According to the Nielsen Com-
pany, the automotive and pharmaceutical industries, which both produce experience
goods, ranked first and third by advertising expenditure among all US industries in
2009.34 Third, repeat purchase does not play any role in the model. Repeat purchase
is unlikely for many experience goods, such as automobiles, pharmaceuticals, or com-
puters, but is a key ingredient in models of advertising as a signal, e.g. Nelson [1974]
or Milgrom and Roberts [1986]. Fourth, advertising need not contain much, or any,
information to be effective. Abernethy and Franke [1996] provide a meta-analysis re-
vealing that 29% of television ads contain no informational cues and that more than
65% contain one or fewer informational cues.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2.2 introduces the model
formally. To avoid Bertrand paradox-like results, I consider a variant of the spatial
competition model introduced by Salop [1979]: firms and consumers are located on
a circular product space. In addition to their different locations, each firm’s product
may be either a high- or a low-quality match for any given consumer. Consumers
easily observe the price and location of each firm but must process information to learn
match quality. Each is optimally inattentive (as in Rubinstein [1993] or Ellis [2012]),
i.e. chooses the information that she processes to maximize ex ante expected utility.
A consumer who sees an ad from a given firm can pay attention to information that
reveals if that firm’s product is valuable “for free.” She still must process information
about the quality of other firms, but she can devote the same capacity as before to a
smaller number of firms. Consequently, advertising increases a consumer’s capacity
34Source: http://smallbusiness.chron.com/industry-spends-advertising-22512.html
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Figure 2.2.1: Setup with n = 5 firms
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for attention.
Section 2.3 describes an inattentive consumer’s purchasing behavior and derives
the demand curve. I demonstrate that advertising in the model can have the effects
on demand described above. Section 2.4 analyzes the equilibrium of the model in
the absence of advertising as a baseline. Price, profit, and total surplus increase
with the consumer’s capacity for attention. Section 2.5 analyzes the full version of
the model. Price increases with advertising. Both equilibrium price and equilibrium
advertising increase as advertising costs decline, but equilibrium profit may either
increase or decrease. Advertising is typically under-provided relative to the socially
optimal level. Section 6 discusses alternate models of advertising and which effects
and implications they deliver.
2.2 The Model
Firms, production and the product space
The product space is a circle of circumference 1. There are n firms located at equally
spaced points along the circle. I assume n ≥ 3 throughout. Let lj be the location of
firm j. Each firm produces a distinct product at constant marginal cost c.
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Consumers
A unit mass of consumers is distributed uniformly along this circle. Identify consumer
i with the consumer located at the point i on the circle. Each consumer wishes to
purchase at most one unit of the good from some firm. To travel to the firm, she
incurs a cost equal to t > 0 times the distance traveled.35
The gross value that a consumer gets from purchasing a good depends on the
quality of the match between the good and the consumer, which may be either high
or low. The state space is ×i∈[0,1]Ω where Ω = {H,L}n and ωij = H if and only if firm
j produces a high quality match for consumer i. For any i and j, the probability that
ωij = H is q, which is independent of the probability that ω
i
j′ = H for all j
′ 6= j and
any i. If state ωij = H, then consumer i values the good produced by firm j at v > c
and otherwise values it at b < c. She may also opt not to purchase any goods. If
she does so, then she receives utility 0. Denote the probability that ωi = ω by ρ(ω),
noting this does not depend on i. If consumer i purchases from firm j at price pj,
then she gets utility
ui =

v − t|lj − i| − pj if ωij = H
b− t|lj − i| − pj if ωij = L
where |lj − i| is the arc distance between lj and i, i.e. it takes into account that
distance “wraps” around the circle. Throughout, I write ωj for ω
i
j when it will not
35I use the analogy of spatial competition throughout, but the product space need only reflect
some easily observed characteristic with idiosyncratic valuations, such as name, color, or size. Many
of my results require some form of easily observable horizontal differentiation because it smooths
consumer responsiveness to changes in price. Without it, no non-trivial pure-strategy equilibrium
exists. The choice of a circular product space with linear transportation costs is not crucial. It makes
the model tractable and symmetric as well as allowing for relatively simple closed form solutions, but
the results continue to hold (with different functional forms) if one assumes other forms of horizontal
differentiation, e.g. Perloff and Salop [1985].
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cause confusion.
Information and inattention
Each consumer observes the price each firm sets and knows the location of the firm.
Moreover, each has access to information that reveals the state of the world perfectly.
If she processes all available information, then she knows exactly which firms are
a high quality match and which are a low quality match. However, she may not
pay attention to all available information. I assume that each consumer’s constraint
allows her to pay attention to information revealing the quality of the match for
at most κ firms and that each chooses to which she pays attention optimally. She
observes all firms’ prices before she observes quality information, so the information
to which she pays attention varies with the prices. In other words, if the price
vector is p, then she pays attention to the information that maximizes her ex ante
expected consumer surplus given these prices. Following the terminology in Ellis
[2012], each consumer has optimal inattention and the information that she processes
is her subjective information.
Advertising technology
Receiving an ad from firm j allows the consumer to process information about the
quality of firm j without affecting her ability to process information about the other
firms. That is, if she sees an ad from only firm j, then she can pay attention to
information that reveals the quality of any κ+ 1 firms as long as at least one of these
firms is j. More generally, if consumer i sees ads from the m firms in the set Ai, then
she can pay attention to information revealing the quality of κ + m firms, provided
that at least m of these firms are in Ai. This increases her capacity for attention,
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necessarily increasing her consumer surplus.36
The advertising technology is similar to that in Grossman and Shapiro [1984].37
Each firm selects a level of advertising, φ, between 0 and 1. If firm j selects advertising
level φj, then a measure φj of the population of consumers receives an advertisement
from firm j, and it incurs a cost A(φj). Ads cannot be targeted at a specific subset
of consumers: all potential customers, regardless of their location on the circle, are
equally likely to receive an ad from a given firm. The probability that consumer i
sees an ad from firm j is independent of the probability that she sees an ad from
firm j′ 6= j. I assume that A′(0) ≥ 0, A′(φ) > 0 for all φ > 0, A′′(φ) > 0 for all
φ, and A(0) = 0. Examples of advertising cost functions include A(φ) = aφ2 and
A(φ) = −a log(1− φ).
Timing
The timing of the game is as follows.
1. Firms simultaneously choose an advertising level φj and a price pj.
2. A fraction φj of consumers receive an ad from firm j.
3. Each consumer observes these prices and chooses her subjective information
partition.
4. Each consumer observes the realized cell of her subjective information partition
and purchases from at most one firm.
36Some readers may be troubled that the effect of advertising is too extreme. I do not mean for
this to be taken as a literal description of the effect of advertising. Seeing an advertisement from
firm j reduces the psychological cost of paying attention to information about j. The extreme nature
of the reduction in cost simplifies the analysis and makes the model tractable.
37The examples of advertising technologies provided in that paper also work for this paper. Note
that advertising has a very different effect on consumer behavior in this paper than in theirs.
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Solution concept
I focus on a symmetric, pure strategy Nash equilibrium in prices and advertising.
Each firm chooses its price and advertising level to maximize profits, given that
every other firm prices at p∗ and advertises at φ∗. If firm j sets price p, then net
revenue equals the measure of consumers who buy from it multiplied by p− c. Profit
equals net revenue minus advertising cost. Given a vector of prices and a set of
firms from which a given consumer has seen advertisements, each firm knows from
which of them she will purchase, conditional on the state of the world. Because
there are a continuum of consumers and both match quality and advertisements are
independently and identically distributed, profit is deterministic.
2.3 Consumer Behavior and Firm Demand
2.3.1 Consumer Behavior
For this section, I fix firm behavior and consider the purchasing behavior of a given
consumer, labeled i. Consumer i faces two decisions: to what information should she
pay attention and from which firm (if any) should she purchase? In what follows, it
will be helpful to denote by
pˆj(i) = pj + t|i− lj|
the effective price that i pays if she buys from firm j. I will also assume that no firm
plays an strictly dominated strategy, i.e. pj ≥ c for all j and that each pˆj(i) ≤ v for
every i.38 For any price vector, the set of consumers for which at least two effective
prices are equal is measure zero, so I focus only on the case where each effective price
38This holds for all consumers if and only if pj ≤ v − t2 for every j. Consumer i never purchases
from firm j if pˆj(i) > v. Therefore, if m firms have pˆj(i) > v, then all the analysis below goes
through with n∗ = n−m replacing n and adding the qualifier “with effective price less than v” after
each instance of “firm”.
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is distinct.
Conditional on the information to which she pays attention, the purchasing de-
cision of consumer i is simple. She never purchases from a firm that she knows to
be a low quality match. If there is at least one firm known to be a high equality
match, then label the one with the lowest effective price as h, and if there is at
least one firm of unknown match quality, then label the one with the lowest effective
price as u. Purchasing from firm h (respectively, u) yields strictly higher utility than
purchasing from any other firm known to be a high quality match (resp. firm with
unknown match quality). If there are no firms of unknown quality and at least one
firm known to be high quality, then the consumer purchases from firm h. If there are
no firms known to be high quality, there is at least one firm of unknown quality, and
qv − (1 − q)b > pˆu(i), then the consumer purchases from firm u. If there is at least
one firm of unknown quality and at least one firm known to be high quality, then the
consumer purchases from firm h if
v − pˆh(i) ≥ qv + (1− q)b− pˆu(i)
and otherwise purchases from u.
The consumer always pays attention to information that reveals the quality of the
firms from which she receives advertisements. The utility from purchasing from firm
j only when she knows it is high quality is
q[v − pˆj(i)] + (1− q)0.
This is strictly greater than either the utility of purchasing a good of unknown quality,
qv + (1− q)b− pˆj(i),
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or the utility not purchasing anything, 0. Consequently, consumer i gains by paying
attention to information that reveals the match-quality of j whenever it does not
consumer capacity to do so.
Consider her choice of to which of the remaining firms’ quality she pays attention.
If she sees more than n−κ ads, then she pays attention to all of their qualities. If she
sees less than n− κ ads, then the optimal subjective information partition takes one
of two forms. Either the information to which she pays attention reveals the quality
of the κ remaining firms with the lowest effective prices, or it reveals the quality of
the κ remaining firms whose effective prices rank between the second and κ+1 lowest
from which she saw no ads.
It is typically optimal to choose the former subjective information.39 If none of
the firms are high quality (which occurs with probability 1− (1− q)κ+m if she sees m
ads), then she purchases from firm u if qv + (1− q)b > pˆu(i) and makes no purchase
otherwise. Assuming that she sees no ads and that the firms are labeled so that
pˆj(i) < pˆj′(i) if and only if j < j
′, if the consumer pays attention to the information
partition above, then the consumer’s expected utility is
(1− (1− q)κ)v −
κ∑
j=1
(1− q)i−1qpˆj(i) (2.3.1)
if qv + (1− q)b < pˆκ+1(i) and is
(1− (1− q)κ)v −
κ∑
j=1
(1− q)i−1qpˆj(i) + (1− q)κ[qv + (1− q)b− pˆκ] (2.3.2)
otherwise.
With sufficiently low effective prices, a sufficiently low probability of a good match,
39In fact, I will impose an assumption from the following section onward that implies this will be
the case.
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and a sufficiently high benefit of purchasing a good match, the consumer may find
the latter subjective information optimal. In this case, if none of the firms are high
quality (which occurs with probability 1 − (1 − q)κ+m if she sees m ads), then she
purchases from the firm with the lowest effective price. Her ex ante expected utility
is
(1− (1− q)κ)v −
κ+1∑
j=2
(1− q)i−1qpˆj(i) + (1− q)κ[qv + (1− q)b− pˆ1]. (2.3.3)
Two necessary (but not sufficient) conditions for optimality of this subjective infor-
mation are that pˆκ+1 < qv + (1− q)b and (1− q)κ > q.
If the consumer finds the latter subjective information to be optimal, then the
consumer is more likely to purchase from firm 1 if she has not seen an ad from it,
(probability (1 − q)κ) than if she has seen one ad (probability q). Consequently,
seeing an advertisement can actually decrease the probability that a consumer pur-
chases from the advertising firm. Anand and Shachar [2011] document this effect for
television program advertising. Conditional on viewing an advertisement for a given
program, the probability of a given consumer watching it increases if it is a good
match and decreases if it is a bad match.
2.3.2 Firm Demand
For simplicity, I make the following assumption for the remainder of the paper.
Assumption. qv + (1− q)b < c
That is, the expected gross benefit of purchasing from a firm of uncertain quality
is less than the marginal cost of production. It implies that whenever a firm plays
an undominated strategy, the consumer does not wish to purchase a good unless she
paid attention to information that revealed it is a high quality match. This greatly
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simplifies the number of cases one must consider when deriving the firm’s demand
curve: all consumers pay attention to the information that reveals the quality of
the κ firms with the lowest effective prices. The substance of the results does not
change substantially without the assumption but it greatly simplifies the statement
and interpretation of the results.
I now turn to deriving the firm’s demand curve with fixed and symmetric levels of
the advertising set by other firms. Let f(r;φ, n) =
(
n
r
)
φr(1− φ)n−r and F (r; p, n) =∑r
i=0
(
n
i
)
φi(1 − φ)n−i be the be the probability mass function and the cumulative
distribution function, respectively, of the Binomial distribution with n trials at success
probability φ.
Lemma 2. If every other firm prices at p¯ ≤ v − t
2
and selects advertising level φ¯,
then the demand of firm j when it sets price p (which is suitably close to p¯ and less
than or equal to v − t
2
) and advertises at φ is
D(p, φ; p¯, φ¯) = φδI(φ¯) + (1− φ)δU(φ¯) + p¯− p
t
[φ∆I(φ¯) + (1− φ)∆U(φ¯)], (2.3.4)
where:
δI(φ¯) > δU(φ¯) and ∆I(φ¯) < ∆U(φ¯).
See Section B.1.1 for a precise statement of the demand function and derivation.
To understand why Lemma 2 holds, it will be helpful to again denote the effective
price that consumer i pays if she buys from firm j by pˆj(i) = pj + t|i− lj|. Fix a price
vector p and a firm j. Divide the consumers up into n groups, where a consumer in
group l ranks the effective price of firm j as the lth lowest. Let Nl be the measure of
consumers in group l.
First, consider consumer i′ in group l where l ≤ κ. There are l − 1 firms with
effective prices lower than l, Firm j is a high quality match with probability q, and
each of these l − 1 firms is a low quality match with probability (1 − q)l−1. Conse-
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quently, firm j has the lowest effective price of all the firms she knows has a high
quality match with probability
(1− q)l−1q,
regardless of the ads she sees. Therefore, she buys from firm j with probability
(1− q)l−1q.
Next, consider consumer i′ in group l where κ < l who does not see an ad from
firm j. She buys from firm j if she sees more than n − κ total ads with probability
(1 − q)l−1q. She also buys from firm j if she sees z < n − κ total ads, i ≥ l − κ of
which are from firms that have lower effective prices, with probability (1 − q)l−1q.
Consequently, she sells to consumer i′ with probability
[1− F (n− κ− 1; φ¯, n− 1)](1− q)l−1q
+
n−κ−1∑
z=l−κ
z∑
i=l−κ
(
n− l
z − i
)(
l − 1
i
)
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z(1− q)l−1q.
Finally, consider consumer i′ in group l where κ < l who does see an ad from
firm j. She buys from firm j if she sees more than n − κ total ads (n − κ − 1 ads
from its competitors) with probability (1 − q)l−1q. She also buys from firm j with
probability (1− q)κ+iq if she sees z < n− κ total ads, i of which are from firms that
have lower effective prices. Finally, she buys from j with probability (1− q)l−1q if she
sees z < n−κ total ads, at least l−κ of which are from firms that have lower effective
prices. These events are mutually exclusive. Consequently, she sells to consumer i′
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with probability
[1− F (n− κ− 2; φ¯, n− 1)](1− q)l−1q
+
n−κ−2∑
z=0
l−κ−1∑
i=0
(
n− l
z − i
)(
l − 1
i
)
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z(1− q)κ+iq
+
n−κ−2∑
z=0
z∑
i=l−κ
(
n− l
z − i
)(
l − 1
i
)
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z(1− q)l−1q.
If each firm sets the same price p¯, then N1 = N2 = ... = Nn =
1
n
. The above cases
imply that probability of a consumer in group Nl buying from j if she sees and ad
from j is larger than if she does not. Consequently, δI(φ¯) > δU(φ¯).
Grossman and Shapiro [1984] show that when firm j increases (resp. decreases)
its price by a small amount, N1 decreases (increases) and Nn increases (decreases) by
the same amount. A consumer in group n buys from j with probability
q(1− q)n−1(1− F (n− κ− 1, φ¯, n− 1)
if she does not see an ad from j and with probability
q(1− q)n−1(1− F (n− κ− 2; φ¯, n− 1)) +
n−κ−2∑
i=0
f(i; φ¯, n− 1)(1− q)κ+iq
if she does. Since the latter is larger than the former and firm j sells to a consumer
in group 1 with probability q regardless of whether the consumer sees an ad from j,
the change demand for good j if j changes its price is larger among those who see an
ad from j, so ∆I(φ¯) < ∆U(φ¯).
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2.3.3 Spillover
Empirical and theoretical work on advertising has shown that advertising may have
a primary demand effect, i.e. increases industry-level demand, and may have positive
spillover effects, i.e. increases rather than decreases the demand for competing prod-
ucts. This section shows that advertising for attention can have both these effects.
An increase in advertising by firm j can increase the demand of firm j′, holding prices
and other firms’ advertising levels constant, provided that initial advertising levels
are not too high.
Many papers provide evidence of a positive effect of advertising on industry-level
demand, e.g. Cowling et al. [1975] for cigarettes in the UK, Seldon and Dorood-
ian [1989] for cigarettes in the US, or Nerlove and Waugh [1961] for oranges in the
US. Moreover, several other theoretical models of advertising assume spillover, e.g.
Examples 1, 2, and 4 in Ellison and Ellison [2011], without specifying why or how
spillover occurs. Inattentive advertising provides micro-foundations for the spillover
effect. Several papers document positive spillover empirically, e.g. Kwoka [1993]
for automobiles in the US, Wosinska [2005] for direct-to-consumer advertising of US
cholesterol drugs, and Kadiyali [1996] for the photographic film in the US.
I now demonstrate that these effect occur naturally in the model. Suppose that
n = 3, κ = 1, every firm advertises with intensity φ, and all firms set the same price
p < v− t
2
. What happens to the demand of firm 2 when firm 1 increases its advertising
level by ?
Consider the demand for firm 2 when firms 2 and 3 advertise at φ and firm 1
advertises at φ + . The probability of seeing ads from a given subset of firms and
demand for firm 2 in that instance is given by Table 2.1, where Nl is the measure of
consumers who rank the effective price of firm 2 the lth lowest. When each firm sets
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Table 2.1: Demand for firm 2
ads seen probability demand for firm 2
none (1− φ− )(1− φ)2 N1q
only 1 (φ+ )(1− φ)2 N1q + 12N2q(1− q)
only 2 (1− φ− )(1− φ)φ N1q +N2q(1− q) +N3q(1− q)
only 3 (1− φ− )(1− φ)φ N1q + 12N2q(1− q)
both 1 and 2 (φ+ )φ(1− φ) N1q +N2q(1− q) +N3q(1− q)2
both 1 and 3 (φ+ )φ(1− φ) N1q +N2q(1− q) +N3q(1− q)2
both 2 and 3 (1− φ− )φ2 N1q +N2q(1− q) +N3q(1− q)2
all three (φ+ )φ2 N1q +N2q(1− q) +N3q(1− q)2
the same price, N1 = N2 = N3 =
1
3
. Consequently, the derivative of the demand of
firm 2 with respect to  evaluated and  = 0 is
(1− φ)2[1
6
q(1− q)] + φ(1− φ)[1
3
q(1− q)2 − 1
6
q(1− q)].
This is positive if and only if 1−φ
φ
> 2q−1. Therefore, more advertising by firm 1 can
lead to higher demand for firm 2.
Moreover, firms 2 and 3 are symmetric, so the demand for firm 3 increases. Ad-
vertising always increases the demand of firm 1 (given the assumption on v, b, and c).
Therefore, every firm in the market has increased demand. Conclude that advertising
has a primary demand effect.
2.4 Baseline: No Advertising
For this section, I assume that firms cannot advertise, i.e. A(0) = 0 and A(φ) = ∞
for all φ > 0. Therefore, in any equilibrium, φ¯ and φ must both equal 0.
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2.4.1 Equilibrium
At φ¯ and φ equal to 0, the firm’s demand function becomes
D(p, p¯) =

(1−(1−q)κ)
n
+ q p¯−p
t
if κ < n
(1−(1−q)n)
n
+ q(1− (1− q)n−1) p¯−p
t
if κ ≥ n
. (2.4.1)
The first order necessary condition for an optimal price is that
p =

p¯+c
2
+ t (1−(1−q)
κ)
2nq
if κ < n
p¯+c
2
+ t (1−(1−q)
n)
2nq(1−(1−q)n−1) if κ ≥ n
.
This allows us to provide necessary conditions for an equilibrium.
Proposition 4. If κ ≥ n and p∗ < v − t
2
is an equilibrium, then
p∗ = t
1− (1− q)n
nq(1− (1− q)n−1) + c. (2.4.2)
If κ < n and p∗ < v − t
2
is an equilibrium, then
p∗ = t
1− (1− q)κ
nq
+ c. (2.4.3)
Remark 1. This proposition, and many that follow, are stated as necessary conditions
for equilibrium. For t large enough, such an equilibrium exists. Otherwise, only mixed
strategy equilibria may exist. For instance if t = 0, then an equilibrium exists. This
equilibrium involves pricing at cost when κ < n and playing a mixed strategy when
κ ≥ n. Details available upon request.
2.4.2 Comparative Statics
I consider comparative statics on the endogenous variables, equilibrium price (p∗) and
profit (pi∗).
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Proposition 5. If p∗ is an equilibrium with p∗ < v − t
2
and κ < n, then:
(i) As κ increases, pi∗ and p∗ both increase.
(ii) As q increases, p∗ decreases while pi∗ increases if q < q∗ but decreases if q > q∗,
where
1− (1− q∗)κ
(1− q∗)κ−1q∗ = 2κ.
(iii) As n increases, pi∗and p∗ both decrease.
(iv) As t increases, p∗ and pi∗ both increase.
The first comparative static is the most important. Namely, both equilibrium price
and profit increase with the consumer’s capacity for attention. There is typically a
very large increase from κ = n − 1 to κ = n. The remaining comparatives are
standard.
2.4.3 Welfare Analysis
An increase in capacity for attention increases both the probability that any given
consumer purchases the good and the equilibrium price. Consequently, profit in-
creases. However, the two effects move consumer surplus in opposite directions: the
former increases it while the latter effect decreases it. Consequently, the effect on
consumer surplus is ambiguous.
Proposition 6. If κ < n and p∗ ≤ v − t
2
is an equilibrium, then total surplus equals
(v − c)(1− (1− q)κ)− t2− q + (1− q)
κ(q − 2 + 2qκ)
4nq
, (2.4.4)
and consumer surplus equals
(v − p∗)(1− (1− q)κ)− t2− q + (1− q)
κ(q − 2 + 2qκ)
4nq
. (2.4.5)
Total surplus monotonically increase as κ increases. All trades that occur benefit
both the consumer and the firm. Since the probability of a trade occurring increases
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Figure 2.4.1: Consumer Surplus and Total Profits
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with κ, so does total surplus. Figure 2.4.1 shows equilibrium total profit and consumer
surplus as a function of κ. Higher κ implies higher price and more demand for each
firm, so profit increases with κ. However, consumer surplus may either increase or
decrease as κ increases. In the example, total profit is maximized at κ = n while
consumer surplus is maximized at κ = 7. In fact, consumer surplus is increasing for
κ < 7 and decreasing for κ > 7.
To see why consumer surplus is non-monotonic, consider its change as κ increases
by one. With probability (1− q)κq, the consumer’s more precise information leads to
an additional trade. However, Proposition 5 shows that p∗ increases, so the consumer
pays a higher price whenever she makes a trade. Consumer surplus increases if and
only if the benefit resulting from the former is larger than the additional cost caused
by the latter.
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2.5 Equilibrium with Advertising
This section analyzes the equilibrium of the market when firms endogenously choose
how much to advertise. When κ ≥ n, advertising has no benefit, and since it is
costly, no firm wishes to advertise. To avoid trivialities, I assume that κ < n for the
remainder of this paper. This guarantees that attention is scarce, so advertising may
be valuable to firms.
2.5.1 Pricing when advertising is exogenous
For only this subsection, suppose that each firm advertises at the exogenously given
level φ¯. Demand is given by Equation (2.3.4). This allows us to give a simple
expression that the equilibrium price must satisfy when the whole market is served.
Proposition 7. If p∗ < v − t
2
is an equilibrium, then
p∗ = p¯(φ¯) = t
φ¯δI(φ¯) + (1− φ¯)δU(φ¯)
φ¯∆I(φ¯) + (1− φ¯)∆U(φ¯)
+ c. (2.5.1)
Since δI(φ¯) > δU(φ¯) and ∆I(φ¯) < ∆U(φ¯), an increase in φ¯ increases equilibrium
price and demand. To see where (2.5.1) comes from, fix φ¯ and p¯ < v − t
2
. The first
order necessary condition (from differentiating (p− c)D(p, φ¯; p¯, φ¯) with respect to p)
when p < v − t
2
is
p =
p¯
2
+ t
D(p, φ¯; p¯, φ¯)
2[φ¯∆I(φ¯) + (1− φ¯)∆U(φ¯)]
+
c
2
=
p¯+ p¯(φ¯) + c
2
.
Solving for p = p¯ yields Equation (2.5.1). Section B.1.4 considers the case where
p∗ = v − t
2
. While p∗ typically increases in φ, if p¯(φh) = v − t2 , then p∗ = v − t2 for
φ ∈ [φh, φh + ) for some  > 0.
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2.5.2 Equilibrium
If firms set a symmetric level of advertising φ¯, then Proposition 7 gives the price
they set. It remains to determine the equilibrium level of advertising. If other firms
advertise at level φ¯ and price at p¯, then the demand curve of firm j when it sets
advertising level φ and price p¯ is
D(p, p¯, φ, φ¯) = φδI(φ¯) + (1− φ)δU(φ¯).
In equilibrium, φ = φ¯ and p = p¯. Proposition 8 establishes equilibrium level of
advertising using Proposition 7 and Envelope Theorem arguments.
Proposition 8. If 0 < φ∗ < 1 and p∗ ≤ v − t
2
are the equilibrium advertising level
and price, then the implication given by Proposition 7 holds and
A′(φ∗) = (p∗ − c)[δI(φ∗)− δU(φ∗)]. (2.5.2)
To interpret (2.5.2), consider the problem of firm j when the other firms set price
p∗ and advertising level φ∗. If firm j also sets the equilibrium price and advertising
level, then it sells to a δI(φ
∗) fraction of the consumers who see an ad from it and
a δU(φ
∗) fraction of the consumers who do not see an ad from it. Because it was
optimal to charge p∗ when advertising at level φ∗, firm j still finds a price very close
to p∗ optimal. By deviating to advertising at level φ, the firm sells to approximately
(φ− φ∗)[δI(φ∗)− δU(φ∗)]
additional consumers, but it has to pay approximately
A′(φ∗)(φ− φ∗)
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more in advertising costs. Equation (2.5.2) implies that the change in cost is equal
to the change in revenue.
In equilibrium, all firms charge the same price. Consequently, all n firms split
demand evenly. Therefore, each firm’s equilibrium demand equals
D(φ∗) =
1
n
{1−
n−κ−1∑
i=0
f(i;φ∗, n)(1− q)κ+i − [1− F (n− κ− 1;φ∗, n)](1− q)n}.
Equilibrium profit per firm pi∗ equals
p¯(φ∗)D(φ∗)− A(φ∗),
where φ∗ solves Equation (2.5.2).
2.5.3 Comparative statics
The empirical literature documents a industry-level positive correlation of prices with
advertising and of profits with advertising (see Bagwell [2007]). Because of the en-
dogenous provision of advertising, one cannot distinguish the direction of the causality
in the absence of a model. This section explores how equilibrium advertising intensity
and profit change following a small exogenous shock to the cost in advertising.
To consider comparative statics in the cost of advertising, I assume that A(φj) can
be written as A(φj; a), where
∂A
∂a
> 0 and ∂
2A
∂φ∂a
≥ 0 . That is, a is a shift parameter in
the cost of advertising with a higher a corresponding to a higher absolute and marginal
cost of advertising. To simplify the statement of Proposition 9, write Aa ≡ ∂∂aA(φ; a)
and Aφ ≡ ∂∂φA(φ; a), all evaluated at φ∗.
Proposition 9. For every n and κ > 0,
∂φ∗
∂a
< 0 (2.5.3)
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and
∂pi∗
∂a
=
∂φ∗
∂a
[p¯′(φ∗)D(φ∗) + p¯(φ∗)D′(φ∗)− Aφ]− Aa. (2.5.4)
A small shock that raises the cost of advertising results in more advertising. In-
tuitively, the marginal cost of advertising increases without altering the marginal
benefit to the firm from additional advertising. To restore equilibrium, the amount
of advertising falls. Proposition 7 then implies that the equilibrium price decreases.
However, the same small shock may either increase or decrease equilibrium profit.
Equation (2.5.4) can be rearranged to show that ∂pi
∗
∂a
> 0 if and only if
∂φ∗
∂a
Aφ + Aa <
∂φ∗
∂a
[p¯′(φ∗)D(φ∗) + p¯(φ∗)D′(φ∗)]. (2.5.5)
On the one hand, revenue always decreases, as both price and demand decrease
due to the fall in advertising. The RHS of (2.5.5) gives the value of this change,
which is necessarily less than zero. On the other hand, advertising costs typically
decrease as well, since the absolute level of advertising falls.40 The LHS of (2.5.5)
gives the decrease in costs, which may be either positive or negative. A sufficiently
large decrease in the cost of advertising can more than offset the loss in revenues. In
general, the difference between the change in revenue and the change in advertising
costs may be either positive or negative.
2.5.4 Welfare analysis
As long as the whole market is served, price plays no role in determining social welfare.
An increase in advertising increases the probability that a consumer purchases from a
high-quality match. That is, it increases the gross social benefit obtained. The total
40For instance, advertising costs decrease for either A(x, a) = axm with m ≥ 2, A(x, a) =
−a log(1− x), or A(x, a) = a(ex − 1).
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social benefit equals
v{
n−κ−1∑
i=0
f(i, φ, n)(1− (1− q)κ+i) + [1− F (n− k, φ, n)](1− (1− q)n)}.
It also affects the expected total transportation cost and consumes resources. There-
fore, social welfare, as a function of φ, is given by
W (φ) =
n−κ−1∑
i=0
f(i, φ, n){(1− (1− q)κ+i)(v − E[TC|i])}
+[1− F (n− k, φ, n)]{(1− (1− q)n)(v − E[TC|n])} − nA(φ)
where E[TC|i] is the expected transportation costs given that the consumer sees i
ads.
Proposition 10. Suppose κ = n− 1. If (φ∗, p∗) is an equilibrium, then
∂W
∂φ
|φ=φ∗ > 0.
That is, advertising is under-provided from a total surplus perspective.
When κ = n − 1, advertising increases the demand of all firms equally. Conse-
quently, a given firm does not reap all of the gain in demand from its extra advertising,
but each firm bears the full cost of producing advertising. Moreover, the price of the
good is less than the marginal social benefit of selling to any additional customer,
i.e. p∗ < v − (E[TC|i+ 1]− E[TC|i]) for all i. Since each firm undervalues both the
magnitude of change in demand and the benefit of of selling to an additional con-
sumer, the private incentive to provides advertising is lower than the social incentive
to provide advertising.
In general, advertising may be either over- or under-provided. The first order
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condition for the socially optimal level of advertising is
n−κ−1∑
i=0
f(i; φ¯, n− 1)(1− q)κ+iq[v − (E[TC|i+ 1]− E[TC|i])] = A′(φ¯). (2.5.6)
Comparing Equations (2.5.2) and (2.5.6), it is clear that if v is very large, then
advertising is under-provided. For advertising to be over-provided, the inequality
δI(φ)− δU(φ) >
n−κ−1∑
i=0
f(i;φ, n− 1)(1− q)κ+iq
must hold, which it does for many parameter values. For instance, if n = 3, κ = 1,
then the above inequality holds whenever 1 < φ(4q − 2). Even if this difference
is positive, advertising may be under-provided if the difference between p∗ and v −
(E[TC|i+ 1]− E[TC|i]) is large.
2.6 Discussion
I have analyzed a model in which advertising increases consumer capacity for atten-
tion. Advertising increases own demand, increases primary demand, and can have
positive spillover. Additionally, seeing an ad from firm j can lower the probability that
a consumer purchases from firm j (the “match effect”). In equilibrium, advertising
increases price, and firms may either over- or under-provide advertising.
By way of conclusion, I discuss some related models and which effects they can
or cannot deliver. Previous work typically classifies advertising as either persuasive,
i.e. changes consumer’s tastes, or informative, i.e. creates information for the con-
sumers.41 Advertising for attention has elements of both these views but does not fall
into either cleanly. While it holds that advertising can alter consumer preferences,
41A third view of advertising, the complementary view, does not fit in with this theory at all. For
an excellent survey of the advertising literature, see Bagwell [2007].
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as in the persuasive view, it changes preferences by altering the information that
consumers process, not altering their tastes. While it links advertising with informa-
tion, as in the informative view, it does not create information, instead changing the
information which consumers process.
Persuasive advertising models are typically reduced form and can thus accommo-
date many of the effects generated here. For instance, the model studied by Friedman
[1983] can generate positive price effect, positive spillovers and a positive primary de-
mand effect, though the latter two effects must be directly assumed. However, the
match effect cannot occur in models of persuasive advertising. Persuasive advertising
is typically over-provided in equilibrium, e.g. Dixit and Norman [1978], whereas it
may be under-provided in this model. It applies to either search goods or experience
goods, whereas advertising for attention does not make sense in the context of search
goods.
There are three classes of models of informative advertising that I will consider:
revealing alternatives Grossman and Shapiro [1984], signaling Milgrom and Roberts
[1986], and comparative Meurer and Stahl [1994]. I begin with Grossman and Shapiro
[1984]’s classic model of advertising that reveals the existence of search goods. The
type of goods for which the models are appropriate differ: Grossman and Shapiro
consider only search goods, whereas my model applies only to experience goods.
Consequently, many findings are reversed: advertising lowers price, it can only have
negative spillover effects and it typically has little or no primary demand effect. As
in this model, firms may either over- or under-provide advertising in equilibrium.
An influential strand of the literature studies advertising as a signal of quality,
e.g. Nelson [1974] or Milgrom and Roberts [1986]. As in this model, it applies to
experience goods. Higher advertising signals higher quality and thus leads to a higher
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price. However, the positive primary demand effect, the positive spillover effect, and
the match effect do not occur in Milgrom and Roberts [1986].42 As noted earlier,
signaling requires that repeat purchase occurs.
Lastly, Meurer and Stahl [1994] analyze comparative advertising of experience
goods. They analyze a duopoly model that generates some of the same effects as
advertising for attention, namely the match effect, the positive spillover effect, and
that advertising increases price. However, positive spillover appears to be an artifact
of the duopoly setting. In an oligopoly setting, advertising can only increase the
demand of the firms that are compared by the ad. Moreover, advertising can have
either a positive or a negative primary demand effect. Comparative advertising only
applies to advertisements that are comparative in nature and contain a good deal of
information. Advertising for attention applies not only to this situation, but also to
ads that mention only the advertiser and contain little or no information. As in this
model, firms may either over- or under-provide advertising in equilibrium.
42Positive primary demand and positive spillover effects could probably be added to the model by
assuming that consumers perceive a correlation between the quality of two products.
Chapter 3
Condorcet Meets Ellsberg
3.1 Introduction
When deciding how to vote, each individual may have private information about
which of the two candidates will be better. Both the information itself and how oth-
ers react to it affect how a rational voter casts her ballot. If each voter maximizes
subjective expected utility (henceforth, SEU) and voters have common values, then
there exists an equilibrium to the voting game in which all private information is
revealed for a large enough electorate.43 This result, known as the Condorcet Jury
Theorem, provides an important efficiency justification for democracy as a political
system. It describes conditions under which democracy is superior to even a benev-
olent dictatorship, since the probability of selecting the better policy is higher when
an election rather than a privately informed dictator picks the policy.
This paper shows that when voters are ambiguity averse and their private in-
formation is ambiguous, there may not exist an equilibrium in which information
aggregates, regardless of the size of the electorate. In fact, Theorems 7 and 9 show
that for many voting games, no equilibrium of the game aggregates information. A
rational voter conditions her action on the probability that her vote changes the out-
come of the election. Consequently, each voter’s equilibrium strategy may differ from
43For instance, see Austen-Smith and Banks [1996], Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1997, 1999], My-
erson [1998] or Wit [1998] .
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the action that her private information would suggest is best if she disregarded others’
strategies. Given SEU, each vote noisily reveals private information, and with enough
voters, information aggregates. When voters are ambiguity averse, each picks a vot-
ing strategy as if to insure herself against altering the outcome in favor of the worse
candidate. Theorem 9 relates this behavior to an extreme “swing voter’s curse”: if
others play a strategy profile that would aggregate information, each voter best re-
sponds by minimizing the probability that she casts a pivotal vote. She either plays
a mixed strategy (Theorem 7) or abstains (Theorem 9). In any equilibrium, no vote
reveals information, precluding aggregation.
A large literature, initiated by Ellsberg [1961], criticizes SEU on both normative
and descriptive grounds. When payoffs depend on ambiguous events – that is, events
about which the decision maker has only vague information – SEU does not accu-
rately describe preferences. Agents typically prefer betting on unambiguous events
to ambiguous ones. For example, a bet on an event E, which is known to occur
with probability 0.5, may be preferred both to a bet on the event F and a bet on
its complement F c when no information is provided about F . Ambiguity aversion
explains evidence from asset markets that contradicts SEU (for instance, see Epstein
and Schneider [2010]).
Many important policy decisions are made under ambiguity.44 A policy to cap
carbon emissions deals with poorly understood costs, base case emissions, and tails
of the probability distribution of temperature changes. The recession of 2008-2009
resulted at least in part from an unprecedented event (systematic default in AAA
rated bonds) in the credit market. The Federal Reserve decided whether or not to
44Papers that address political economy questions with ambiguity averse voters or candidates
include Berliant and Konishi [2005], Ashworth [2005], Ghirardato and Katz [2006] and Bade [2011],
though none consider strategic interaction between voters.
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bail out banks and hedge funds based on their beliefs about the poorly understood
connection between this default, these companies and the financial system as a whole.
Many foreign policy decisions must be made despite possessing only poor quality
information, such as that leading to the 2003 invasion of Iraq.
To accommodate ambiguity averse voters, this paper assumes that voter preference
conforms to maxmin expected utility (henceforth, MEU; introduced and axiomatized
in Gilboa and Schmeidler [1989]). Voters consider a set of probability measures and
evaluate an act by taking its minimum expected utility with respect to every measure
in that set. Formally, for some set of probability measures Π and a von Neumann-
Morgenstern index u(·), the utility of an act f can be written as
min
p∈Π
Ep[u ◦ f ].
SEU is the special case when Π is singleton. When Π is not singleton, the behavior
in the Ellsberg paradox can be rationalized.
Section 3.2 gives an example that illustrates how ambiguity averse voters behave
differently from their SEU counterparts. Section 3.3 introduces ambiguous Poisson
games and proves existence of an equilibrium. Section 3.4 describes a common val-
ues voting game when voter preferences are MEU and presents the paper’s main
results. Theorem 7 shows that ambiguity aversion can preclude the existence of any
equilibrium that aggregates information. Theorem 8 provides sufficient conditions
for existence of an equilibrium that aggregates information. Section 3.5 modifies the
setup by allowing voters to abstain strategically. Theorem 9 shows that information
may fail to aggregate in this setting as well. Section 3.6 concludes by relating the
main results to other works that show failure of information aggregation in voting
games. Proofs are collected in the remaining sections.
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3.2 Sincere Voting and Ambiguity
This section offers a brief example showing how ambiguity aversion alters the set
of equilibria to voting games. Formal definitions of the game and equilibrium are
deferred to Section C.1.
Consider an election with 101 voters who vote for one of two candidates, A and B.
The candidate with the most votes wins. Suppose there are two states of the world,
a and b, and all voters agree that A’s policy is better in state a but B’s policy is
better in state b. Before voting, all voters observe a signal from the set {1, 2}. They
believe that signal 1 occurs with probability 0.6 in state a, that signal 2 occurs with
probability 0.6 in state b, and that signals are independently distributed conditional
on the state of the world. After observing signal t, each voter considers the set of
posteriors Πt consisting of the Bayesian updates of the probability measures in some
set Π. Because the state space is one dimensional, it is convenient to represent Πt and
Π as intervals, [pt, p¯t] and [p, p¯] respectively, corresponding to the probability each of
the measures in the set assigns to a. For simplicity, suppose that the interval [p, p¯] is
symmetric about 1
2
. Voters get utility equal to 1 if the correct candidate is elected
but 0 otherwise. After observing signal t, voter preference is represented by
min
p∈[pt,p¯t]
[p(Pr(A wins|a)) + (1− p)Pr(B wins|b)]. (3.2.1)
Because of the noted symmetry, a voter (strictly) prefers to bet on a over b if she
observes signal 1 and vice versa if she observes signal 2. If all voters who observe 1
vote for A and all those who observe 2 vote for B, information aggregates. If voters
were SEU (p = p¯ = 1
2
), then McLennan [1998, Thm. 1] would show that this sincere
voting strategy is an equilibrium. In that equilibrium, information aggregates and
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each voter receives the same expected utility in each state, about 0.979. However,
when p < 0.4 and 0.6 < p sincere voting is not an equilibrium because all players best
respond by voting for both A and B with equal probability.
For instance, assume that p = .39 and p = .61. After updating, players who
observe signal 1 use Π1 = [0.49, 0.7] and players who observe signal 2 use Π2 =
[0.3, 0.51]. Consider the problem of an arbitrary voter when all others vote sincerely.
If this voter observes signal 1, then she picks her vote to maximize
min
p∈[0.49,0.7]
[pPr(A wins|a) + (1− p)Pr(B wins|b)]. (3.2.2)
She affects the outcome only when she is pivotal, or when exactly 50 of the others
vote for A. Since all others vote sincerely,
Pr(A has 50 votes|a) = Pr(B has 50 votes|b) =
(
100
50
)
.650.450 = ρ,
which is approximately 0.01, and
Pr( 51+ votes for A|a) = Pr( 51+ votes for B|b) =
100∑
j=51
(
100
j
)
.6j.4100−j = θ,
which is approximately 0.973. If she votes for A with probability α, then
Pr(A wins|a) = θ + ρα
and
Pr(B wins|b) = θ + ρ(1− α).
Therefore, this voter’s utility from voting for A with probability α is
min
p∈[0.49,0.7]
p[αρ+ θ] + (1− p)[(1− α)ρ+ θ]. (3.2.3)
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If she voted sincerely, then she would always vote for A (α = 1) and her utility would
be
min
p∈[0.49,0.7]
p[ρ+ θ] + (1− p)θ = θ + .49ρ,
about 0.9779. If she played her other pure strategy, voting for B (α = 0), then she
would get utility
min
p∈[0.49,0.7]
pθ + (1− p)[θ + ρ] = θ + .3ρ,
about 0.976 which is less than if she voted for A.
When the voter picks her strategy, the state of the world is determined but un-
known. By randomizing, she replaces subjective uncertainty with objective risk.
While she prefers to follow her signal rather than vote against it, voting for A and B
with equal probability insures her against ambiguity. By doing so, she receives utility
equal to
min
p∈[0.49,0.7]
p[θ + .5ρ] + (1− p)[θ + .5ρ] = θ + .5ρ,
about 0.978, so she prefers this mixture to sincere voting. A symmetric argument
shows that the voter also prefers to mix in this way after observing signal 2. Hence,
her best response is to randomize between voting for A and B regardless of the signal
she observes.
As in the SEU case, each voter picks her strategy based on her “beliefs” about
the state of the world if her vote decides the election. If all voters were SEU, then
each vote would reveal something about the voter’s private information, and as the
number of voters approached infinity, the outcome of the election would reflect all
private information. In contrast, in the example the voter minimizes the probability
that she makes a mistake (conditional on her being pivotal) by randomizing between
voting for A and B. She thinks that if she is pivotal, she will make a mistake with
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probability as high as 0.51 by voting for A or as high as 0.7 by voting for B. By mixing,
she makes a mistake with precisely probability 0.5. Because the voter is ambiguity
averse, she strictly prefers the latter strategy. Should the whole electorate play this
strategy, information could not aggregate because no individual’s vote reveals the
underlying signal. Indeed, all voters randomizing as above is an equilibrium to this
game.
That sincere voting fails to be an equilibrium is not in itself surprising; in fact,
Austen-Smith and Banks [1996] show this is typically the case even with SEU voters.
However, Theorem 7 below shows that there is no equilibrium to the above game in
which information aggregates: if σ is an equilibrium where the expected winner in
state a is A, then the expected winner in state b is not B.45 Theorem 7 extends the
logic above to any strategy profile. If information would aggregate should voters play
strategy profile σ, then some voter prefers to insure herself rather than follow her
prescribed strategy. Consequently, σ cannot be an equilibrium.
3.3 Ambiguous Poisson Games
This section introduces ambiguous Poisson games, a generalization of Myerson [1998]’s
notion of extended Poisson games. Extended Poisson games simplify the analysis of
large population games with some underlying uncertainty. Myerson proves that if an
extended Poisson voting game has a common prior, common values and informative
signals, then there exists an equilibrium in which information aggregates. The no-
tation and definition of equilibrium are adapted from Myerson [1998]. Theorem 6
proves existence of an equilibrium.
45This paper’s results are stated for games with Poisson population uncertainty, but only Theorem
9 relies on this assumption. Theorems 7 and 8 hold without population uncertainty. Details available
from the author upon request.
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For any finite set E, denote by ∆E the set of probability measures on E.
Definition. An ambiguous Poisson game Γ is a collection (Ω, C, T, U, (Πt)t∈T , r, n)
where:
• Ω is a finite set of states.
• C is a finite set of actions. Define Z(C) = {x ∈ RC : x(c) ∈ N∀c ∈ C}, the set
of all possible realized action profiles (the number of players taking each action).
• T is a finite set of types.
• U : T × C × Ω × Z(C) → R is a bounded function that represents preference.
U(t, c, ω, x) is the utility for a voter of type t who takes action c when the realized
state is ω and the realized action profile is x.
• Πt ⊂ ∆(Ω) is a closed, non-empty and convex set, representing the set of pos-
teriors for each type. If Πt is a singleton for every t, then all players are SEU,
though they may have different priors.
• r : Ω → ∆T maps each state to a probability measure over types. Types are
drawn independently according to r(ω) in state ω.
• The number of players is a random variable distributed Poisson with mean n ∈
R++.
The timing of the game is as follows. Nature chooses the number of players
according to the Poisson distribution with mean n and chooses the state of the world
according to some unknown, unmodeled procedure. Each player learns her type
and forms a set of posteriors.46 Before learning the realized state, how many other
players there are or what actions the other players have taken, she picks a strategy
s ∈ ∆C. When she picks this strategy, the state of the world is realized but unknown,
46Note that posterior beliefs rather than prior beliefs are taken as a primitive. One could specify
a set of priors and an updating rule (in the example from Section 3.2, the updating rule is prior-by-
prior Bayesian updating), which would constitute a special case of the above. However, there are
no ex-ante actions so the set of priors only enters a voter’s decision through her set of posteriors.
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so ambiguity aversion leads each player to act as if Nature picked the distribution
over states with the goal of minimizing her utility. A mixed strategy may equalize
her expected utility across states, limiting her exposure to Nature’s choice. For this
reason, she may find a mixed strategy to be the only best response. For a more in
depth discussion of this issue see Lo [1996] or Klibanoff [1996].
As in Myerson [1998], assuming a Poisson population yields convenient proper-
ties. Because types are conditionally independent and the population is distributed
Poisson, the number of players that take each action c in state ω is also distributed
Poisson and is independent of the number of players taking action c′ 6= c in state
ω. Moreover, each player’s conditional expectation does not depend on her private
information. If λ(ω)(c) is the expected number of players in state ω that take action
c, the probability of any given action profile x in state ω is p(x|λ(ω)) where
p(x|λ) =
∏
c∈C
e−λ(c)λ(c)x(c)
x(c)!
. (3.3.1)
These properties imply that the best response correspondence is the same for any two
players with the same type. A strategy profile σ is a map from types to strategies,
σ : T → ∆(C). A player of type t picks a strategy σt ∈ ∆C to maximize
Vt(σt, σ) = min
q∈Πt
ˆ
Ω
ˆ
Z(C)
∑
c∈C
σt(c)U(t, c, ω, x)dp(x|λ(ω))dq(ω) (3.3.2)
where
λ(ω)(a) = n
∑
t∈T
σ(t)(a)r(t|ω). (3.3.3)
Definition. A strategy profile σ∗ is an equilibrium for Γ if for each t ∈ T
σ∗(t) ∈ arg max
σˆ∈∆C
Vt(σˆ, σ
∗). (3.3.4)
If σ∗ is an equilibrium, then every player picks her strategy to maximize the
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minimum expected utility over all measures in her set of posteriors, given she knows
that the other players follow the strategy profile σ∗. When Πt is singleton for all
t ∈ T this definition is equivalent to the definition in Myerson [1998]. Because each
player maximizes her minimum expected utility given her beliefs and all player’s
beliefs agree, the behavior of each player is as in Lo [1996]’s “beliefs equilibrium with
agreement.” While he does not consider games with population uncertainty, this
definition of equilibrium otherwise coincides with his.
Theorem 6. For any ambiguous Poisson game Γ, there exists a strategy profile σ∗
that is an equilibrium for Γ.
3.4 The Condorcet Jury Theorem
This section describes common values voting games with MEU players and discusses
the limiting equilibria. Theorem 7 establishes the existence of voting games for which
no equilibrium aggregates information. Theorem 8 shows that information aggregates
in equilibrium for some voting games where no voter is SEU. Neither of these two
results depends on population uncertainty – very similar arguments work when the
population is fixed at n. Details are available upon request.
3.4.1 Ambiguous voting games
Candidates A and B each commit to a distinct policy. Voters cast a vote for one of
them, and the candidate with the most votes wins; in a tie, each candidate is selected
with equal probability. Voters have common values and are instrumentally rational:
they care only about the policy outcome and they have the same preference over
policies given the state. Depending on the state of the world, the policy is either
good or bad. There are two states, a and b, representing which policy is the good
one.
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Formally, an ambiguous voting game is an ambiguous Poisson game where the
action set is C = {A,B}, the set of states is Ω = {a, b} and the utility function of all
types takes value 1 if the candidate elected matches the state and 0 otherwise. The
action A is interpreted as a vote for candidate A, B is interpreted as a vote for B and
the set of types T is interpreted as a set of signals. Given that others play strategy
profile σ, the payoff to a voter of type t using strategy σˆ ∈ ∆{A,B} is
Vt(σˆ, σ) = min
pi∈Πt
{pi(a)[σˆ(A)Pr(A wins|a, vA, σ) + σˆ(B)Pr(A wins|a, vB, σ)] +
+pi(b)[σˆ(A)Pr(B wins|b, vA, σ) + σˆ(B)Pr(B wins|b, vB, σ)]},
where Pr(c wins|ω, vd, σ) is the probability candidate c wins in state ω if she votes
for candidate d and others play strategy profile σ.
As in Section 3.2, represent Πt by the interval of probabilities that the mea-
sures within it assign to a. That is, Πt ≡ [pt, qt] where pt = minρ∈Πt ρ(a) and
qt = maxρ∈Πt ρ(a).
3.4.2 Main result
This subsection describes a set of ambiguous voting games for which no equilibrium
aggregates information. Theorem 7 below shows that if voters lack confidence, then
no equilibrium aggregates information. Voters lack confidence when the following
condition on posteriors holds.
Definition. An ambiguous voting game has voters who lack confidence if
pt <
1
2
< qt
for all t ∈ T .
An outsider can detect when voters lack confidence through betting preferences.
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If voters lack confidence, then all voters strictly prefer betting on the outcome of a
fair coin toss over betting on either a or b. Even if the voter thinks that a is a better
bet than b, she lacks confidence in this judgment and strictly prefers to hedge her bet
on a by mixing it with a bet on b. This is impossible with SEU: if a is at least as
likely as b when a and b are the only two states, then a bet on a is at least as good
as a fifty-fifty lottery.
This translates into the voting setting as follows. Suppose a random voter were
made a dictator – whichever policy she chooses will be implemented. If, irrespective of
the signal she receives, she strictly prefers to pick the policy implemented by flipping
a fair coin rather than implementing either policy for sure, then, and only then, voters
lack confidence.
To give a better sense of the meaning of lacking confidence, suppose that voters
form posterior beliefs by updating a common set of priors Π using prior-by-prior
Bayesian updating. Precision of signals and the set of priors both contribute to
posterior beliefs. Voters lack confidence when the signals do not provide enough
information to offset the prior ambiguity. With very precise signals (there is some t
so that r(t|b)
r(t|a) is very high or very low), Π must be very close to [0, 1] for voters to lack
confidence; however, if signals are not very precise ( r(t|b)
r(t|a) close to one for all t), then
Π can be a much smaller interval. For instance, with the signal structure described
in Section 3.2, voters lack confidence whenever [.4, .6] ⊂ Π without equality, but if
r(1|a) = r(2|b) = .51, then voters lack confidence whenever [.49, .51] ⊂ Π without
equality. If Π = [.45, .55], then voters lack confidence given the second signal structure
but not the first.
Theorem 7. Suppose that Γ is an ambiguous voting game with voters who lack con-
fidence. If σ is an equilibrium for Γ in which the expected vote share for A in state a
is greater than 1
2
, then the expected vote share for B in state b is less than 1
2
.
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Theorem 7 implies that the equilibrium probability of the correct candidate win-
ning the election is bounded above by 1
2
in at least one state, prohibiting information
aggregation. The following outlines the proof, which is by contradiction.
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that there is an equilibrium strategy profile
σ where the expected winner is correct in both states of the world. The key is to show
that the worst case scenario (the state in which the wrong candidate is more likely
to be elected) is not independent of the voter’s strategy when the others play σ. If
the worst case scenario were independent, then the voter acts as if maximizing SEU
according to the posterior that maximizes the probability of the worst case scenario
and familiar arguments (for instance, Myerson [1998, Thm. 2]) would imply that
there is an equilibrium in which information aggregates when n is large.
To see why the worst case scenario depends on the voter’s strategy, suppose that it
doesn’t, that n is “large” and that σ calls for all voters to play a pure strategy. Since
the ratio of pivot probabilities must not go to either 0 or 1, Myerson [2000, Thm. 1]
shows that the expected vote share for A in state a is the same as the expected vote
share for B in state b. As a consequence, each voter thinks that if she abstains, then
her conditional expected utility is equal across states. When a player votes for A for
sure, her expected utility conditional on state a increases and her expected utility
conditional on state b decreases (vice versa when voting for B). It follows that the
worst case scenario depends on her vote. When voters lack confidence, this argument
can be extended to any σ, regardless of n.
Because the worst case scenario depends on her vote, there is a mixed strategy that
insures the voter against making a mistake and altering the election in favor of the
wrong candidate when others play σ, as in Section 3.2. Since voters lack confidence,
each voter weakly prefers to play this mixed strategy over any other strategy. If every
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voter insured herself, then information could not aggregate because this insurance
strategy is independent of private information. Therefore, it must be that some voter
is willing to play a different strategy. However, the only strategies that are at least as
good as the insurance strategy assign higher probability to voting for the candidate
that receives more votes from the insurance strategy. All voters expect to vote for the
same candidate regardless of signal. This candidate is the expected winner in both
states, a contradiction.
The following result characterizes one equilibrium to the game.
Proposition 11. If an ambiguous voting game Γ has voters who lack confidence, then
the strategy profile σ defined by σ(t)(A) = 1
2
for all t ∈ T is an equilibrium for Γ.
In this equilibrium, both candidates are elected with equal probability regardless
of the state. Therefore, knowing the winner of the election would not change the
beliefs of a Bayesian agent. Neither Proposition 11 nor Theorem 7 show that this
is the only equilibrium. However, Theorem 7 shows that if an equilibrium results
in a higher probability of electing the correct candidate than this equilibrium in one
state of the world, then it must result in a lower probability of electing the correct
candidate in the other state of the world.
3.4.3 Information aggregation
This subsection provides a formal definition of information aggregation and proves
that some ambiguous voting games have an equilibrium in which information aggre-
gates. Because there is always some possibility of a mistake in a finite electorate, one
cannot require full certainty that voters elect the proper candidate in a given game.
Instead, the literature focuses on sequences of voting games where the probability of
electing the wrong candidate vanishes along some sequence of equilibria. Below, a
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sequence of ambiguous voting games is indexed by the mean number of players, with
all other primitives remaining the same.
Definition. A sequence of ambiguous voting games (Γn)
∞
n=1 satisfies full information
equivalence (FIE) if there exists a sequence of strategy profiles (σn)
∞
n=1 so that σn is
an equilibrium for Γn, and for any  > 0, there exists N so that n > N implies that
the correct candidate is elected in each state with probability higher than 1 −  when
σn is played.
47
An implication of Theorem 7 is that FIE fails for many sequences of ambiguous
voting games. In contrast, as long as the signal structure is informative (the con-
ditional distribution of signals varies with the state), any sequence of SEU voting
games satisfies FIE. Since SEU is a special case of MEU, some ambiguous voting
games satisfy FIE. However, SEU is not necessary for information to aggregate. In
fact, Theorem 8 proves the existence of a sequence of equilibria that aggregates in-
formation whenever the game has disjoint* posteriors.
Definition. An ambiguous Poisson game has disjoint* posteriors if for any distinct
t and t′ in T either pt′ = qt, pt = qt′ or [pt, qt] ∩ [pt′ , qt′ ] is empty.
If all voters are SEU, then each Πt is a singleton and the ambiguous Poisson game
has disjoint* posteriors. More generally, one can distinguish between SEU, disjoint*
posteriors and voters who lack confidence using Lemma 28. Consider an ambiguous
voting game Γ. If Γ has singleton posteriors, then all voters act as SEU maximizers
and none strictly prefer to randomize for any strategy profile. If Γ has disjoint*
posteriors, then for any strategy profile at most one type of voter strictly prefers to
randomize. If Γ has voters who lack confidence, then there exists a strategy profile
such that all voters strictly prefer randomizing to playing a pure strategy.
47This definition is adapted from Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1997].
78
Theorem 8. Suppose that (Γn)
∞
n=1 is a sequence of ambiguous voting games that
have disjoint* posteriors, that 0 < pt ≤ qt < 1 for all t and that for each ω and t,
r(t|ω) > 0. If there is some t ∈ T s.t. r(t|a) 6= r(t|b), then (Γn)∞n=1 satisfies FIE.
The proof generalizes the construction from Myerson [1998, Thm. 2]. As in
that paper, the equilibrium consists of a “step strategy”: at most one type of voter
randomizes, and all others play a pure strategy, determined by how likely they view
a relative to the randomizing voter. Because of disjoint* posteriors, at most one type
of voter has a strict preference for randomization. The proof shows that along this
sequence, even if some voter strictly prefers to randomize for every element of the
sequence, the strategy will be the same as in the SEU game with the same signal
structure at the limit. In fact, Myerson [1998, Thm. 2] is the special case where each
Πt is a singleton that results from Bayesian updating of a common prior.
3.5 Strategic Abstention
In SEU voting games, abstention typically improves the outcome of the election.
This is due to the “swing voter’s curse” (introduced in Feddersen and Pesendorfer
[1996]): uninformed voters are more likely to abstain than informed voters. As a
consequence, the expected number of votes for the correct candidate is larger than if
voters could not abstain, so abstention improves the expected outcome of the election.
The ambiguous voting games studied in Section 3.4 explicitly rule out the possibility
of strategic abstention, leaving open the possibility that the conclusion of Theorem 7
fails when voters can choose to abstain.
This section will show that a version of Theorem 7 holds without mandatory
voting. The analysis provides insight into the mechanism behind Theorem 7; namely,
equilibrium behavior can be interpreted as an extreme swing voter’s curse. Each
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voter prefers to minimize the chance that she casts a pivotal vote. If she abstained,
then she would never be pivotal, which would be better than any available strategy.
However, Theorem 7 assumes that she must vote. Among her available choices, her
best option is to mimic abstention through a mixed strategy.
In order to allow for abstention, modify the ambiguous voting games from Section
3.4 by replacing the action set with C = {A,B, ∅} and requiring that T = {1, 2}. The
action ∅ corresponds to abstention. The payoffs for each voter are as in the previous
section. The restriction to two types is for simplicity. Call such a game an ambiguous
voting game with abstention.
Say that an ambiguous Poisson game has symmetric signals if r(1|a) = r(2|b)
and that players have posteriors that respect likelihood ratios if r(t|a)
r(t|b) >
r(t′|a)
r(t′|b) implies
that minpi∈Πt pi(a) ≥ minpi∈Πt′ pi(a) and maxpi∈Πt pi(a) ≥ maxpi∈Πt′ pi(a) for every t, t′ ∈
T . In ambiguous voting games with abstention satisfying these two assumptions,
information does not aggregate along any sequence of equilibria.
Theorem 9. Suppose that (Γn)
∞
n=1 is a sequence of ambiguous voting games with
abstention and symmetric signals. If voters lack confidence and have posteriors that
respect likelihood ratios, then (Γn)
∞
n=1 does not satisfy FIE.
For a sequence of ambiguous voting games with abstention to satisfy FIE, it
is necessary that there exists a sequence of equilibrium strategy profiles where the
winner is correct in both states and the expected number of votes in each state goes
to infinity. The proof of Theorem 9 adapts and extends the arguments from Theorem
7 to show that either the number of votes is bounded above in some state or the
expected winner is incorrect in at least one state. As a consequence, FIE must fail.
With SEU voters, Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1999] and Bouton and Castanheira
[2009] show the swing voter’s curse persists in voting games similar to those considered
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here. Given two SEU voters who observe different signals, the voter whose signal
conveys less information about the state of the world is more likely to abstain in
equilibrium. As a consequence, for a fixed signal structure, the percentage of votes
cast by more informed voters is higher in an election with abstention compared to one
with mandatory voting. In contrast, Theorem 9 demonstrates that ambiguity aversion
strengthens the swing voter’s curse. An ambiguity averse swing voter perceives the
probability of making a mistake with her vote to be larger than her SEU counterpart.
Allowing abstention leads to fewer votes in expectation but, unlike SEU, may not
change the composition of the votes when voters lack confidence.
Proposition 12. If Γ is an ambiguous voting games with abstention that has voters
who lack confidence, the strategy profile σ∗ defined by σ∗(t)(∅) = 1 for every t ∈ {1, 2}
is an equilibrium for Γ.
Unlike the equilibrium shown to exist in Proposition 11, all voters play a pure
strategy. When allowing for abstention, the equilibrium from Proposition 11 still
exists. However, both equilibria lead to the same distribution of outcomes in both
states, so the equilibrium payoffs are the same for each voter, as is the information
that the outcome provides to an observer.
This result contrasts with Propositions 2 and 3 of Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1996]
and Propositions 5 of Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1999]. In these papers, the fraction
of voters who don’t abstain remains bounded away from zero along any sequence of
equilibria. This result is a consequence of SEU preferences: even a small difference in
the expected benefits of voting for A instead of B induces a strict preference to vote
for A.
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3.6 Conclusion
Theorems 7 and 9 show that rational but ambiguity averse voters may find it opti-
mal to insure themselves by minimizing the chance they cast a pivotal vote. This
mechanism leads to a failure of information aggregation not documented by previous
work. These papers show that the dimensionality of the uncertainty and the degree of
commonality between voters are important in evaluating the efficiency of the election.
In contrast, this paper suggests that how familiar the electorate is with the issues at
stake also matters a good deal. By way of conclusion, this section reviews some of
these results and contrasts them with Theorems 7 and 9.
Feddersen and Pesendorfer [1997] prove that if the distribution of preferences is
unknown, then FIE fails generically. The problem is one of dimensionality; namely,
each voter must infer both the distribution of signals and the distribution of prefer-
ences from these votes. Even if a voter knew which votes others cast and the electorate
were large, she could not infer the state of the world. In contrast, this paper assumes
common knowledge of the distribution of preferences. However, the distribution of
votes may not vary with the state (see Proposition 11 or 12) because voters insure
themselves against ambiguity by abstaining or randomizing.
Mandler [2011] shows that if the conditional distribution of signals is unknown,
then FIE may fail. If all the signals were observed by each voter, then uncertainty
would remain as to which state is correct even as the size of the electorate goes to
infinity. In this paper, if all signals were observed, then the true state would be known
with probability approaching 1 despite the prior ambiguity.
Bhattacharya [2008] drops the assumption of common values and characterizes the
distributions of preferences for which FIE fails. For instance, FIE fails when any voter
who receives information in favor of the Condorcet-winner with perfect information is
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very likely to strongly prefer the other candidate.48 In contrast, this paper maintains
pure common values.
Finally, the result in this paper relates to work that studies the effect of ambiguous
information in other contexts. For instance, Condie and Ganguli [2011] demonstrates
a failure of information transmission with ambiguity averse agents in general equilib-
rium. They show that a rational expectations equilibrium for an exchange economy
may be partially revealing when agents are ambiguity averse; in contrast, fully reveal-
ing equilibria are generic with SEU agents. Two differences are worth pointing out.
First, in their model agents do not act strategically – they are price takers. Second,
they assume that only a subset of agents are ambiguity averse, while an ambiguous
voting game has voters who lack confidence only if all voters are ambiguity averse.
48Additionally, the non-aggregation result in this paper is stronger because of his more demanding
definition of FIE, which requires the definition of FIE from this paper to hold for every sequence of
symmetric, Bayesian Nash equilibria in undominated strategies. Unlike Theorem 7, his conditions
do not rule out the existence of a different equilibrium in which information would aggregate. For
example, the game depicted by his Figure 1 fails his definition of FIE but satisfies the definition in
this paper.
Appendix A
Appendix for Chapter 1
A.1 Preview of the Proof of Theorem 1
This Section discusses the key idea behind the proof of Theorem 1. The key idea of the
proof is to map choices of acts onto a larger domain where it is suitably well-behaved.
In particular, I consider the space of “plans.” A plan is a mapping from each state
to an act. Each set of conditional choices from a given menu defines one plan. In the
example from Section 1.1.2, the modeler observes the doctor’s conditional choices of
acts. Instead of looking at her each of her conditional choices in isolation, one can
think of them as choosing one plan. For instance, the doctor chooses the plan “pick
g in state γ, otherwise pick m” from {g,m} and chooses the plan “pick f in state φ,
otherwise pick m” from {g,m, f}.
Although choice in a given state may violate WARP, INRA guarantees that her
choice over plan maximizes a preference relation (whose domain is plans rather than
acts). However, this preference relation may be discontinuous, incomplete and in-
transitive. Given the other axioms, one can extend it to a well-behaved preference
relation so that the DM’s choices are a maximal element of this preference relation.49
I then show that this preference over plans can be represented as expected utility
over a subset of “feasible” plans. I identify a candidate for P∗ and show that any
49Although this is an extension, it is typically not a “compatible extension” in the sense that it
may not preserve strict preference.
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plan measurable with respect to some Q ∈ P∗ is feasible. The coarsest partition
that measures her chosen plan is identified as the DM’s subjective information. This
subjective information is optimal, in the sense that it maximizes expected utility ac-
cording to the utility index and prior representing the preference over plans. The
final step shows that her conditional choices can also be represented as maximizing
this preference relation.
This suggests an alternative domain on which optimal inattention admits foun-
dations: preference over plans. In supplementary material, I show that one can use
preference over plans to derive both optimal inattention and costly attention repre-
sentations. Observing choice of plan is more convenient because it requires observing
a single ex ante choice rather than choices in each state of the world. It has also
been used in applications (for instance, Gul et al. [2011]). However, this has some
significant drawbacks. First, choice of plan is difficult to observe outside of a labo-
ratory. Second, choice of plan typically reflects both constraints and true preference.
Third, what a DM plans to choose may differ from what she actually chooses. Fourth,
economic objects of interest are conditional choices, not ex ante choices. Therefore,
I focus in the main paper on choice of acts. This data is closer to what economists
typically work with, and reflects the DM’s response to whatever constraints she faces
rather than those she thinks that she will face. Moreover, if the DM follows through
with her choice of plan, then her final conditional choices of acts satisfy the axioms
from Section 1.3.
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A.2 Proofs
A.2.1 Proofs from Section 1.3
Proof of Theorem 1:
Proof. If c(B|ω) = B for all B ∈ K(X), then by Monotonicity, it follows that
c(B|ω) = B∀B ∈ K(F). Taking P∗ = {Ω} and u(x) = 0∀x establishes the desired
result. Therefore, assume that there are x∗, x∗ ∈ X and ω so that x∗ /∈ c({x∗, x∗}|ω).
Lemma 3. There exists an affine, continuous u : X → R so that for any B ∈ K(X),
x ∈ c(B|ω) ⇐⇒ u(x) ≥ u(y) for all y ∈ B.
Proof. Fix any A ⊂ B ∈ K(X). By Monotonicity, if x ∈ c(B|ω), then x ∈ c(B|ω′)
for any ω′. By INRA, c(B|ω) ∩ A 6= ∅ implies that c(B|ω) ∩ A = c(A|ω), i.e. c(·|ω)
satisfies WARP when restricted to problems of lotteries. It is routine to verify that
the resulting revealed preference relation satisfies the hypothesis of Grandmont [1972,
Thm 2] and therefore an affine, continuous u : X → R exists.
Let FΩ be the set of functions from Ω to F that are σ(P ) measurable. I refer
to elements of FΩ as “plans” with the interpretation that the DM chooses F (ω) in
state ω. Since P is finite, any F ∈ FΩ is simple. I denote elements of X by x, y, z, ...
, elements of F by f, g, h, ... and elements of FΩ by F,G,H, .... Identify X with the
subset of F that does not vary with the state and F with the subset of FΩ that does
not vary with the state, so X ⊂ F ⊂ FΩ.
Denote by A(·) the partition defined as ˆˆP (·) in Equation (1.4.1) and define cˆ :
K(F)  FΩ by F ∈ cˆ(B) ⇐⇒ F (ω) ∈ c(B|ω) for every ω and σ(F ) ⊂ σ(A(B)).
Since σ(A(B)) ⊂ σ(P ), any σ(A(B))-measurable selection from c(B|·) is in FΩ. For
any F ∈ FΩ, define {F} ∈ K(F) by {F} = {F (ω) : ω ∈ Ω}. Since F is simple, {F}
is finite and compact. By INRA, if F ∈ cˆ(B) then F ∈ cˆ({F}).
Define C ⊂ FΩ by F ∈ C ⇐⇒ F ∈ cˆ({F}); C is the set of plans that the DM
chose from some problem. Define a binary relation ˆ on C by
F ˆG ⇐⇒ {F} IS {G}.
Note that F ∈ cˆ(B) =⇒ F ˆG for every G ∈ C so that {G} ⊂ B. For any
F ∈ FΩ, define F ∗ ∈ F to be F ∗(ω) = F (ω)(ω).
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Lemma 4. If F ∈ cˆ({F}), then F ∗∼ˆF .
Proof. Assume that F = cˆ({F}) and define Fˆ so that
Fˆ (ω) = F (ω)A({F})(ω)x
for some x ∈ X so that u(x) ≤ u(F (ω))∀ω. It holds that Fˆ ∈ cˆ({F} ∪ {Fˆ}). To see
this, note that
u ◦ Fˆ (ω) ≤ u ◦ F (ω)
for all ω so it must be that F ∈ cˆ({F}∪{Fˆ}) by monotonicity and INRA. Therefore,
A({F} ∪ {Fˆ})  A({F}). For any ω, so that A({F} ∪ {Fˆ})(ω) ⊂ A({F})(ω) so
since
F (ω)(ω′) = Fˆ (ω)(ω′)∀ω′ ∈ A({F})(ω),
it follows from Subjective Consequentialism and F (ω) ∈ c({F}∪{Fˆ}|ω) that Fˆ (ω) ∈
c({F} ∪ {Fˆ}|ω). By INRA, Fˆ = cˆ({Fˆ}). Further, if F ∗∼ˆFˆ , it follows that F ∗∼ˆF .
By construction, A({Fˆ}) is finer than A({F ∗}). By ACI,
αFˆ + (1− α)F ∗ ∈ cˆ(α{Fˆ}+ (1− α){F ∗})
for all α ∈ [0, 1]. Further
u ◦ αFˆ (ω) + (1− α)F ∗ ≥ u ◦ Fˆ (ω)
by construction. Therefore, when Bα = (α{F ∗}+ (1− α){Fˆ}) ∪ {Fˆ}
αFˆ + (1− α)F ∗ ∈ cˆ(Bα)
by INRA. Since A(Bα) A({Fˆ}) for any α ∈ [0, 1) and for any ω,
[αF ∗ + (1− α)Fˆ (ω)](ω′) = Fˆ (ω)(ω′)
for all ω′ ∈ A({Fˆ})(ω), by Subjective Consequentialism
Fˆ ∈ cˆ(Bα).
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Therefore, for n ∈ {1, 2, ...}, {F} IS n−1
n
{F ∗} + 1
n
{Fˆ}, which goes to {F ∗}, and by
definition F ˆF ∗. Since F ∗ ∈ cˆ({F ∗} ∪ {Fˆ}), it follows that F ∗ˆF ; combining yields
F ∼ˆF ∗.
Lemma 5. For any h ∈ F , α ∈ [0, 1] and A,B ∈ K(F), if AIS B, then αA + (1−
α){h} IS αB + (1− α){h}.
Proof. There are sequences (An)
∞
n=1 and (Cn)
∞
n=1 that converge to A and B respec-
tively where An IS Cn.
Consider an arbitrary n and the finite sequence B1, ..., Bm so that An = B1 and
Bm = Cn and c(Bi|ω) ∩ Bi−1 6= ∅ for every ω. Since A(Bi)  A({h}), c(αBi +
(1− α){h}|ω) ∩ [αBi−1 + (1− α){h}] for every ω by ACI. Since αAn + (1− α){h} =
αB1 + (1− α){h} and αBm + (1− α){h} = αCn + (1− α){h}, αAn + (1− α){h} IS
αCn + (1− α){h}.
Since n was arbitrary, we can do this for all n. Note that αAn + (1 − α){h} →
αA + (1 − α){h} and αCn + (1 − α){h} → αB + (1 − α){h}, it follows that αA +
(1− α){h} IS αB + (1− α){h}.
Lemma 6. ˆ is transitive.
Proof. Suppose F ˆG and GˆH. Set A = {F}, B = {G} and C = {H}. Then
F,G,H ∈ C, AIS B and B IS C.
Then there are sequence An, Bn, B
′
n, Cn that converge to A,B,B,C respectively
so that An IS Bn and B
′
n IS Cn. Pick Gn ∈ cˆ(B′n), noting that {Gn} IS Cn by INRA.
Let y be the worst outcome of any act in B. Let z ∈ X be so that u(y)−u(z) = k > 0
(if such an outcome does not exist, replace each problem by mixing it with x∗). Pick
Fn ∈ cˆ(B′n) for every n. Note that {Fn} IS Cn for every n using INRA.
Because u(·) is continuous, for any  > 0 there is a δ() so that d(x, x′) < δ()
implies that |u(x) − u(x′)| < . Therefore, for any  there is an n() so that for any
every n > n() and any act f ′ ∈ {Gn} there is an act f ∈ Bn so that u(f(ω)) −
u(f ′(ω)) <  (for every ω) and u(f ′(ω)) > u(y)− .
Take a sub-sequence of B′n and Bn so that Bni = Bn( 1
i
)+1 and B
′
ni
= B′
n( 1
i
)+1
. Pick
i¯ so that 1
i¯
< k. Set αi =
1
ni
(u(y)− 1
ni
−u(z)) for every i > i¯. Consider f = Fni(ω) for an
arbitrary ω and i > i¯. Pick f ′ ∈ {Gni} so that u(f(ω′))− u(f ′(ω′)) <  for every ω′.
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Note that for every ω′
(1− α)u(f(ω′)) + αu(z)− u(f ′(ω′)) = u(f(ω′))− u(f ′(ω′))
−α(u(f(ω′))− u(z))
<
1
ni
− α(u(f(ω′))− u(z))
<
1
ni
− α(u(y) + 1
ni
− u(z)).
Therefore, for every ω,
u ◦ ((1− αi)Fni(ω) + αiz) ≤ u ◦ f ′
for some f ′ ∈ {Gni}.
By Monotonicity and INRA, cˆ(Bni) ⊂ cˆ(Bni ∪ ((1− αi){Gni}+ αi{z})) for i < i¯.
By Lemma 5, {Gni} IS Cni implies that (1−αi){Gni}+αi{z} IS (1−αi)Cni +αi{z}.
But then for i > i¯k Ani IS (1 − αi)Cni + αi{z} and since αi → 0, Ani → A and
Cni → C, we have A IS C. Suppose we needed to mix all problems with x∗ first. The
amount of this mixture can be arbitrarily small. So using the same logic, we can find
a sub-sequence (nk)
∞
k=1and a sequence (αk)
∞
k=1 where αk → 0 so that (k−1k Ank+ 1k{x∗})
IS (1−αk)(k−1k Cnk + 1k{x∗}) +αk{z} for every k. Again, this gives A I¯S C. Conclude
that F ˆH.
Define P∗ = {A(B) : B ∈ K(F)} and P∗∗ = {Q ∈ P∗ : @Q′ ∈ P∗ s.t. Q′  Q}.
Identify FΩQ with the subset of FΩ that is σ(Q)−measurable.
Define the binary relation  on FΩ by
F  G ⇐⇒ either F ∈ H and F ∗ˆG∗ or G /∈ H
 is a consistent extension of ˆ.
Lemma 7.  extends ˆ consistently.
Proof. Suppose first that F,G ∈ H and that G ∈ FΩQ .
[F ˆG implies F  G] Suppose F ˆG. Then F,G ∈ C. By Lemma 4, F ∗∼ˆF and
G∗∼ˆG. Since ˆ is transitive, F ∗∼ˆF ˆG =⇒ F ∗ˆG. Since G∼ˆG∗, we have that
F ∗ˆG∗ using transitivity of ˆ.
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[F ˆG implies F  G] There are two cases: G ∈ H and G /∈ H. In the latter
case, it is impossible that F ˆG. Therefore, it must be that both F,G ∈ C. For
contradiction, assume that F ˆG but F 6 G. Since F ˆG implies F  G, it must
be that G  F (otherwise F  G) so F ∗∼ˆG∗. Since F ∼ˆF ∗ and G∗∼ˆG and ˆ is
transitive, it follows immediately that G∼ˆF , a contradiction with F ˆG.
For any act f ∈ F and partition Q ∈ P∗, define f¯Q ∈ FΩ as follows. If minx∈X u(x)
does not exist, then f¯Q(ω) = fQ(ω)x where x is so that u(x) = minx∈∪ω∈Ωsupp(G(ω)) u(x)−
1. If minx∈X u(x) exists, then by f¯Q(ω) = fQ(ω)x where x is so that u(x) =
minx∈X u(x).
Lemma 8.  is a preorder.
Proof. [Transitive] Suppose that F  G and G  H. If F /∈ H then G /∈ H so H /∈ H
so F  H. If G /∈ H then H /∈ H so F  H. If H /∈ H, then F  H. All that
remains is the case where F,G,H ∈ H which would imply that
F ∗ˆG∗ˆH∗
Since ˆ is transitive, F ∗ˆH∗ and F  H.
[Reflexive] Fix arbitrary F . If F /∈ H, then F  F by definition. If F ∈ H, then
noting that F ∗∼ˆF ∗ (since F ∗ ∈ cˆ({F ∗}) immediately gives F ∗ˆF ∗ and F  F .
Lemma 9. If x, y ∈ X then either x  y or y  x.
Proof. This follows immediately from Lemma 3.
Lemma 10. For all e, f, g, h ∈ F , the set U = {λ ∈ [0, 1] : λf + (1 − λ)g 
λh+ (1− λ)e} is closed in [0, 1].
Proof. Suppose λn → λ and λn ∈ U for all n. Then {λnf + (1 − λn)g} = Bn,
{λnh+(1−λn)e} = Cn and Bn IS Cn by definition of . Therefore, for every n, there
are sequences (Bnm)
∞
m=1 and (C
n
m)
∞
m=1 so that B
n
m IS C
n
m and d(B
n
m, Bn)+d(C
n
m, Cn)→
0. For every , there is anMn so thatm > M
n
 implies that d(B
n
m, Bn)+d(C
n
m, Cn) < .
Since Bn → {λf + (1− λ)g} = B and Cn → {λh+ (1− λ)e} = C, for every , there
is an N so that n > N implies that d(Bn, B) + d(Cn, C) < .
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For every n ∈ {1, 2, ...} define B′n and C ′n by
B′n = B
M 1
n
+1
N 1
n
+1
and
C ′n = C
M 1
n
+1
N 1
n
+1 .
By the triangle inequality,
d(B′n, B) ≤ d(B,BN 1
n
+1) + d(BN 1
n
+1, B
M 1
n
+1
N 1
n
+1 )
and
d(C ′n, C) ≤ d(C,CN 1
n
+1) + d(CN 1
n
+1, C
M 1
n
+1
N 1
n
+1 ).
Since
d(B,BN 1
n
+1) + d(BN 1
n
+1, B
′
n) + d(C,CN 1
n
+1) + d(CN 1
n
+1, C
′
n) ≤
4
n
which goes to zero, B′n → B and C ′n → C; since B′n IS C ′n for every n, B IS C. It
immediately follows from the definition of  and U that λf+(1−λ)g  λh+(1−λ)e
so λ ∈ U .
Lemma 11. For any f, g ∈ F , if f(ω)  g(ω) for all ω, then f  g.
Proof. For any f, g ∈ F so that f(ω)  g(ω) for every ω, it follows that f(ω) ∈
c({f(ω), g(ω)}|ω) from Lemma 3. From monotonicity, f ∈ c({f, g}|ω)∀ω so f ∈
cˆ({f, g}) and f  g.
Lemma 12. For any f, g, h ∈ F and α ∈ (0, 1], f  g if and only if αf + (1−α)h 
αg + (1− α)h.
Proof. Fix f, g, h ∈ F so that f  g. Let α ∈ (0, 1] be arbitrary. Since f  g,
{f} I¯S {g}. Apply Lemma 5 to get {αf + (1 − α)h} I¯S {αg + (1 − α)h}, implying
that αf + (1− α)gˆαf + (1− α)g so αf + (1− α)g  αf + (1− α)g.
Given the above and Lemma 10, Lemma 1.2 of Shapley and Baucells [1998] gives
that αf + (1− α)h  αg + (1− α)h for α > 0 implies f  g.
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Lemma 13. There are x, y ∈ X so that x  y.
Proof. Recall that x∗ /∈ cˆ({x∗, x∗}). Since A({x∗}) = A({x∗}) = {Ω} and x∗ ∈
cˆ({x∗, x∗}) by Lemma 3, x∗ weakly dominates x∗. It follows that x∗  x∗. Further,
by Continuity, it is not the case that {x∗} I¯S {x∗} so x∗  x∗.
Lemma 14. If there is an x ∈ X so that u(f(ω)) > u(x) for every ω, then f¯Q ∈
cˆ({f¯Q}).
Proof. Fix any such f and relabel f¯Q = F¯ . Let y ∈ arg minx′∈∪ωsupp(F¯ (ω)) u(x′).
Suppose not: F¯ /∈ cˆ({F¯}) and H ∈ cˆ({F¯}).
It must be that A({F¯}) 6 Q. If A({F¯})  Q, pick any ω so that F¯ (ω) /∈
c({F¯}|ω). Take h = H(ω)A({F¯})x. Since u ◦H(ω) ≥ u ◦ h, H ∈ cˆ({F¯} ∪ {h}) and
A({F¯} ∪ {h})  A({F¯}). Further, by Subjective Consequentialism, h ∈ c({F¯} ∪
{h}|ω). However, u◦F¯ (ω) ≥ u◦h so monotonicity implies that F¯ (ω) ∈ c({F¯}∪{h}|ω).
Since h is never strictly relevant, INRA implies that F¯ (ω) ∈ c({F¯}|ω), a contradiction.
Since A({F¯}) 6 Q, there is some E ∈ P so that u(H∗(ω)) = u(y)∀ω ∈ E.
For every ω /∈ E, u(F ∗(ω)) ≥ u(H∗(ω)). Therefore, F ∗ weakly dominates H∗ by
monotonicity.
Define H¯ ≡ H¯∗Q where Q = A({F¯}). By definition, there is some J so that J ∈
cˆ({J}) and A({J}) = Q. Since A({F ∗}) = {Ω}, αF ∗+(1−α)J ∈ cˆ(α{F ∗}+(1−α)J)
By INRA, monotonicity and Subjective Consequentialism, H¯ ∈ cˆ({H¯}∪{F¯}) and
H¯∗ ∈ cˆ({H¯}∪{H¯∗}). Let B0 = α{H¯∗}+(1−α){J∗}, B1 = α{H¯∗}∪{H¯}+(1−α){J∗}
and B2 = α{H¯} ∪ {F¯}+ (1− α){J∗}. By ACI,
αH¯∗ + (1− α)J∗ ∈ cˆ(B1) ∩ cˆ(B0)
and
αH¯ + (1− α)J∗ ∈ cˆ(B2).
This implies that
αH¯∗ + (1− α)J∗ˆαH¯ + (1− α)J∗ˆαF¯ + (1− α)J∗. (A.2.1)
Set B4 = α{F ∗} + (1 − α){J}. By ACI, αF ∗ + (1 − α)J(ω) ∈ c(B4|ω). Let
B5 = B4∪{αF¯+(1−α)J}. By INRA, monotonicity and Subjective Consequentialism,
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αF ∗ + (1 − α)J ∈ cˆ(B5). By Subjective Consequentialism, αF¯ (ω) + (1 − α)J(ω) ∈
c(B5|ω) for all ω so by INRA, αF¯ + (1− α)J ∈ C. Set B3 = B2 ∪ {αF¯ + (1− α)J}.
By Monotonicity and INRA,
αH¯ + (1− α)J∗ ∈ cˆ(B3)
so αH¯∗ + (1− α)J∗ ˆαF¯ + (1− α)J .
By Lemma 4, αF¯ + (1− α)J∼ˆαF ∗ + (1− α)J∗. By Lemma 6,
αH¯∗ + (1− α)J∗ˆαF ∗ + (1− α)J∗
which, by definition, is equivalent
{αH¯∗ + (1− α)J∗} IS {αF ∗ + (1− α)J∗}.
Since F ∗ dominates H¯∗ and H¯∗ does not dominate F ∗ by Monotonicity, αF ∗+(1−α)J∗
dominates αH¯∗+ (1−α)J∗ and αH¯∗+ (1−α)J∗ does not dominate αF ∗+ (1−α)J∗.
This contradicts Continuity, so f¯Q ∈ cˆ({f¯Q}).
If Q ∈ P∗ and Q Q′, then Lemma 14 implies that Q′ ∈ P∗.
Lemma 15. Suppose F ∈ cˆ(B). If {G} ⊂ B, then F  G.
Proof. If G /∈ H, then F  G. If G ∈ H, then pick Q ∈ P∗ so that G ∈ FΩQ . There
are two cases.
First, suppose u(G∗(ω)) > u(x) for some x ∈ X and every ω. Set G¯ = ¯(G∗)Q.
By monotonicity F ∈ cˆ(B ∪ {G¯}). By Lemma 14, G¯ ∈ cˆ({G¯}), which implies that
{F} IS {G¯}. Since G∗ = G¯∗ by construction, it follows that F  G.
Now, suppose u(G∗(ω′)) = minx∈X u(x) for at least one ω′. Consider F ′ = 12F+
1
2
x∗
and G′ = 1
2
G + 1
2
x∗ and G¯′ = ¯(G′∗)Q. Now, u(G
′∗(ω)) > minx∈X u(x). Apply the
above argument to get {F ′} IS {G′} and (1
2
F + 1
2
x∗)∗ˆ(1
2
G+ 1
2
x∗)∗. Lemma 12 gives
that F ∗  G∗, so F  G.
Lemma 16. There is a finitely additive probability measure on Σ, pi(·), that assigns
positive probability to every E ∈ P so that for any f, g ∈ F , f  g implies ´ u◦fdpi >´
u ◦ gdpi and f ∼ g implies ´ u ◦ fdpi = ´ u ◦ gdpi.
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Proof. Let F ′ ⊂ F be the acts that are σ(P ) measurable.
Claim 1. For any f ∈ F , there is an f ′ ∈ F ′ so that f ′ ∼ f .
Proof. First, I show that for any act f and any E ∈ P , there is an act g so that g ∼ f
and g is constant on E and agrees with f on Ec. Pick any f ∈ F and any E ∈ P .
Let x¯ = arg maxω∈E u(f(ω)), x = arg minω∈E u(f(ω)), g¯ = x¯Ef and g = xEf . For
every α ∈ [0, 1], define
Bα = {f, αg¯ + (1− α)g}.
By Subjective Consequentialism and because c(B|·) must be P measurable, there is
at least one h in every Bα so that h ∈ c(Bα|ω) for all ω ∈ Ω.
Fix ω ∈ E. By Monotonicity and INRA,
αg¯ + (1− α)g ∈ c(Bα|ω) & β > α =⇒ βg¯ + (1− β)g ∈ c(Bβ|ω)
and conversely
αg¯ + (1− α)g /∈ c(Bα|ω) & β < α =⇒ βg¯ + (1− β)g /∈ c(Bβ|ω).
Using the above and that g¯ ∈ c(B1|ω), there is an α¯ so that α > α¯ implies that
{αg¯ + (1 − α)g} IS {f} and α < α¯ implies that {f} IS {αg¯ + (1 − α)g} IS {f}.
Conclude that α¯g¯ + (1− α¯)g ∼ f . Since f and E were arbitrary, this establishes the
first step.
Now, label P = {E1, ..., En}. Fix f . By the above, there is an f1 so that f ∼ f1
and f1is constant on E1 and agrees with f on E
c
1. For i = 2, ..., n, the above shows that
there is fi+1 so that fi ∼ fi+1 and fi+1is constant on Ei+1 and agrees with fi on Eci+1.
By construction, fn is σ(P )-measurable, and f ∼ f1 ∼ f2 ∼ ... ∼ fn =⇒ f ∼ fn by
Lemma 8, so fn ∈ F ′ and fn ∼ f , establishing the claim.
Moreover, F ′ is finite dimensional. Restricted to F ′,  satisfies reflexivity, transi-
tivity and independence by Lemmas 8 and 5. Lemma 10 implies that if λf+(1−λ)g 
g for every λ ∈ (0, 1), then it is not the case that g  f . Applying Aumann
[1962, Thm. A] yields the existence of a mixture linear U(·) so that f  g implies
U(f) > U(g) and f ∼ g implies U(f) = U(g). By Monotonicity using choice from
problems in the set {{xEy, y} : E ∈ P} where u(x) > u(y) and Lemma 3, there is a
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pi(·) with the desired properties, an α > 0 and a β ∈ R so that U(·) = ´ αu◦fdpi(·)+β,
the desired result. WLOG, take α = 1 and β = 0.
Lemma 17. c(B|ω) = arg maxf∈B
´
u ◦ fdpi(·|A(B)(ω)).
Proof. Fix B ∈ K(B) and set E = A(B)(ω). First, suppose f ∈ c(B|ω) and set
F ∈ cˆ(B) so that F (ω) = f for all ω ∈ E. Specifically, F  G whenever there is
a g ∈ B so that G(ω) = F (ω) for every ω /∈ E and G(ω) = g for every ω ∈ E, so
f ∈ arg maxg∈B
´
u ◦ gdpi(·|E), implying that c(B|ω) ⊂ arg maxf∈B
´
u ◦ fdpi(·|E).
Now, suppose that
´
u ◦ gdpi(·|E) ∈ arg maxg∈B
´
u ◦ gdpi(·|E). Set x ∈ X so
that u(x) < min{f(ω):f∈B andω∈Ω} u(f(ω)). Define Fˆ (ω) = F (ω)A(B)(ω)x for all ω
and Gˆ(ω) = F (ω)A(B)(ω)x for all ω /∈ E and Gˆ(ω) = gEx for ω ∈ E and B′ =
B ∪ {Fˆ} ∪ {Gˆ} and note that Subjective Consequentialism and Monotonicity imply
Fˆ ∈ cˆ(B′). Then take B′′ = {Fˆ} ∪ {Gˆ} and by INRA, Fˆ ∈ cˆ(B′′). Now, take y ∈ X
so that u(y) >
´
u◦fdpi(·|E) define Bn = (B′′\{gEx})∪{ 1ny+ n−1n gEx}. By Lemma
16, Gn  F ′ for all F ′ so that {F ′} ⊂ B where Gn(ω) = Fˆ (ω)A(B)(ω)x for all ω /∈ E
and Gn(ω) =
1
n
y + n−1
n
gEx for all ω ∈ E. By Lemma 15, Gn ∈ cˆ(Bn).50
By construction, A(Bn) = A(B′′) for all n. Since 1ny + n−1n g ∈ c(Bn|ω) and
( 1
n
y + n−1
n
g)Ex → gEx, it follows from Continuity that gEx ∈ c(B′′|ω). By INRA,
c(B′′|ω) = c(B′|ω) ∩ B′′. Since u ◦ g ≥ u ◦ gEx, gEx ∈ c(B′|ω) =⇒ g ∈ c(B′|ω)
by Monotonicity. By INRA, c(B′|ω) = c(B′|ω) ∩ B, so g ∈ c(B|ω), completing the
proof.
Set Pˆ (B) = A(B). Lemma 16 and 15 give that
Pˆ (B) ∈ arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E′∈Q
pi(E ′) max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′)
because if F ∈ cˆ(B) then F  G for all G ∈ H and {G} ⊂ B implies that ´ u◦F ∗dpi ≥´
u ◦G∗dpi, implying that
∑
E′∈Pˆ (B)
pi(E ′)
ˆ
u(F (ω)(ω))dpi(·|E ′) ≥
∑
E′∈Q
pi(E ′) max
g∈B
ˆ
u ◦ gdpi(·|E ′)
50These inequalities for u(x) and u(y) can be taken to be strict even if u(·) is bounded because
the remainder relies only on properties of R˜. Mixing with B with a constant z ∈ int(u(X)) ensures
that there exists such x, y ∈ X.
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for any Q ∈ P∗. Using that Pˆ (B) = A(B), Lemma 17 gives that
c(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Pˆ (B)(ω)),
completing the proof.
Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. Suppose c(·) is represented by (u(·), pi(·),P∗, Pˆ (·)). First, I show that c(·)
satisfies Continuity.
Lemma 18. c(·) satisfies Continuity.
Proof. Suppose that both {f} IS {g} and g weakly dominates f . Let Bn → {f}
and Cn → {g} so that Bn IS Cn. If Bn IS Cn, Fn ∈ c(Bn) and Gn ∈ c(Cn), then´
u◦F ∗ndpi ≥
´
u◦G∗ndpi. To see this, let B1, ..., Bn be the sequence from the definition
of indirectly selected. Then Fi ∈ cˆ(Bi) and {Fi+1} ⊂ Bi implies that
´
u ◦ F ∗i dpi ≥´
u ◦ F ∗i+1dpi by construction of c(·) for all i. Therefore,
´
u ◦ F ∗ndpi ≥
´
u ◦G∗ndpi.
Now, note that F ∗n → f since all components of Bn → f . Similarly, G∗n → g.
Therefore, since u(·) is continuous, ´ u ◦ fdpi ≥ ´ u ◦ gdpi. Since g weakly dominates
f ,
´
u ◦ gdpi(·|Pˆ ({f, g})(ω)) ≥ ´ u ◦ fdpi(·|Pˆ ({f, g})(ω)), without equality for some
ω′. This implies that
´
u ◦ gdpi(·) > ´ u ◦ fdpi, a contradiction.
For the second part, begin by defining a function V : {Q : P  Q} ×K(F)→ R
by
V (Q,B) =
∑
E∈Q
pi(E) max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E).
With this formulation, Pˆ (B) ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗ V (Q,B) for all B. By the maximum
theorem, V (Q, ·) is continuous and arg maxV (·, B) is upper-hemi continuous.
If u(·) is constant, then set K = K(F). Both INRA and ACI are satisfied because
c(B|ω) = B for every B and ω. Clearly, K is open and dense in K(F).
If not, then define K by
K = {B ∈ K(F) : ∃Q ∈ P∗ s.t. V (Q,B) > V (Q′, B)∀Q′ ∈ P∗\{Q}}.
I proceed by showing that cl(K) = K(F) and then that K is open.
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Lemma 19. cl(K) = K(F)
Proof. Pick any B ∈ K(F) and any  > 0.
Fix x ∈ X so that u(x) ∈ int(u(X)). Define B′ ∈ K(F) by αB + (1− α){x} for
α close enough to 1 so that d(B′, B) < 
3
.
Pick a Q ∈ P∗ so that Q A(B′) and Q′  Q for Q′ ∈ P∗ implies that Q = Q′.
Label Q = {E1, ..., En} and pick f1, ..., fn so that fi ∈ c(B′|ω) for some ω ∈ Ei.
Define f ∗ so that
f ∗(ω) = fi(ω)
whenever ω ∈ Ei and f ∗∗ so that u(f ∗∗) = u(f ∗) + k for some k > 0. Since u ◦ f ∗ ∈
int(u(X)Ω) by construction of B′, such a k exists.
Now, define f iα for every α ∈ [0, 1] by f iα = (αfi + (1 − α)f ∗∗)Eifi for every
i ∈ {1, ..., n}. For α close enough to 1, d(f iα, fi) < 3 . Therefore, for α∗ sufficiently
high, note that d(B′′, B′) < 
3
where
B′′ = B′ ∪ {f iα∗}ni=1.
Conclude that d(B′′, B) ≤ d(B′′, B′) + d(B′, B) < 2
3
< . Further, V (Q,B′′) >
V (Q′, B′′) for all Q′ ∈ P∗ so that Q′ 6= Q. Therefore, B′′ ∈ K. Since B and 
are arbitrary, there is a B′′ ∈ K arbitrarily close to any B ∈ K(F). Therefore,
cl(K) = K(F).
Lemma 20. K is open.
Proof. Let Kc = K(F)\K. K is open if and only if Kc is closed. Because K(F) is a
metric space and thus first countable, it is sufficient to only show sequentially closed.
Pick (Bn)
∞
n=1 ⊂ Kc and suppose that Bn → B. Because P∗ is finite, there are
Q 6= Q′ ∈ P∗ and a sub-sequence (Bnk)∞k=1 so that Q,Q′ ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗ V (Q,Bnk) for
all Q′′ ∈ P∗. Because arg maxQ∈P∗ V (Q, ·) is upper hemi-continuous and Bnk → B,
Q,Q′ ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗ V (Q,B). Conclude that B ∈ Kc, so Kc is closed and K is
open.
Let > be a linear order on P∗∗ and set
Qˆ(B) = max
>
arg max
Q∈P∗∗
V (Q,B).
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Define the conditional choice correspondence c′(·) by
c′(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Qˆ(B)(ω))
for every B ∈ K(F). Clearly c′(·) has an optimal inattention representation and for
every B ∈ K, c′(B|ω) = c(B|ω) for every ω ∈ Ω.
Lemma 21. c′(·) satisfies ACI.
Proof. If A(B)  A(C), then Qˆ(B) ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,C). Therefore, Qˆ(B) ∈
arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,αB+(1−α)C). Further, if Q′ ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,αB+(1−α)C),
then Q′ ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,B) ∩ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,C). Since Qˆ(B) > Q′ for every
Q ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,B), it follows immediately that Qˆ(αB + (1 − α)C) = Qˆ(B).
The conclusion follows immediately.
Lemma 22. c′(·) satisfies INRA.
Proof. Suppose that A ⊂ B and c′(B|ω) ∩ A 6= ∅ for all ω. Note that
arg max
Q∈P∗∗
V (Q,A) ⊂ arg max
Q∈P∗∗
V (Q,B)
and since Qˆ(B) > Q′ for all Q′ ∈ arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,B), Qˆ(B) > Q′ for all Q ∈
arg maxQ∈P∗∗ V (Q,A) so Qˆ(A) = Qˆ(B). Since
c′(B|ω) ∩ A = [arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Qˆ(B)(ω))] ∩ A 6= ∅
= arg max
f∈A
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Qˆ(B)(ω))
= arg max
f∈A
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Qˆ(A)(ω))
= c′(A|ω)
it follows that c′(B|ω) ∩ A = c′(A|ω).
Since K is open and cl(K) = K(F), the Theorem follows immediately.
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Proof of Corollary 2:
Proof. (iii) clearly implies either (i) or (ii).
[(i) implies (iii)] Suppose c(·) satisfies Independence and has optimal inattention,
with the canonical representation Pˆ (B) = A(B). Let Q be coarsest common refine-
ment of {Pˆ (B)}B∈K(F). Claim that c(B|ω) = arg maxf∈B
´
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω)) for every
B. If not, there is a B′ and an ω so that
c(B′|ω) 6= arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω)).
Since c(·) has inattention,
c(B′|ω) = arg max
f∈B′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Pˆ (B′)(ω)).
There is a finite collection {B1, ..., Bn} ⊂ K(F) so that
[∩ni=1Pˆ (Bi)(ω)] ∩ Pˆ (B′)(ω) = Q(ω)
and c(Bi|ω) 6= c(Bj|ω) for all i 6= j (perhaps after mixing Bi with a singleton). Set
B∗ =
∏n
i=1
1
n
Bi and note that A(B∗)(ω) = Q(ω). Since we can take Pˆ (B∗) = A(B∗),
it follows that
c(B∗|ω) = arg max
f∈B∗
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω)).
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Now, since c(1
2
B∗ + 1
2
B′|ω) = 1
2
c(B∗|ω) + 1
2
c(B′|ω), A(1
2
B∗ + 1
2
B′)  A(B∗). By
construction, A(1
2
B∗ + 1
2
B′)(ω) = Q(ω), so
c(
1
2
B∗ +
1
2
B′|ω) = arg max
f∈ 1
2
B∗+ 1
2
B′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))
=
1
2
arg max
f∈B∗
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))
+
1
2
arg max
f∈B′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))
6= 1
2
arg max
f∈B∗
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))
+
1
2
arg max
f∈B′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Pˆ (B′)(ω))
=
1
2
c(B∗|ω) + 1
2
c(B′|ω),
which contradicts Independence.
[(ii) implies (iii)] Suppose that c(·|ω) satisfies WARP and has optimal inattention.
Since K(F) includes all two and three element subsets, there is a complete and
transitive binary relation ω so that This binary relation is equal to the revealed
preference relation. Let Q be any maximal element of P∗ according to . I show
that f ∼ω fQ(ω)y for any f and an arbitrarily bad y. Therefore, Pˆ (B)(ω) ⊂ Q(ω)
for every B and ω and consequently Pˆ (B)(ω) = Q(ω) represents choices.
Fix f ∈ F , ω∗ ∈ Ω and x, y ∈ X so that u(x) > u(f(ω)) > u(y) for every ω ∈ Ω.
Define gω by gω(ω
′) = 1
2
x+ f(ω) if ω′ ∈ Q(ω) and gω(ω′) = y otherwise. Consider the
problem B = {gω : ω /∈ Q(ω∗)} ∪ {f, fQ(ω∗)y}. Clearly, Pˆ (B) = Q (otherwise, this
is not optimal) and also f, fQ(ω∗)y ∈ c(B|ω∗). Conclude that f ∼ω fQ(ω∗)y.
Proof of Corollary 1:
Proof. That (ii) implies (i) is trivial, so suppose c(·) has optimal inattention and
satisfies Consequentialism.
Set y, x ∈ X so that u(x) > u(y) and consider B = {xEy : E ∈ P}∪{x}. Clearly
x ∈ c(B|ω)∀ω. For any ω, note that xP (ω)y ∈ B and xP (ω)y(ω′) = x(ω′) for every
ω′ ∈ P (ω). By Consequentialism, xP (ω)y ∈ c(B|ω). However, if ω′ /∈ P (ω), then
monotonicity implies that xP (ω)y /∈ c(B|ω′). Therefore, A(B) = P , which implies
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that P ∈ P∗. Since there is no Q ∈ P∗\{P} finer than P or coarser than P , {P} = P∗,
implying that c(·) is Bayesian.
A.2.2 Proof from Section 1.4
Proof of Theorem 3
Proof. [i,iv]Affine-uniqueness of u(·) is standard, and canonical uniqueness of Pˆ (·) is
trivial.
[iii] Suppose P∗1,P∗2 both represent c(·). Since c(·) is non-degenerate, there are
x, y ∈ X so that u(x) > u(y). For any Q ∈ P∗1, define BQ = {xEy : E ∈ Q}. Clearly,
xQ(ω)y ∈ c(BQ|ω) for every ω, so Pˆ (BQ)  Q. Since P∗2 represents c(·), Q ∈ P∗2.
Reversing the role of P∗1 and P∗2 give the converse, so they must be equal. T
[ii] Suppose that both pi1 and pi2 represent c(·). By (iii), let P∗ = P∗1 = P∗2 and
P∗∗ = {Q ∈ P∗ : Q′  Q&Q′ ∈ P∗ =⇒ Q = Q′} be the set of the finest subjective
information partitions in P∗. Write
V (B) = arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E∈Q
pi(E)[max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))]
for any B. Let Q be the set of minimal isolatable events for P∗.
Lemma 23. E is a isolatable event for P∗ if and only if any Q1, Q2 ∈ P∗∗ are such
that Q1  {E,Ec}, Q2  {E,Ec}, and there is a Q3 ∈ P∗∗ so that
Q3  {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ Ec}.
Proof. [ =⇒ ] Suppose that E is an isolatable event for P∗. Then pick any Q1, Q2 ∈
P∗∗ and x, y, z ∈ X so that u(x) > u(y) > u(z) ; let Bi = {xE ′y : E ′ ∈ Qi} for
i = 1, 2.
Suppose Qi 6 {E,Ec}. Then ∃F ∈ Q1 s.t. F ∩ E 6= ∅ and F ∩ Ec 6= ∅. Fix
z ∈ X so that u(x′) = u(x) +  where  > 0 and u(y) > u(z). Consider B = Bi
and B′ = Bi, noting that BE,zB′ = BEc,zB′ by construction, and that Qi is the only
element of V (B). If Pˆ (BE,zB
′) 6= Qi, then E is not an isolatable event since there is
no partition in P∗ finer than Qi except Qi. However, if Pˆ (BEB′) = Qi, then either
for any ω ∈ F ∩ E, [xFy]Ex /∈ c(BE,zB′|ω) or [xFy]Ecz /∈ c(BEc,zB′|ω), implying
101
that xFy /∈ c(BEB′|ω).51 This contradicts that E is an isolatable event for P∗.
Now, consider B = B1 and B
′ = B2. By construction,
BE,zB
′ = B′Ec,zB = B
′′.
Consequently,
[xQ1(ω)y]Ez ∈ c(B′′|ω)
for any ω ∈ E and
[xQ2(ω)y]E
cz ∈ c(B′′|ω)
for any ω ∈ Ec, implying that
Pˆ (B′′) {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ Ec}.
Therefore, there is some Q3 ∈ P∗∗ satisfying the desired property.
[⇐=] Suppose that any Q1, Q2 ∈ P∗∗ are such that Q1  {E,Ec}, Q2  {E,Ec},
and there is a Q3 ∈ P∗∗ so that
Q3  {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ Ec}.
Consider any B so that V (B) is singleton, and pick any B′, labeling Pˆ (B) = Q1 and
Pˆ (B′) = Q. If there is no z so that z /∈ c({f(ω), z}|ω) for any f ∈ B ∪ B′, then the
condition is arbitrarily satisfied so suppose such a z exists and consider BE,zB
′.
I claim that
{Q1} = arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E′∈Q&E′⊂E
pi(E ′) max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′).
Suppose not, so Q′ 6= Q1 is in the argmax above. Q′′ = {E ′∩E : E ′ ∈ Q′}∪{E ′∩Ec :
E ′ ∈ Q1} gives at least as high utility as Q1 when facing, and by assumption, there
is a Q∗ ∈ P∗∗ so that Q∗  Q′′, contradicting that V (B) is a singleton.
Consider now BE,zB
′. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that Pˆ (BE,zB′)
cannot be written as {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ Ec} for some Q2 ∈ P∗.
51This procedure must be modified slightly when pi1(F ∩ E) = pi1(F ∩ Ec) so that the bet on F
gives slightly higher utility on F ∩ Ec, but arguments otherwise extend.
102
Let Pˆ (BE,zB
′) = Q′ and take any Q  Q′ so that Q ∈ P∗∗. There is a Q3  {E ′ ∈
Q1 : E
′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q : E ′ ⊂ Ec} that is in P∗∗. Further,
∑
E′∈Q3&E′⊂Ec
pi(E ′) max
f∈BE,zB′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′) ≥
∑
E′∈Q′&E′⊂Ec
pi(E ′) max
f∈BE,zB′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′)
because Q3 is finer than Q
′ when restricted to Ec, and
∑
E′∈Q3&E′⊂E
pi(E ′) max
f∈BE,zB′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′) ≥
∑
E′∈Q′&E′⊂E
pi(E ′) max
f∈BE,zB′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′)
by the above claim because for any E ′ ⊂ E,
max
f∈BE,zB′
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′) ≤ max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E ′),
where equality holds whenever E ′ ∈ Q1. But this contradicts the assumption that
V (B) is a singleton: since {E ′ ∈ Q3 : E ′ ⊂ E} 6= {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E}, there is a
Q4  {E ′ ∈ Q3 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ Ec}, Q4 6= Q1 and Q4 ∈ V (B) by
construction. Conclude that Pˆ (BE,zB
′) = {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q : E ′ ⊂ Ec}
for some Q ∈ P∗.
Now, fix any ω ∈ E and suppose f ∈ c(B|ω). Since
c(B|ω) = arg max
g∈B
ˆ
u ◦ gdpi(·|Q1(ω))
and
c(BE,zB
′|ω) = arg max
f∈BE,zB′
ˆ
u ◦ gdpi(·|Q1(ω))
and ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q1(ω)) =
ˆ
u ◦ fEzdpi(·|Q1(ω)),
it follows that fEz ∈ c(B|ω). Similar arguments show that the same property holds
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for Ec. Conclude that E is an isolatable event for P∗.
This implies that Q P .
Lemma 24. If E is an isolatable event for P∗and F is a isolatable event P∗, then
E ∩ F is an isolatable event P∗.
Proof. Suppose E and F and isolatable events. Fix any Q1, Q2 ∈ P∗∗. Since E is an
isolatable event, there is a Q3  {E ′ ∈ Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ Ec} ∈ P∗∗.
Since Q2, Q3 ∈ P∗∗ and F is an isolatable event, there is a Q4  {E ′ ∈ Q3 : E ′ ⊂
F} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ F c} ∈ P∗∗. By construction, Q4  {Q1 : E ′ ⊂ E ∩ F} ∪ {E ′ ∈
Q2 : E
′ ⊂ (E ∩ F )c}. Since Q1, Q2 were arbitrary, this holds for any Q1, Q2. By
Lemma 23, E ∩ F is a sub-problem.
Lemma 25. If Q ∈ P∗∗ and E ∈ Q, then pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E).
Proof. Take any Q ∈ P∗∗ and any E ∈ Q. Set x, y ∈ int(u(X)) so that u(x) > u(y).
WLOG, identify x = u(x) and y = u(y). Set  so that
pi1(E)2+ (y − x)pi1(E ′) < 0
for all E ′ ∈ P . Take any simple f, g ∈ RE so that ´ fdpi1(·|E) ≥ ´ gdpi1(·|E). There
is an α ∈ (0, 1] so that αf + (1 − α)x, αg + (1 − α)x ∈ [x − , x + ]. There are
acts f ′, g′ ∈ F so that u(f ′)(ω) = αf(ω) + (1 − α)x for all ω ∈ E and u(f ′)(ω) = x
otherwise and u(g′)(ω) = αg(ω) + (1−α)x for all ω ∈ E and u(g′)(ω) = x otherwise.
Define B = {f ′Q(ω)y : ω ∈ Ω} ∪ {g′Q(ω)y : ω ∈ Ω}.
Claim that Pˆ (B) = Q. If not, then there is a Q′ so that Pˆ (B) = Q′, so let
H ∈ cˆ(B) and consider H∗. It must be that ´ H∗dpi1 ≥ ´ fdpi1. Since Q′ is not
finer than Q, there must be some E ′ ∈ P so that H∗(ω) = y for all ω ∈ E ′. Let
E ′′ = {ω ∈ Ω : u(H∗(ω)) ≥ u(f(ω))}. By construction, E ′′ ⊂ E. Further, 2 ≥
u(H∗(ω)) − u(f(ω)). Therefore pi1(E)2 + (y − x)pi1(E ′) +
´
u ◦ f ′dpi1 ≥
´
H∗dpi1.
However,
´
u ◦ f ′dpi1 > pi1(E)2 + (y − x)pi1(E ′) +
´
u ◦ f ′dpi1, contradicting that
Pˆ (B) = Q′.
Since
´
fdpi1(·|E) ≥
´
gdpi1(·|E), f ′Q(ω)x ∈ c(B|ω). Since pi2(·) also repre-
sents c(·), ´ fdpi2(·|E) ≥ ´ gdpi2(·|E). Since f and g are arbitrary, ´ fdpi1(·|E) ≥´
gdpi1(·|E) ⇐⇒
´
fdpi2(·|E) ≥
´
gdpi2(·|E) for any f and g. Therefore, pi1(·|E) =
pi2(·|E) for every E.
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Lemma 26. If pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E), pi1(·|E ′) = pi2(·|E ′) and E ∩ E ′ 6= ∅ then pi1(·|E ∪
E ′) = pi2(·|E ∪ E ′).
Proof. Suppose that pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E), pi1(·|E ′) = pi2(·|E ′) and E ∩ E ′ 6= ∅. Note
that pi1(F |E) = pi2(F |E) and pi1(F |E ′) = pi2(F |E ′). Using Bayes’ rule on the event
E ∩ E ′, it follows that
pi1(E|E ∪ E ′)
pi1(E ′|E ∪ E ′) =
pi2(E|E ∪ E ′)
pi2(E ′|E ∪ E ′) .
For any F ∈ Σ, it holds that
pi1(F |E ∪ E ′) = pi1(E|E ∪ E ′)(pi1(F |E)
−pi1(F ∩ E ′|E)) + pi1(E ′|E ∪ E ′)pi1(F |E ′)
and that
pi2(F |E ∪ E ′) = pi2(E|E ∪ E ′)(pi2(F |E)
−pi2(F ∩ E ′|E)) + pi2(E ′|E ∪ E ′)pi2(F |E ′).
Because pi1(E ∪ E ′|E ∪ E ′) = pi2(E ∪ E ′|E ∪ E ′) = 1, conclude that pi2(·|E ∪ E ′) =
pi1(·|E ∪ E ′).
Let Q∗ be the finest common coarsening of P∗∗. By successive applications of
Lemma 26, we have that pi1(·|E ′) = pi2(·|E ′) for all E ′ ∈ Q∗.
Lemma 27. For any E ∈ Q, pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E).
Proof. To save on notation, write pi1 = pi1(·|E) and pi2 = pi2(·|E) and assume it is
understood that each event E ′ is contained in E. Label the events in Q∗ that are
contained in E as E1, E2, ..., En. If n = 1, then we are done by the above, so assume
n ≥ 2.
Consider E1 and E2. By construction, there must be Q1, Q2 ∈ P∗∗ so that E ′ ⊂ E1
is in Q1 but not Q2, E
′′ ⊂ E2 is in Q2 but not in Q1, and there is no Q3  {E ′ ∈
Q1 : E
′ ⊂ E1} ∪ {E ′ ∈ Q2 : E ′ ⊂ Ec1}. Fix x, y ∈ X so that u(x) > u(y) and
u(x), u(y) ∈ int(u(X)). Define B1 = {xFy : F ∈ Q1} and B2 = {xFy : F ∈ Q2}. Let
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B1 = (B1∪{x′E ′y})\{xE ′y} and B2 = (B1∪{x′E ′′y})\{xE ′′y} where u(x′) = u(x)+.
For , ′ small enough but positive,
Pˆ (B1 ∪B
′
2 ) =
Q1 if pi1(E ′) > ′pi1(E ′′)Q2 if pi1(E ′) < ′pi1(E ′′).
Therefore, there exists a k = pi1(E
′′)
pi1(E′)
so that 
′ > k implies Pˆ (B

1 ∪ B′2 ) = Q1 and

′ < k implies Pˆ (B

1 ∪ B′2 ) = Q1. Since pi2 also represents c(·), the same cutoff must
hold for pi2. Therefore,
pi2(E
′′)
pi2(E ′)
=
pi1(E
′′)
pi1(E ′)
.
By Lemma 26 and Bayes rule,
pi2(E1)
pi2(E2)
=
pi1(E1)
pi1(E2)
.
By replacing E1 with Ei and E2 with Ei+1, we must have
pi2(Ei)
pi2(Ei+1)
= pi1(Ei)
pi1(Ei+1)
. Since∑n
i=1 pi1(Ei) =
∑n
i=1 pi2(Ei) = 1, we must have that pi1(Ei) = pi2(Ei) for all i.
Conclude that pi1(·|E) = pi2(·|E) whenever E is a minimal isolatable event for P∗1,
establishing the result.
Proof of Lemma 1:
Proof. Fix a pi1 that represents c(·). It suffices to show that any pi so that pi(·|E) =
pi1(·|E) for every E ∈ Q also represents c(·). Fix any such pi. It’s clear that
pi(·|Pˆ (B)(ω)) = pi1(·|Pˆ (B)(ω)) for all ω because Pˆ (B) Q. By Lemma 23,
arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E∈Q
pi(E)[max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))] =
arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E∈Q
pi1(E)[max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi1(·|Q(ω))]
for every B. Conclude that pi(·) also represents c(·).
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A.2.3 Proofs from Section 1.5
Assume P is finite and label P = {P1, ..., Pn}. Write AISP B if AIS B for cP (·).
Axiom. (Agreement) If {f} ISP {g} and not {g} ISP {f}, then for any α1, ..., αn ∈
[0, 1] and acts f1, ..., fn, g1, ..., gn so that
∑
αi = 1 and {gi} ISPi {fi}, either
∑
αigi 6=
g or
∑
αifi 6= f .
Theorem 10. If P is finite, each c ∈ {cP (·)}P∈P has an optimal inattention repre-
sentation and {cP (·)}P∈P satisfies Agreement, then there is a pi(·) and a u(·) so that
each cQ(·) is represented by (u, pi, Qˆ(·),P∗Q).
Proof. Define P on F by f P g if and only if {f} ISP {g}. P is a preorder
that satisfies Gilboa et al. [2010]’s c-completeness, monotonicity and independence
by Lemmas 8, 9, 11, and 12 respectively. Let B0 be the set of simple, Σ-measurable,
real functions. There exists a uP : X → R by Lemma 3. By agreement, it is WLOG
to take the same u(·) for uP (·) and assume that 0 ∈ int(u(X)). For every P , define
a cone KP ⊂ B0 by
KP = {λ(u ◦ f − u ◦ g) : f P g and λ ∈ R+}
and let K = co(∪P∈PKP ). K is a cone: suppose v ∈ K. Then there are γi and
vi ∈ Ki so that
∑
γivi = v. But then λvi ∈ Ki and consequently
∑
γiλvi = λv and
λv ∈ K.
Note that Agreement implies that if there exist
f1, ..., fn, g1, ..., gn ∈ F
and
α1, ..., αn ∈ [0, 1]
so that
∑
αi = 1, fi Pi gi, f =
∑
αifi and g =
∑
αigi, then g 6P f for any P ∈ P .
Identify fˆ with u◦f ∈ B0. Define  by f  g if and only if fˆ− gˆ ∈ K. Claim that
 extends each P compatibly. First, note that if f P g, then fˆ − gˆ ∈ KP ⊂ K, so
f  g.
Suppose g Pi f but f  g, so that fˆ − gˆ = v ∈ K. Then there are v1, ..., vn so
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that vi ∈ KPi and γ1, ...γn ∈ R+ so that∑
γivi = v.
Consequently, there is a λi and two acts fi, gi so that fi Pi gi and λi(fˆi − gˆi) = vi.
Rewriting,
fˆ − gˆ =
∑
λiγifˆi −
∑
λiγigˆi
so defining h(ω) =
∑
λiγifˆi(ω)− fˆ(ω) =
∑
λiγigˆi(ω)− gˆ(ω) gives that
fˆ + h =
∑
λiγifˆi
and
gˆ + h =
∑
λiγigˆi.
Moreover, by mixing f, g, fi, gi with an act 0 so that u(0(ω)) = 0 in every state
at a given probability, we can take h ∈ u(X)Ω. Now, we have that 1
2
f + 1
2
h =∑
λiγi(
1
2
fi +
1
2
0) and 1
2
g + 1
2
h =
∑
λiγi(
1
2
gi +
1
2
0). Conclude that there are acts
f ′i =
1
2
fi +
1
2
0 and g′i =
1
2
gi +
1
2
0 and αi ∈ [0, 1] so that f ′i Pi g′i for every i and
that 1
2
f + 1
2
h =
∑
αif
′
i and
1
2
g + 1
2
h =
∑
αig
′
i. By Agreement, it is not the case that
1
2
g + 1
2
h Pi 12f + 12h. However g Pi f ⇐⇒ 12g + 12h Pi 12f + 12h because Pi
satisfies Independence, a contradiction.
Now,  has an Aumann utility for the same reasons as above. Further, it also sat-
isfies Independence, monotonicity, reflexivity, transitivity and continuity from Gilboa
et al. [2010]. Conclude from their Theorem 1 that  has a unique set of priors Π so
that f  g ⇐⇒ ´ u ◦ fdpi ≥ ´ u ◦ gdpi for all pi ∈ Π. The prior from the Aumann
utility must be in Π by routine arguments.
Proof of Theorem 4:
Proof. First, suppose that c(·) is more attentive than c′(·). Fix an arbitrary Q ∈ P∗c′
and x, y ∈ X so that uc′(x) > uc′(y). Define the problem B by {xEy : E ∈ Q}.
By construction, Pˆc′(B)  Q so ˆˆPc′(B) = Q. It follows from c(·) more attentive
than c′(·) that there exists a B′ so that ˆˆPc(B′) = Q. Consequently, Pˆc(B′) ∈ P∗c and
Pˆc(B
′) ˆˆPc(B′) = Q so Q ∈ P∗c .
108
Now, suppose that P∗c′ ⊂ P∗c . Fix an arbitrary B and suppose that ˆˆPc′(B) = Q.
It follows immediately that Q ∈ P∗c′ . Fix x, y ∈ X so that uc(x) > uc(y). Define
the problem B′ by {xEy : E ∈ Q}. By construction, Pˆc(B′)  Q , implying that
ˆˆ
Pc(B
′) = Q. Since B is arbitrary, there exists such a B′ for every B. It follows that
c(·) is more attentive than c′(·).
Proof of Theorem 5:
Proof. It is clear that P∗Q ⊂ P∗P implies that that P is more valuable than Q. From
Theorem 4, this follows from cP (·) has a higher capacity for attention than cQ(·).
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that P is not more valuable than Q but
that cP (·) does not have a higher capacity for attention than cQ(·). Then there must
be some u, pi, B ∈ K(F) so that
max
Q′∈P∗Q
V (u, pi,B,Q′) > max
Q′′∈P∗P
V (u, pi,B,Q′′).
Let Q∗ ∈ arg maxQ′∈P∗Q V (u, pi,B,Q′). From Theorem 4, P∗Q ⊂ P∗P , so Q∗ ∈ P∗P .
Therefore,
max
Q′′∈P∗P
V (u, pi,B,Q′′) ≥ V (u, pi,B,Q∗) = max
Q′∈P∗Q
V (u, pi,B,Q′),
a contradiction.
A.2.4 Proofs from Section 1.6
Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Let p be an equilibrium to the market φ where there is at least one firm of
each type. For i = 1, ...,m, let pi = min{pj : φj = i} where min(∅) = ∞. Relabel so
that p1 ≤ p2 ≤ ... and suppose that pi ≤ 1 for i ≤ κ (this is WLOG because no firm
of type i sells anything if pi > 0). I claim that pκ−1 = 0. By assumption, there is at
least one firm, j∗, so that φj∗ = κ+ 1.
Suppose pκ−1 > 0. If the consumer purchases a good of type i, she purchases from
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the firm that charges pi by monotonicity. If she pays attention to the partition
{{1}, {2}, ..., {κ, κ+ 1, ...,m}}, (A.2.2)
then her expected utility is
κ−1∑
i=1
1
m
(1− pi)
which is a maximum, unless 1
m
(1− pκ) ≥ p1(m− κ), in which case
{{1}, {2}, {3}, ..., {κ}, {j, κ+ 1, ...m}}\{j} (A.2.3)
for some 1 ≤ j ≤ κ so that pj = p1 attains an expected utility of
κ∑
i=1
1
m
(1− pi)− (m− κ)p1.
In either case, firm j∗ makes zero profit.
Suppose j∗ deviates to charging a price pκ−1
2
> 0. Now, the optimal partition is
either
{{1}, {2}, ..., {κ+ 1}, {κ− 1, κ, κ+ 2, ...,m}}
if (A.2.2) was maximal in the first problem or
{{1}, {2}, {3}, ..., {κ− 1}, {κ+ 1}, {j, κ, κ+ 2, ...,m}}\{j}
for j as above if (A.2.3) was maximal in the first problem. In state κ+1, the consumer
purchases from j∗ so it attains an expected profit of
pκ−1
2m
> 0
which is a profitable deviation and contradicts that p is an equilibrium where pκ−1 > 0.
Therefore, pκ−1 = 0 in any equilibrium.
Since p1 = 0, the second partition is always optimal. Suppose 1 ≥ pκ > 0, so
the consumer purchases from a firm of type κ and pays a positive price in state κ in
the equilibrium. Firm j∗can charge pκ
2
and attract customers to make positive profit.
Therefore, pκ = 0 so κ firms of different types charge price 0 in equilibrium and the
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consumer purchases from one of these firms no matter what the state is.
Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. Expected total surplus is equal to the probability that the consumer purchases
the good from a firm whose type matches the state. Clearly, this probability can be no
larger than nm(φ)+nc(φ)
m
. Further, the consumer makes at most κ different purchases,
so it can also be no larger than κ
m
. If k ≥ nm(φ) + nc(φ) but the consumer makes
less than nm(φ) + nc(φ) different purchases or nm(φ) + nc(φ) > κ and the consumer
makes less than κ, then a firm from which the consumer does not purchase can make
positive profit by charging a price equal to  > 0 for  small enough. Consequently,
in equilibrium, the consumer purchases the good from a firm whose type matches the
state with probability equal to max{nm(φ)+nc(φ)
m
, κ
m
}.
For expected consumer surplus, if κ < nm(φ) + nc(φ), the result follows from
Proposition 2 and the above discussion. If κ ≥ nm(φ)+nc(φ), then it is easy to verify
that in equilibrium, the monopolistic firms charge price 1 and at least one competitive
firm of each type charges price 0. Consequently, expected consumer surplus equals
nc(φ)
m
.
A.3 Counter-Examples
For the following, set Ω = {ω1, ω2, ω3}, P = {{ω1}, {ω2}, {ω3}} and X = ∆R. To
economize on space, I write (a, b, c) for an act that gives a for sure in state ω1, b for
sure in state ω2 and c for sure in state ω3 and c(B|·) = (c(B|ω1), c(B|ω2), c(B|ω3)).
A.3.1 All but ACI
Suppose P∗ = {Q P : #Q ≤ 2}, u(x) = x and pi(ω) = 1
3
for every ω. Define a cost
function ρ so that ρ(Q) = #Q− 1 if Q ∈ P∗ and ρ(Q) =∞ otherwise. If
Pˆ (B) = max
>
arg max
Q∈P∗
∑
E∈Q
pi(E)[max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))]− ρ(Q)
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where {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}} > {{ω2}, {ω1, ω3}} > {{ω3}, {ω1, ω2}} > {Ω} and Equation
(1.2.2) holds, then c(·) violates ACI but satisfies the other 4 axioms. Define f, g, h by
(2, 0, 0), (0, 2, 2) and (0, 0, 0), respectively, and let Bα = α{f, g} + (1− α){h}. Note
that c(B1|·) = ({f}, {g}, {g}). For α ≥ 12 , Pˆ (Bα) = {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}}, but for α < 12
Pˆ (Bα) = {Ω}. Therefore,
c(B 1
4
|ω1) = {1
4
g +
3
4
h} 6= {1
4
f +
3
4
h} = 1
4
c(B1|ω1) + 3
4
{h},
contradicting ACI.52 Monotonicity and Subjective Consequentialism are clearly sat-
isfied. To see that INRA is satisfied, note that by Equation (1.2.2), if A ⊂ B and
A ∩ c(B|ω) 6= ∅ for all ω, then Pˆ (A) = Pˆ (B). Again using equation (1.2.2), we have
that c(A|ω) = c(B|ω) ∩ A.
A.3.2 All but INRA
Keeping P∗, u(·), pi(·) and > as above, suppose that
Pˆ (B) = max
>
arg min
Q∈P∗
∑
E∈Q
pi(E)[min
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|Q(ω))]
for every B and that Equation (1.2.2) holds for each B and ω. This c(·) vio-
lates INRA. Take f, g, h, j so that f = (3, 1, 2), g = (1, 3, 1), h = (1, 0, 0) and
j = (0, 1, 1). If B = {f, g, h, j} and A = {f, g}, then Pˆ (B) = {{ω1}, {ω2, ω3}}
while Pˆ (A) = {{ω2}, {ω1, ω3}}. Consequently, c(B|·) = ({f}, {g}, {g}) and c(A|·) =
({f}, {g}, {f}), contradicting INRA.53 Equation (1.2.2) implies that Subjective Con-
52Similar choices occur for any B′ with d(B′, B) <  for  suitably small.
53Similar choices occur for any B′ with d(B′, B) <  for  suitably small.
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sequentialism and Monotonicity hold. To see why ACI holds, note that
min
f∈αB+(1−α){g}
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E) = αmin
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|E) + (1− α)
ˆ
u ◦ gdpi(·|E)
for any B, g and E. This implies that Pˆ (αB + (1 − α){g}) = Pˆ (B), and Equation
(1.2.2) gives that ACI holds.
A.3.3 All but Monotonicity
Let v(x, ω1) = x and v(x, ω2) = v(x, ω3) = −x. Define
c(B|ω) = arg max
f∈B
∑
ω∈Ω
v(f(ω), ω)
and note that 0 ∈ c({0, 1}|ω) for all ω. Set f = (1, 0, 0) and B = {f, 0}. Since∑
ω∈Ω v(f(ω), ω) = 1 and
∑
ω∈Ω v(0, ω) = 0, {f} = c(B|ω). However,
0 ∈ c({0, f(ω)}|ω)
for all ω, so Monotonicity is contradicted. It is trivial to verify that the other axioms
are satisfied.
A.3.4 All but Subjective Consequentialism
Return to the setup from the first two counter-examples. Set pi1(ω1) = pi2(ω3) =
1
2
,
pi1(ω2) = pi1(ω3) = pi2(ω1) = pi2(ω2) =
1
4
, and pi3 = pi2. Suppose that
c(B|ωi) = arg max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpii
and consider f = (4, 2, 2), g = (4, 2, 0), h = (0, 4, 5) and B = {f, g, h}. By construc-
tion c(B|·) = ({f}, {h}, {h}). Note that {ω1} = {ω′′ : c(B|ω′′) = c(B|ω1)} and that
f(ω1) = g(ω1), a contradiction of subjective consequentialism. The other properties
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are trivial to verify.
A.3.5 All but Continuity
Take P∗, u(·) and pi(·) as in the first example. Write Pi = {{ωi}, {ωi}c}. For every
problem B, define an ordering >B by Pi >B Pj if and only if
max
f∈B
u(f(ωi))) > max
f∈B
u(f(ωj))OR
[max
f∈B
u(f(ωi))) = max
f∈B
u(f(ωj))AND
(max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|{ωi}c) > max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|{ωj}c)]
OR [max
f∈B
u(f(ωi))) = max
f∈B
u(f(ωj))AND
(max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|{ωi}c) = max
f∈B
ˆ
u ◦ fdpi(·|{ωj}c)
AND i < j]
Also, set every Pi >B {Ω}. For every problem B, take Pˆ (B) = max>B P∗ and suppose
Equation (1.2.2) holds. I will show that Continuity fails. Set f = (1, .9., 1). and
g = (1, .8, 1), noting that f dominates g but g does not dominate f . Set h = (1, 0, 1),
j = (0, .9, 0) and k = (0, 0, 0), and for every n > 2 define Bn,1 = {g},
Bn,2 = {g, n− 1
n
h+
1
n
k,
n− 1
n
j +
1
n
k},
Bn,3 = {n−1n h+ 1nk, n−1n j + 1nk, n−2n f + 2nk}, Bn,4{, n−2n f + 2nk}. Note that
({g}, {g}, {g}) = c(Bn,2|·),
that
({n− 1
n
h+
1
n
k}, {n− 1
n
j +
1
n
k}, {n− 1
n
h+
1
n
k}) = c(Bn,3|·),
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and that
({n− 2
n
f +
2
n
k}, {n− 2
n
f +
2
n
k}, {n− 2
n
f +
2
n
k}) = c({n− 2
n
f +
2
n
k}|·).
Therefore {g} IS {n−2
n
f + 2
n
k} for every n > 2, and as n→∞,
n− 2
n
f +
2
n
k → f.
Conclude that {g} IS {f} and f dominates g but g does not dominate f , contradicting
Continuity. One can verify easily that the other four axioms are satisfied.
A.3.6 Behavior compatible with optimal inattention but not inattention
to alternatives
Suppose Ω = {a, b, c, d} and P = {{a}, {b}, {c}, {d}}. Consider pi so that pi(ω) = 1
4
for every ω and P∗ = {Q : Q  Q1} ∪ {Q : Q  Q2} where Q1 = {{a}, {b, c}, {d}}
and Q2 = {{a, d}, {b}, {c}}. Define acts x, y, z, w that give the utility values in the
following table:
a b c d
u ◦ w 6 6 6 4
u ◦ x 8 9 0 0
u ◦ y 0 0 0 16
u ◦ z 2 0 9 0
One can verify that Pˆ ({x, y, z, w}) = Q1, Pˆ ({x, z, w}) = Q2, Pˆ ({x, y, z}) = Q2,
and Pˆ ({y, z}) = Q1, so c({x, y, z, w}|a) = {x}, c({x, z, w}|a) = {w}, c({x, y, z}|a) =
{y}, and c({y, z}) = {z}. But then by Lemma 1 and Theorem 3 of Masatlioglu et al.
[2012], xPy and yPx so c(·|a) cannot be a choice with limited attention.
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A.3.7 Behavior compatible with inattention to alternatives but not opti-
mal inattention
Use the same setup as in C.6. Fix x, y, z ∈ X, i.e. all three are lotteries. Suppose
c(·|a) is a choice with limited attention where Γ({x, y, z}) = {y, z}, Γ({x, y}) = {x, y}
and x  y  z. Then c({x, y, z}|a) = {y} and c({x, y}|a) = {x}. If c(·) has an
optimal inattention representation, then c({x, y, z}|a) = {y} implies u(y) > u(x) but
c({x, y}|a) = {x} implies u(x) > u(y), a contradiction.
Appendix B
Appendix for Chapter 2
B.1 Proofs not in text
B.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2
I will show that
D(p, φ; p¯, φ¯) = φDI(p, p¯, φ¯) + (1− φ)DU(p, p¯, φ¯),
where:
DU(p, p¯, φ¯) = δU(φ¯) +
p¯− p
t
∆U(φ¯),
DI(p, p¯, φ¯) = δI(φ¯) +
p¯− p
t
∆I(φ¯),
δU(φ¯) = (1−(1−q)
n)
n
+ 1
n
∑n
l=κ+1[
∑n−κ−1
z=l−κ
∑z
i=l−κ (
n−l
z−i)(
l−1
i )φ¯z(1−φ¯)n−1−z(1−q)κ+iq
−F (n−κ−1;φ¯,n−1)(1−q)l−1],
∆U(φ¯) = q[1− (1− q)n−1(1− F (n− κ− 1; φ¯, n− 1))],
δI(φ¯) = (1−(1−q)
n)
n
+ 1
n
∑n
l=κ+1[
∑n−κ−2
z=0
∑z
i=0 (
n−l
z−i)(
l−1
i )φ¯z(1−φ¯)n−1−z(1−q)κ+iq
−F (n− κ− 2; φ¯, n− 1)(1− q)l−1q], and
∆I(φ¯) = q[1−(1−q)n−1(1−F (n−κ−2;φ¯,n−1))−
∑n−κ−2
i=0 f(i;φ¯,n−1)(1−q)κ+i].
116
117
This follows from the discussion following Lemma 2 and noting that if firm j charges
price p (which is “close” to p¯), then
N1 =
p¯− p
t
+
1
n
,
N2 = N3 = ... = Nn−1 = 1n and
Nn =
p− p¯
t
+
1
n
.
See Grossman and Shapiro [1984] for explicit derivation of the measure of these groups.
Combining the above cases, the expected demand for firm j among the consumers
who do not see her ad equals
κ∑
l=1
Nl(1− q)l−1q +
n∑
l=κ+1
Nl[1− F (n− κ− 1; φ¯, n− 1)](1− q)l−1q
+
n∑
l=κ+1
Nl[
n−κ−1∑
z=l−κ+1
z∑
i=l−κ+1
(
n− l
z − i
)(
l − 1
i
)
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z(1− q)l−1q].
Using the formulas above for Nl yields that
DU(p, p¯, φ¯) = δU(φ¯) +
p¯− p
t
∆U(φ¯),
where δU and ∆U are as above. Similarly, the expected demand for firm j among the
consumers who see her ad equals
κ+1∑
l=1
Nl(1− q)l−1q +
n∑
l=κ+2
Nl[1− F (n− κ− 2; φ¯, n− 1)](1− q)l−1q
+
n∑
l=κ+2
Nl{
n−κ−2∑
z=0
[
l−κ−1∑
i=0
(
n− l
z − i
)(
l − 1
i
)
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z(1− q)κ+iq
+
z∑
i=l−κ
(
n− l
z − i
)(
l − 1
i
)
φ¯z(1− φ¯)n−1−z(1− q)l−1q]}.
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Using the formulas above for Nl yields that
DI(p, p¯, φ¯) = δI(φ¯) +
p¯− p
t
∆I(φ¯),
where δI and ∆I are as above. Conclude that firm j has an expected demand given
by (2.3.4). Note that DI(p, p¯, φ¯) ≥ DU(p, p¯, φ¯), and that both are weakly increasing
in φ¯. Therefore, the demand for firm j is also weakly increasing in φ¯.
B.1.2 Proof of Proposition 5
(iii) and (iv) are obvious from equations (2.4.1) and (2.4.2).
[(i)] Note that
∂p∗
∂q
= −t1− (1− q)
κ + κ(1− q)κ−1q
nq2
using Equation (2.4.2). Since 1 > (1− q)κ and nq2 > 0 for every q ∈ (0, 1), it follows
that ∂p
∗
∂q
< 0.
Moving on to pi∗, note that
pi∗ = t
(1− (1− q)κ)2
qn2
.
Taking the first derivative,
∂pi∗
∂q
= −t(1− (1− q)κ)1− (1− q)
κ + 2κ(1− q)κ−1q
n2q2
.
This is positive if and only if
1− (1− q)κ + 2κ(1− q)κ−1q < 0
which holds if and only if
1− (1− q)κ
(1− q)κ−1q < 2κ.
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Note that q∗ is the value making the first derivative equal to 0. I know show that the
LHS is decreasing in q. Taking the first derivative yields that
∂ 1−(1−q)
κ
(1−q)κ−1q
∂q
=
1− (1− q)κ − κq
q2(1− q)k .
Noting that 1− (1− q)κ − κq = 0 when q = 0, since
∂(1− (1− q)κ − κq)
∂q
= κ(1− q)κ−1 − κ ≤ 0
the LHS is decreasing in q. Therefore, whenever q < q∗, pi∗ is decreasing in q, and
whenever q > q∗, pi∗ is increasing in q.
[(ii)] To see that p∗ increases as κ increases, note that (1 − q)κ+1 − (1 − q)κ =
(1− q)κ((1− q)− 1) = −q(1− q)κ < 0. Therefore, t1−(1−q)κ+1
q
> t1−(1−q)
κ
q
. Similarly,
as κ increases, demand also increases. Therefore, pi∗ increases. 
B.1.3 Proof of Proposition 6
The key step is showing that total transportation costs in equilibrium are
t
2− q + (1− q)κ(q − 2 + 2qκ)
4nq
.
If I show this, then the rest of the proposition follows from the fact that a consumer
purchases a good only if it is high quality and she process information about it. The
probability of paying attention to information that reveals at least one firm is high
quality equals 1− (1− q)κ.
In equilibrium, a consumer purchases from the closest firm with probability q, the
second with probability (1 − q)q and so on. However, the probability of purchasing
from the the jth closes firm when j ≥ κ + 1 is 0. Following Grossman and Shapiro
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[1984], the aggregate cost of traveling to the jth closest firm if there are n firms is
t
2j − 1
4n
so transportation costs are given by
κ∑
j=1
t
2j − 1
4n
q(1− q)j−1 = t2− q + (1− q)
κ(q − 2 + 2qκ)
4nq
,
which was to be verified. 
B.1.4 Details for p∗ = v − t/2
If other firms charge p¯ = v − t
2
and firm j charges p > p¯, then less than the entire
market is served. In particular, when p is close to p¯, firm j has a demand of
DI2(p, p¯, φ¯) = δI(φ¯) +
p¯− p
t
∆I2(φ¯),
where δI(φ¯) is as above and
∆I2(φ¯) = q[1+(1−q)n−1(1−F (n−κ−2;φ¯,n−1))+
∑n−κ−2
i=0 (
n−1
i )φ¯i(1−φ¯)n−1−i(1−q)κ+i].
from the consumers who see its ad, and a demand of
DU2(p, p¯, φ¯) = δU(φ¯) +
p¯− p
t
∆U2(φ¯)
where δU(φ¯) is as above and
∆U2(φ¯) = q[1 + (1− q)n−1(1− F (n− κ− 1; φ¯, n− 1))].
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If price p∗ = v − t
2
is an equilibrium, then
p¯(φ¯) ≥ v − t
2
≥ p¯(φ¯) = t φ¯δI(φ¯) + (1− φ¯)δU(φ¯)
2[φ¯∆I2(φ¯) + (1− φ¯)∆U2(φ¯)]
.
To see why, fix φ¯ and suppose that all other firms set p¯ = v− t
2
. A price p < p¯ is best
response only if p satisfies Equation (2.5.1). A price p > p¯ is a best response only if
p− c/2 = p¯
2
+ t
φ¯δI(φ¯) + (1− φ¯)δU(φ¯)
2[φ¯∆I2(φ¯) + (1− φ¯)∆U2(φ¯)]
=
p¯
2
+
p¯(φ¯)
2
.
If p¯(φ¯) ≥ v − t
2
≥ p¯(φ¯), then the only possible best response is p = p¯.
B.1.5 Proof of Proposition 8
The Proposition claims only necessity. This can be established using the Envelope
Theorem and Proposition 7. I provide more detailed arguments below because they
provide sufficient conditions as well. The expected demand for firm j from setting
price p and advertising φ is
D(p, φ, p¯, φ¯) = δU + φ(δI − δU) + p¯− p
t
[φ∆I + (1− φ)∆U ]
= δU + φ(δI − δU) + p¯− p
t
C(φ, φ¯).
Fixing φ, φ¯ and p¯, pD(p, φ, p¯, φ¯) is a concave function of p. The first order condition
for p is given by
0 = δU + φ(δI − δU) + p¯
t
C(φ, φ¯)− 2p
t
C(φ, φ¯)
so
p =
p¯
2
+
t(δU + φ(δI − δU))
2(C(φ, φ¯))
.
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In a symmetric equilibrium, p¯ = t(δU+φ¯(δI−δU ))
C(φ¯,φ¯)
, so p is a function of only φ¯ and φ:
p(φ, φ¯) = t[
δU + φ¯(δI − δU)
2C(φ¯, φ¯)
+
δU + φ(δI − δU)
2C(φ, φ¯)
]
Assuming she prices at p(φ, φ¯), expected demand as a function of φ and φ¯ can be
written as
D(φ, φ¯) = δU + φ(δI − δU) + p¯− p
t
C(φ, φ¯)
= δU + φ(δI − δU) + C(φ, φ¯)[δU + φ¯(δI − δU)
2C(φ¯, φ¯)
+
δU + φ(δI − δU)
2C(φ, φ¯)
]
=
δU + φ(δI − δU)
2
+ (δU + φ¯(δI − δU)) C(φ, φ¯)
2C(φ¯, φ¯)
so
D′(φ, φ¯) =
δI − δU
2
+
C ′(φ, φ¯)(δU + φ¯(δI − δU))
2C(φ¯, φ¯)
=
δI − δU
2
+
(∆I −∆U)(δU + φ¯(δI − δU))
2C(φ¯, φ¯)
and D′′(φ, φ¯) = 0. Similarly,
p′(φ, φ¯) = t
δI − δU
2C(φ, φ¯)
− tC
′(φ, φ¯)(δU + φ(δI − δU))
2(C(φ, φ¯))2
= t
δI − δU
2C(φ, φ¯)
− t(∆I −∆U)(δU + φ(δI − δU))
2C(φ, φ¯)2
= t
∆UδI −∆IδU
2C(φ, φ¯)2
and
p′′(φ, φ¯) = −t(∆I −∆U)∆UδI −∆IδU
C(φ, φ¯)3
,
noting that both p′(φ, φ¯) ≥ 0 and p′′(φ, φ¯) ≥ 0 since δI > δU and ∆U > ∆I .
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If there is a symmetric equilibrium in which price is less than v− t
2
and φ ∈ (0, 1),
then the first order condition is that
A′(φ; a) =
∂R(φ, φ¯)
∂φ
|φ=φ¯
Combining,
∂R(φ, φ¯)
∂φ
|φ=φ¯ = p′D + pD′
= t[
δI − δU
2C(φ, φ¯)
− (∆I −∆U)(δU + φ(δI − δU))
2C(φ, φ¯)2
]D(φ, φ¯) +
t
D(φ¯, φ¯)
C(φ¯, φ¯)
[
δI − δU
2
+
(∆I −∆U)(δU + φ¯(δI − δU))
2C(φ¯, φ¯)
]
= p¯(δI − δU)
A local optimum requires that the second derivative of pi(·)−A(·) is negative. Since
∂2R(φ, φ¯)
∂φ2
|φ=φ¯ = p′′D + 2p′D′ + pD′′
= 2(δI − δU)p′ − t(∆I −∆U)∆UδI −∆IδU
C(φ, φ¯)3
D
= 2(δI − δU)p′ − p¯(∆I −∆U)∆UδI −∆IδU
C(φ, φ¯)2
= [2(δI − δU)t+ p¯(∆U −∆I)]∆UδI −∆IδU
C(φ, φ¯)2
because D′′ = 0. A further necessary condition is then that ∂
2R(φ,φ¯)
∂φ2
|φ=φ¯ < A′′(φ¯), so
the second order sufficient condition for a local optimum is satisfied. 
B.1.6 Proof of Proposition 9
Again write Aφa ≡ ∂2A(φ,a)∂a∂φ and Aφφ ≡ ∂
2
∂2φ
A(φ; a), evaluated at φ = φ∗. If φ∗ is
an equilibrium, then the marginal benefit of advertising must be less than (resp.
greater than) the marginal cost of advertising for a region above (resp. below) φ∗.
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Consequently, ∂p¯(φ)[δI(φ)−δU (φ)]
∂φ
|φ=φ∗ = R′ < Aφφ.
Totally differentiating equation (2.5.2) yields
dφ∗R′ = Aφada+ Aφφdφ∗.
Therefore,
dφ∗
da
=
Aφa(φ
∗)
R′ − Aφφ(φ∗)
The assumption that Aφa(φ
∗) > 0 implies
dφ∗
da
< 0.
Since p¯′(φ) > 0, dp¯(φ
∗)
da
< 0 when a < a¯. Equilibrium profit is given by
pi(φ∗) = p¯(φ∗)D(φ∗)− A(φ∗).
Therefore,
dpi
da
=
d
dφ∗
[p¯(φ∗)D(φ∗)]
dφ∗
da
− Aφdφ
∗
da
− Aa
= [p¯′(φ∗)D(φ∗) + p¯(φ∗)D′(φ∗)− Aφ]dφ
∗
da
− Aa,
completing the claim. 
B.1.7 Proof of Proposition 10
Since κ = n− 1, the surplus from consumers who see at least one ad is
(1− (1− q)n)v − t2− q + (1− q)
n(q − 2 + 2qn)
4nq
,
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and the surplus from consumers who see exactly zero ads is
(1− (1− q)n−1)v − t2− q + (1− q)
n−1(q − 2 + 2q(n− 1))
4nq
.
This follows from Proposition 6. Since the proportion who see zero ads is (1− φ)n,
W (φ) = (1− (1− q)n)v − t2− q + (1− q)
n(q − 2 + 2qn)
4nq
−(1− φ)n[q(1− q)n−1[v − t2n− 1
4n
]]− nA(φ).
Taking the first derivative yields that
W ′(φ) = n(1− φ)n−1[q(1− q)n−1[v − t2n− 1
4n
]]− nA′(φ).
Now,
DI(φ) =
1− (1− q)n
n
and
DU(φ) =
1− (1− q)n
n
− (1− φ)
n−1[q(1− q)n−1]
n
.
The first order necessary condition for an equilibrium is that
p¯(φ∗)(1− φ∗)n−1 q(1− q)
n−1
n
= A′(φ∗).
Since p¯(φ∗) ≤ v − t
2
< v − t2n−1
4n
= v − t
2
+ 1
4n
,
nA′(φ∗) < (1− φ∗)n−1q(1− q)n−1(v − t2n− 1
4n
).
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Conclude that
W ′(φ∗) = n(1− φ∗)n−1[q(1− q)n−1[v − t2n− 1
4n
]]− nA′(φ)
> (n− 1)(1− φ)n−1[q(1− q)n−1[v − t2n− 1
4n
]]
> 0
so if (φ∗, p∗) is an equilibrium, W ′(φ∗) > 0.
Appendix C
Appendix for Chapter 3
C.1 Details for Section 3.2
Consider n = 101, a set of players I = {1, ..., n}, a set of alternatives A = {A,B},
set of types Ti = {1, 2} for each i ∈ I and T0 = {a, b}. Set T := T0 × T1 × ... × Tn.
Each player has the same preference over state-alternative pairs given by a function
u : T ×A → R. Define u(·) by
u((t0, ..., t101), c) ≡ u(t0, c) =

1 t0 = c
0 t0 6= c
for all T . Player i’s pure strategies are Si = {A,B}; let S = S1 × ... × Sn. An
aggregation rule f : S → A maps the profile of actions to an alternative. Set
f(s0, ..., s101) =

A if
∑101
i=1 χsi(A) ≥ 51
B otherwise
for all (s0, ..., s101) ∈ S, where χE(·) is the indicator function of the set E. Fix a
non-empty, closed and convex set of common priors Π ∈ ∆T . Define Π by
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Π = {pi ∈ ∆T : pi({a} × T1 × ...× T101) ∈ [p, p¯] and
pi({(a, t1, ..., t101)})
pi({a} × T1 × ...× T101) =
101∏
i=1
.6ti .41−ti and
pi({(b, t1, ..., t101)})
pi({b} × T1 × ...× T101) =
101∏
i=1
.61−ti .4ti}
The game is defined by the collection (A, I, T, u, S, f,Π).
For each i, let Sˆi : Ti → ∆Si be a strategy for player i and let Σ := Sˆ0 × ...× Sˆn
be the set of strategy profiles. This requires that the player’s strategy be measurable
with respect to her type. As is convention, let σi denote player i’s strategy and let σ−i
represents the vector of strategies chosen by players other than i. A strategy profile
σ∗ ∈ Σ is an equilibrium if σ∗i (ti) is in the set
arg max
σ∈∆Si
min
pi∈Π
Epi[Eσ∗−i [u((t0, ..., tn), f((s0(t0), ..., si−1(ti−1), σ, si+1(ti+1), ...)]|ti]
for every i ∈ I.
C.2 Proof of Theorem 6
Proof. Define the set Λ = {l ∈ RA×Ω : ∑a∈A l(a, ω) = n}, noting that Λ is compact,
and consider the correspondence Ct : Λ  ∆A defined by
Ct(λ) = arg max
σˆ∈∆A
min
q∈pit
ˆ
ω
ˆ
Z(A)
∑
a∈A
σˆ(a)U(x, t, a, ω)dp(x|λ(ω))dq.
Define C(λ) = ×t∈TCt(λ) and let F : Λ  Λ be defined by
F (λ) = {n
∑
t∈T
ct(a)r(t|ω) : c ∈ C(λ)}.
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If λ ∈ F (λ) then (3.3.3) is satisfied, since then σ∗(t) ∈ arg maxσˆ∈∆(A) Vt(σˆ, σ∗) for
some σ∗ that generates λ. Hence, existence of an equilibrium is equivalent to showing
F (·) that has a fixed point. It remains to be shown that F is convex and closed.
Since F (λ) is an affine transformation of C(λ), need to show that C(·) is convex and
closed. Show first that all Ct are convex, compact and upper hemi continuous.
[Convex:] Define φ : C(Ω)→ R by φ(f) = minq∈pit
´
fdq, where C(Ω) is the set of
continuous functions from Ω to the real numbers). Then φ and p(x|λ(ω))U(x, t, ·, ω)
are both concave. So g : ∆A→ R defined by
g(σˆ) = φ(p(x|λ(ω))
∑
a∈A
σˆ(a)U(x, t, a, ω))
is also concave. Hence g(x) = g(y) =⇒ g(αx + (1 − α)y) ≥ g(x)∀α ∈ [0, 1] and
x, y ∈ Ct(λ) =⇒ αx + (1 − α)y ∈ Ct(λ). Therefore Ct(λ) is convex, from which
it follows that C(·) is convex since a product of convex sets is convex. Since C(·) is
convex, F (·) is convex.
[Closed:] φ is continuous by the Maximum Theorem (Theorem 17.31 of Aliprantis
and Border [2006]; henceforth, AB). p(x|·) is continuous since it is a product of
continuous functions. U(x, t, ·, ω) is continuous by assumption. So
min
q∈pit
ˆ
ω
p(x|λ(ω))[
∑
a∈A
σˆ(a)U(x, t, a, ω)]dq
is continuous. Hence Ct(λ) is upper hemi continuous and compact by the Maximum
Theorem as the set of solutions to a maximization problem.
C(λ) is compact for all λ by the Tychonoff product theorem (AB Theorem 2.61)
because C(λ) is a product of compact sets. By AB Theorem 17.20, it suffices to show
that if λn → λ, xn ∈ C(λn), and xn → x then x ∈ C(λ). Given such sequences,
let xn,t be the t-th component of xn and xt the t-th component of x for any t ∈ T .
By definition of the product topology, xn → x ⇐⇒ xn,t → xt for all t ∈ T . By
definition of C(·), xn,t ∈ Ct(λn) for each n. Because Ct(·) is upper hemi continuous
and compact, xt ∈ Ct(λ). Since t is arbitrary, xt ∈ Ct(λ) for all t ∈ T and by
definition of C(·), x ∈ C(λ). Hence C(·) is upper hemi continuous and compact. AB
Theorem 17.10 establishes that C(·) is closed and thus F (·) is closed.
Since Λ is compact and F (·) is closed and convex, applying Kakutani’s Fixed point
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theorem (AB Corollary 17.55) yields a λ∗ such that λ∗ ∈ F (λ∗).
C.3 Preliminaries for the Remaining Proofs
Lemma 28 relies on two functions of the strategy profile.
Formally, if other votes unfold so that the realized action profile is in the event
PivA = {x ∈ Z(C) : x(A) = x(B) or x(A) = x(B)− 1}, (C.3.1)
then the voter is pivotal for candidate A; let PivB be the corresponding event for B.
Each voter’s best response depends on the relationship between her set of posteriors
and the function b : Ω× (∆C)T → [0, 1] given by b(b, σ) =
Pr(PivB|b, σ) + Pr(PivA|b, σ)
Pr(PivB|b, σ) + Pr(PivB|a, σ) + Pr(PivA|b, σ) + Pr(PivA|a, σ) . (C.3.2)
and b(a, σ) = 1 − b(b, σ). The probabilities in this function depend only on the
strategy profile and not on an individual voter’s type.
Another key equation is the insurance strategy, denoted sˆ(·, σ), is given by
sˆ(A, σ) =
2(E[U |b, σ]− E[U |a, σ]) + Pr(PivB|b, σ) + Pr(PivB|a, σ)
Pr(PivB|b, σ) + Pr(PivB|a, σ) + Pr(PivA|b, σ) + Pr(PivA|a, σ) .
and sˆ(B, σ) = 1 − sˆ(A, σ). This maps a strategy profile σ into the strategy a voter
would play to ensure his expected utility is independent of the state if sˆ(A, σ) ∈ [0, 1].
Otherwise, no strategy equalizes a voters expected utilities between states.
Notice that expected utility in state ω if the voter abstained is given by
E[U |a, σ] =
∞∑
n=0
e−λ(a)(A)λ(a)(A)n
n!
[
n−1∑
j=0
e−λ(a)(B)λ(a)(B)j
j!
+
1
2
e−λ(a)(A)λ(a)(A)n
n!
]
where λ(ω)(c) = E[x(c)|ω, σ] as in equation (3.3.3). Define E[U |b, σ] analogously.
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This expression is precisely the probability that candidate ω wins in state ω. The
expected utility of voting for candidate c in state ω when others play strategy profile
σ is
E[U |ω, vc, σ] = E[U |ω, σ] + [χ{ω}(c)− 1
2
]Pr(Pivc|ω).
Additionally, let τ : C × Ω × ∆CT → [0, 1] be the expected vote share for a
candidate in a state given a strategy profile. Formally,
τ(c|ω, σ) =
∑
t∈T
r(t|ω)σ(t)(c).
Note that this does not depend on the number of voters.
C.4 Proofs from Section 3.4
Lemma 28 establishes the form of a voter’s best response correspondence. This will
be used to prove both Theorem 7 and Theorem 8.
Lemma 28. For any σ∗, σ∗ is an equilibrium if σ∗t (A) ∈ BRt(σ∗)(A) where
BRt(σ)(A) =

{0} if E[U |a, vB, σ] ≥ E[U |b, vB, σ] & b(b, σ) > pt
or E[U |b, vA, σ] ≥ E[U |a, vA, σ] & b(b, σ) > qt
[0, 1] if E[U |a, vB, σ] ≥ E[U |b, vB, σ] & b(b, σ) = pt
or E[U |b, vA, σ] ≥ E[U |a, vA, σ] & b(b, σ) = qt
{1} if E[U |a, vB, σ] ≥ E[U |b, vB, σ] & b(b, σ) < pt
or E[U |b, vA, σ] ≥ E[U |a, vA, σ] & b(b, σ) < qt
BˆRt(σ)(A) otherwise
and
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BˆRt(σ)(A) =

{0} if b(b, σ) > qt
[0, sˆ(A, σ)] if b(b, σ) = qt
{sˆ(A, σ)} if qt > b(b, σ) > pt
[sˆ(A, σ), 1] if b(b, σ) = pt
{1} if b(b, σ) < pt
where pt = minρ∈Πt ρ(a) and qt = maxρ∈Πt ρ(a). If BRt(σ) = ˆBRt(σ) then
sˆ(A, σ) ∈ [0, 1].
Proof. Throughout, a strategy is indexed solely by the probability of playing A. This
is WLOG since ∆C is one dimensional. Let pt and qt be as in the statement of the
Lemma.
A player of type t has a best response to σ of playing A with probability s if s
maximizes
Vt(s, σ) = min
ρ∈Πt
Eρ[
ˆ
[sU(t, A, ω, x) + (1− s)U(t, B, ω, x)]p(dx|λ(ω))].
This function is not in general differentiable everywhere. Since Vt(·, σ) is concave as
a minimum of a set of linear functions, the super-differential exists everywhere. By
definition and adapted to this setting, the super-differential is given by
∂Vt(s, σ) = {x ∈ RΩ : Vt(y, σ) ≤ Vt(s, σ) +
∑
ω
[(y(ω)− s(ω))x(ω)]∀y ∈ ∆A}.
The best response correspondence is the set of all s s.t. 0 ∈ ∂Vt(s, σ) where ∂Vt(s, σ)
is the super-differential of Vt(·, σ) at s. This follows from the dual to Aliprantis and
Border [2006, Lem 7.10], which states that s is a maximum of Vt(·, σ) if and only if
0 ∈ ∂Vt(s, σ).
Consider the case where E[U |a, vB, σ] ≥ E[U |b, vB, σ]. Note that Vt(s, σ) equals
133
min
p∈Πt(A)
{p[s1
2
Pr(PivA|a)− (1− s)1
2
Pr(PivB|a) + E[U |a, σ]] +
+(1− p)[(1− s)1
2
Pr(PivB|b)− s1
2
Pr(PivA|b) + E[U |b, σ]]}
= pt[s
1
2
Pr(PivA|a)− (1− s)1
2
Pr(PivB|a) + E[U |a, σ]] +
+(1− pt)[(1− s)1
2
Pr(PivB|b)− s1
2
Pr(PivA|b) + E[U |b, σ]]
because for every s
sPr(PivA|a)− (1− s)Pr(PivB|a) + 2E[U |a, σ] ≥
(1− s)Pr(PivB|b)− sPr(PivA|b) + 2E[U |b, σ]
This occurs because the RHS reaches its minimum at s = 0 and the LHS reaches
its maximum at s = 0. At s = 0 the RHS equals E[U |a, vB, σ] and the LHS equals
E[U |b, vB, σ]. By hypothesis, E[U |a, vB, σ] ≥ E[U |b, vB, σ] so for every s the RHS
is larger than the LHS. Thus, Vt(s, σ) is differentiable in s ∈ (0, 1). By Aliprantis
and Border [2006, Cor 7.17] ∂Vt(s, σ) is singleton and coincides with the Gateaux
derivative when it exists. Hence,
∂Vt(s, σ) = {pt[1
2
Pr(PivA|a) + 1
2
Pr(PivB|a)]
−(1− pt)[1
2
Pr(PivA|b) + 1
2
Pr(PivB|b)]}
and 0 ∈ ∂Vt(s, σ) only if b(b, σ) = pt. If b(b, σ) < pt this is positive and if b(b, σ) < pt
this is negative and hence no s ∈ (0, 1) is a maxima.
If s = 1 then the derivative is not defined since Vt(1 + , σ) for any  > 0 does not
exist. The super-differential does exist:
∂Vt(1, σ) = {x ∈ R : Vt(y, σ)− Vt(1, σ) ≤ (y − 1)x∀y ∈ [0, 1]}.
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Since
Vt(y, σ)− Vt(1, σ) = (y − 1)1
2
(pt[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)]
− (1− pt)[Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b)])
0 ∈ ∂Vt(1, σ) if and only if
pt[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)]− (1− pt)[Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b) > 0.
As noted above, b(b, σ) < pt implies this is positive.
Additionally, if s = 0 the derivative is not defined since Vt(0− , σ) for any  > 0
does not exist. The super-differential does exist:
∂Vt(0, σ) = {x ∈ R : Vt(y, σ)− Vt(0, σ) ≤ y · x∀y ∈ [0, 1]}.
Since Vt(y, σ)− Vt(0, σ) =
y
1
2
(pt[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)]− (1− pt)[Pr(PivA|n) + Pr(PivB|n)])
0 ∈ ∂Vt(0, σ) if and only if
pt[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)]− (1− pt)[Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b)] < 0.
As noted above, b(B, σ) > pt implies this is negative.
The above observations show that if E[U |a, vB, σ] ≥ E[U |b, vB, σ], then the set of
maximizers of Vt(·, σ) is
arg max
s∈[0,1]
Vt(s, σ) =

{1} if b(b, σ) > pt
[0, 1] if b(b, σ) = pt.
{0} if b(b, σ) < pt
If E[U |a, vB, σ] ≤ E[U |b, vB, σ], similar arguments show the same form of BR
correspondence with the probability assigned to a equal to qt instead of pt.
Now, suppose that neither of the above inequalities hold. Then there exists an
s¯ ∈ (0, 1) so that the conditional expected utilities in A and B are equal. Further,
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if s > s¯ the conditional expected utility in state a is larger than that in state b and
if s < s¯ then the expected utility in state B is larger than that in state A. Algebra
shows that
s¯ =
2(E[U |b, σ]− E[U |a, σ]) + Pr(PivB|b) + Pr(PivB|a)
Pr(PivB|a) + Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|b) + Pr(PivA|b)
which is sˆ(A, σ).
Since for all s ∈ (0, s¯) and every s ∈ (s¯, 1) the minimizer is unique, the Gateaux
derivative exists whenever s /∈ {0, s¯, 1}. If s ∈ (s¯, 1) then
∂Vt(s, σ) = { ∂
∂s
Vt(s, σ)}
= {pt1
2
[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)]
−(1− pt)1
2
[Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b)]}.
If s′ ∈ (0, s¯) then
∂Vt(s
′, σ) = { ∂
∂s
Vt(s, σ)}
= {qt1
2
[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)]
−(1− qt)1
2
[Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b)]}.
Thus any s ∈ (s¯, 1) is an optimum only if
pt[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)]− (1− pt)[Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b)] = 0,
which happens when pt = b(b, σ). Similarly, any s ∈ (0, s¯) is an optimum when
qt = b(b, σ). Otherwise there cannot be an optimum in (0, 1)\{s¯}.
As above, when s = 1 then the derivative is not defined since Vt(1 + , σ) for any
 > 0 does not exist. The super-differential does exist:
∂Vt(1, σ) = {x ∈ R : Vt(y, σ)− Vt(1, σ) ≤ (y − 1)x∀y ≤ 1}.
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Since Vt(y, σ)− Vt(1, σ) is equal to
(y − 1)(pt1
2
[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivA|b)]− (1− pt)1
2
[Pr(PivB|a) + Pr(PivB|b)]),
0 ∈ ∂Vt(1, σ) if and only if
Vt(y, σ)− Vt(1, σ) ≤ 0 ⇐⇒ b(b, σ) ≤ pt.
Hence s = 1 is optimal only if b(b, σ) ≥ pt. Similar arguments show then 0 ∈
∂Vt(0, σ) ⇐⇒ b(b, σ) ≥ qt.
By the above, we have covered the cases where b(b, σ) ≥ qt and b(b, σ) ≤ pt.
Suppose pt < b(b, σ) < qt. In this case,
qt[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)] > (1− qt)[Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b)]
and
pt[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)] < (1− pt)[Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b)].
So for s > s¯,
∂Vt(s, σ) = {pt1
2
[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)]
−(1− pt)1
2
[Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b)]}
is a singleton strictly smaller than zero. For s′ < s¯,
∂Vt(s
′, σ) = {qt1
2
[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)]
−(1− qt)1
2
[Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b)]}
is a singleton strictly larger than zero. However, for s = s¯
∂Vt(s¯, σ) = {p(a)1
2
[Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)]
−p(b)1
2
[Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b)] : p ∈ Πt}
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Since qt > ρ(A) > pt, ∃ρ ∈ Πt s.t.
ρ(a)
1− ρ(a) =
Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b)
Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a)
implying that 0 ∈ ∂Vt(s¯, σ) and s¯ is the only maximizer when qt > b(B, σ) > pt.
Combining the above results yields the desired form of the best response function.
In order to prove Theorem 7, two more preliminary results are necessary. Lemma
29 and Lemma 30 allow characterization of the worst case scenario. The proof of
Theorem 7 will use both these facts to show that no equilibrium exists where a voter
thinks the worst case scenario is independent of her vote.
Lemma 29. For any n ≥ 1,
E[U |a, σn] ≥ E[U |B, σn] ⇐⇒ τ(A|a, σn) ≥ τ(A|b, σn).
Proof. Let f(x, λ) = e
−λλx
x!
, the probability mass function of the Poisson distribution
with mean λ, and F (x, λ) its CDF. The CDF of the Poisson distribution has the form
Γ([x+1],λ)
[x]!
where [z] is the greatest integer less than or equal to z and Γ(z, y) is the
generalized incomplete gamma function:
Γ(z, y) =
ˆ ∞
y
e−ttz−1dt.
We can write
E[U |a, σn] = Q(τ(A|a, σn)n) + 1
2
∞∑
j=0
f(j, τ(A|a, σn)n)f(j, τ(B|a, σn)n)
where Q(·) is given by
Q(λ) =
∞∑
j=0
f(j, λ)F (j − 1, n− λ).
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Observe that
∂Q
∂λ
=
∞∑
x=1
[
∂f(j, λ)
∂λ
F (j − 1, n− λ) + f(j, λ)∂F (j − 1, n− λ)
∂λ
].
By the fundamental theorem of calculus,
∂F (x, λ)
∂λ
= −e
−λλx
x!
and
∂f(x, λ)
∂λ
=
e−λλx−1(x− λ)
x!
whenever x is an integer. Given this, the above sum can be written as
∂Q
∂λ
= e−n[
∞∑
x=1
λx
x!
(n− λ)x−1
x− 1! +
∞∑
x=0
λx
x!
(n− λ)x
x!
].
Now, we must deal with the second term.
∂
∂λ
∑∞
j=0 f(j, λ)f(j, n− λ) =
∑∞
x=0
∂
∂λe
−n λx(n−λ)x
x!x!
=
∑∞
x=1 e
−n[xλ
x−1(n−λ)x
x!x! − xλ
x(n−λ)x−1
x!x! ]
=
∑∞
x=1 e
−n[λ
x−1(n−λ)x
x!(x−1)! − λ
x(n−λ)x−1
x!(x−1)! ]
Adding together shows that ∂
∂λ
E[U |a, σn, n] is equal to
e−n[
∞∑
x=0
λx
x!
(n− λ)x
x!
+
1
2
∞∑
x=1
(
λx
x!
(n− λ)x−1
x− 1! +
λx−1(n− λ)x
x!(x− 1)! )].
Clearly, this term is positive. Recall that λ = τ(A|a, σn)n so that
∂E[U |a, σn]
∂τ(A|a, σn) =
∂E[U |a, σn]
∂λ
∂λ
∂τ(A|A, σn) = n
∂E[U |a, σn]
∂λ
.
Since ∂E[U |a,σn]
∂λ
≥ 0, so is ∂E[U |a,σn]
∂τ(A|a,σn) .
Since ∂E[U |a,σn]
∂τ(A|a,σn) ≥ 0, as τ(A|a, σn) increases, E[U |a, σn] increases. Similarly for
τ(A|b, σn) and E[U |b, σn]. Since the expected number of voters in each state is equal,
the terms E[U |a, σn] and E[U |b, σn] are equal whenever τ(A|a, σn) and τ(B|b, σn) are
equal. This establishes the claim.
Lemma 30. If 1
2
< τ(B|b, σn) < τ(A|a, σn), then sˆ(A, σn) < 12 . In particular, when
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the expected winner in each state is correct, sˆ(A, σn) <
1
2
⇐⇒ b(b, σn) > 12 .
Proof. Suppose 1
2
< τ(B|b, σn) < τ(A|a, σn). By Lemma 29,
E[U |b, σn] < E[U |a, σn].
Consider the numerator of sˆ(A, σn). Recall that it is
φ(σn) = 2(E[u|b, σn]− E[u|a, σn])
+Pr(PivB|b, σn) + Pr(PivB|a, σn).
The fraction is less than 1
2
if and only if
2φ(σn) < Pr(PivB|b, σn) + Pr(PivB|a, σn)
+Pr(PivA|b, σn) + Pr(PivA|a, σn).
Equivalently, this holds if and only if
0 > 4(E[u|b, σn]− E[u|a, σn]) + Pr(PivB|b, σn)
+Pr(PivB|a, σn)− Pr(PivA|b, σn)− Pr(PivA|a, σn)
We can rewrite
γ = Pr(PivB|b, σn) + Pr(PivB|a, σn)− Pr(PivA|b, σn)− Pr(PivA|a, σn)
as a function only of τ(A|a, σn) and τ(B|b, σn). Set t = τ(B|b, σn) and s = τ(A|a, σn)
for convenience. Expanding and writing in terms of t and s,
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γ = e−n
∞∑
j=0
n2j[
tj(1− t)j
j!j!
+ n
tj(1− t)j+1
j!j + 1!
+
sj(1− s)j
j!j!
+ n
sj+1(1− s)j
j!j + 1!
]
−e−n
∞∑
j=0
n2j[
tj(1− t)j
j!j!
+ n
tj+1(1− t)j
j!j + 1!
+
sj(1− s)j
j!j!
+ n
sj(1− s)j+1
j!j + 1!
]
=
∞∑
j=0
e−nn2j+1[
tj(1− t)j+1
j!j + 1!
+
sj+1(1− s)j
j!j + 1!
−t
j+1(1− t)j
j!j + 1!
− s
j(1− s)j+1
j!j + 1!
].
Recall that
E[U |b, σn] =
∞∑
j=0
f(j; tn)F (j − 1; (1− t)n) + 1
2
∞∑
j=0
f(j; tn)f(j; (1− t)n)
:= ψˆn(τ(B|b, σn))
and similarly E[U |a, σn] = ψˆn(τ(A|a, σn)). Setting
θn(t) =
∞∑
j=0
e−nn2j+1[
tj(1− t)j+1
j!j + 1!
− t
j+1(1− t)j
j!j + 1!
]
and
ψn(x) = 4ψˆn(x) + θn(x).
gives that
sˆ(A, σn) <
1
2
⇐⇒ ψn(t)− ψn(s) < 0.
From Lemma 29 and writing λ = nt, we have that
∂ψˆn
∂λ
= e−n[
∞∑
x=0
λx
x!
(n− λ)x
x!
+
1
2
∞∑
x=1
(
λx
x!
(n− λ)x−1
x− 1! +
λx−1(n− λ)x
x!(x− 1)! )].
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which is positive. Now,
θn(λ) =
∞∑
j=0
e−n
λj(n− λ)j+1 − λj+1(n− λ)j
j!(j + 1)!
so that
∂θn
∂λ
=
∞∑
j=0
e−n
∂
∂λ
λj(n− λ)j+1 − λj+1(n− λ)j
j!(j + 1)!
=
∞∑
j=0
e−n
λj−1(n− λ)j+1
(j − 1)!(j + 1)! −
λj(n− λ)j
j!j!
− λ
j(n− λ)j
j!j!
+
λj+1(n− λ)j−1
(j − 1)!(j + 1)!
=
∞∑
j=1
e−n
λj−1(n− λ)j+1 + λj+1(n− λ)j−1
(j − 1)!(j + 1)! − 2
∞∑
j=0
e−n
λj(n− λ)j
j!j!
Combining,
∂ψn
∂t
= [4
∂ψˆn
∂λ
+
∂θn
∂λ
]
∂λ
∂t
= n[2
∞∑
x=0
e−n
λx(n− λ)x
x!2
+ 3
∞∑
j=1
e−n
λj−1(n− λ)j+1 + λj+1(n− λ)j−1
(j − 1)!(j + 1)! ]
which is clearly greater than 0.
To show that ψn(τ(B|b, σn)) − ψn(τ(A|a, σn)) < 0, recall that we can write this
as
´ t
s
∂ψn(x)
∂x
dx which is negative because the integrand is positive but τ(A|a, σn) >
τ(B|b, σn). Therefore, whenever τ(A|a, σn) > τ(B|b, σn) it must be that sˆ(A, σn) < 12 .
To complete the second part of the Lemma, note the following.
Claim 2. b(b, σn) >
1
2
⇐⇒ |τ(A|a, σn)− 12 | > |τ(B|b, σn)− 12 |.
Proof. Note
b(b, σn) >
1
2
⇐⇒ Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b) > Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a).
Let t = τ(A|a, σn) so that Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|a) equals
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2
∞∑
j=0
p(2j)
(
2j
j
)
tj(1− t)j
+
∞∑
j=0
p(2j + 1)
(
2j + 1
j + 1
)
[tj(1− t)j+1 + tj+1(1− t)j]
where p(x) = e
−nnx
x!
. Take the derivative with respect to t to get
(1− 2t)[2
∞∑
j=0
j{p(2j)
(
2j
j
)
tj−1(1− t)j−1
+
∞∑
j=0
p(2j + 1)
(
2j + 1
j + 1
)
tj−1(1− t)j−1}]
which is positive whenever t < .5 and negative whenever t > .5. Similarly for
Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b). Given the symmetry of Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivB|b) with
respect to τ(A|a, σn) and Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivB|b) with respect to τ(B|b, σn), the
claim follows immediately.
From Claim 2, whenever b(b, σn) >
1
2
, |τ(A|a, σn)− 12 | > |τ(B|a, σn)− 12 |. Further, if
the expected winners are correct, it must be that both τ(A|a, σn) > 12 and τ(B|b, σn) >
1
2
. It follows that τ(A|a, σn) > τ(B|b, σn), so sˆ(A, σn) < 12 . Similarly, suppose that
sˆ(A, σn) <
1
2
and the expected winners are correct. From the above, τ(A|a, σn) >
τ(B|b, σn) > 12 , so by Claim 2 b(b, σn) > 12 .
Proof of Theorem 7:
Proof. First, note that if there is no t so that r(t|a) 6= r(t|b), vote shares must be equal
across states, completing the proof. Therefore, assume that for some t, r(t|a) 6= r(t|b).
Suppose, for the sake of contradiction, that σn is an equilibrium for Γn where
τ(A|a, σn) > 12 and τ(B|b, σn) > 12 .
Claim 3. BRt(σn) = BˆRt(σn) for all t.
143
Proof. If BRt(σn) 6= BˆRt(σn) then either
E[U |a, σn] ≥ E[U |b, σn] + 1
2
(Pr(PivB|b) + Pr(PivB|a)) (C.4.1)
or
E[U |b, σn] ≥ E[U |a, σn] + 1
2
(Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivA|a)) (C.4.2)
by Lemma 28.
In the first case, some type tˆ plays a mixed strategy in σn. First, suppose equation
(C.4.1) holds. In this case, because σn is an equilibrium, Lemma 28 implies that
b(b, σn) = ptˆ. Because voters lack confidence, ptˆ <
1
2
which implies that
|τ(A|a, σn)− 1
2
| < |τ(B|b, σn)− 1
2
|
by Claim 2. Since τ(A|a, σn), τ(B|b, σn) > 12 it follows that τ(A|a, σn) < τ(B|b, σn)
and Lemma 29 implies that E[U |b, σn] > E[U |a, σn], a contradiction.
Similarly, if instead equation (C.4.2), it must be that b(n, σn) = qtˆ. Because voters
lack confidence, qtˆ >
1
2
which implies that
|τ(A|a, σn)− 1
2
| > |τ(B|b, σn)− 1
2
by Claim 2. Since τ(A|a, σn), τ(B|b, σn) > 12 it follows that τ(A|a, σn) > τ(B|b, σn),
Lemma 29 implies that E[u|a, σn] > E[U |b, σn], a contradiction.
In the second case, all types play pure strategies in σn. Further, at least one type
(WLOG, 1) votes for A for sure and another type (WLOG, 2) votes for B for sure.
By Lemma 28, if equation (C.4.1) holds then p2 ≤ b(b, σn) ≤ p1 < 12 . By Lemma 29,
E[U |b, σn] > E[U |a, σn], contradicting that equation (C.4.1) holds. Suppose instead
that equation (C.4.2) holds. By Lemma 28, 1
2
< q2 ≤ b(b, σn) ≤ q1. By Lemma 29,
E[U |a, σn] > E[U |b, σn], contradicting that equation (C.4.2) holds.
Hence, BRt(σn) = BˆRt(σn) for all t.
I now show that no type plays a pure strategy.
Claim 4. σn(t) ∈ (0, 1) for all t.
Proof. Suppose σn(t)(A) ∈ {0, 1} for some t. WLOG, assume that either σn(2)(A) =
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1 or σn(2)(B) = 1.
Assume the former. Then it must be that 1 ∈ BR2(σn)(A) so
b(b, σn) ≤ p2 < 1
2
by Lemma 28. By Lemma 30 it must be that sˆ(A, σn) >
1
2
. By assumption, some
type of voter must vote for A with probability smaller than 1
2
. WLOG, assume this
type is 1, so that σn(1)(A) ≤ 12 < sˆ(A, σn) for n high enough. Hence, it must be
that b(b, σn) ≥ q1. Combining with p2 ≥ b(b, σn) gives that p2 ≥ q1, which is a
contradiction of p2 <
1
2
< q1.
Now, assume the latter. It must be that 0 ∈ BR2(σn)(A) so b(B, σn) ≥ q2 by
Lemma 28. By Lemma 30 it must be that sˆ(A, σn) <
1
2
. By assumption, some
type of voter must vote for A with probability larger than 1
2
. WLOG, assume this
type is 1, so that σn(1)(A) ≥ 12 > sˆ(A, σn) for n high enough. Lemma 28 implies
that b(B, σn) ≤ p1. Combining with b(B, σn) ≥ q2 gives that p1 ≥ q2, which is a
contradiction of p1 <
1
2
< q2.
This claim shows that all types of voters must play a mixed strategy. Setting
[p, p¯] = ∩t∈T [pt, qt], b(b, σn) ∈ [p, p¯], since otherwise at least one type of voter plays
a pure strategy by Lemma 28. Further, if b(b, σn) ∈ (p, p¯), the best response of all
voters is to play σn(t)(A) = sˆ(A, σn). Because of this, vote shares in each state are
the same, a contradiction.
Claim 5. Suppose that b(b, σn) = p. Then the expected winner in state b is not B.
Proof. WLOG, assume that p = p1; in fact, p1 = maxt∈T pt so
qt > b(b, σn) > pt∀t 6= 1.
By Lemma 28, σn(1)(A) ≥ sˆ(A, σn) and σn(t)(A) = sˆ(A, σn) for all t 6= 1. Because
b(b, σn) = p1 <
1
2
, by Lemma 30 it must be that sˆ(A, σn) >
1
2
. Therefore σn(t)(A) >
1
2
for all t. Therefore, τ(B|b, σn) < 12 and thus B is not the expected winner in state
b.
Claim 6. Suppose that b(B, σn) = p¯ . Then the expected winner in state a is not A.
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Proof. WLOG, assume that p¯ = q1. By Lemma 28, σn(1)(A) ≤ sˆ(A, σn) and
σn(t)(A) = sˆ(A, σn) for all t 6= 1. By Lemma 30 it must be that sˆ(A, σn) < 12 .
Therefore σn(t)(A) <
1
2
for all t, so τ(A|a, σn) < 12 and A is not the expected winner
in state a.
Therefore, there is no equilibrium where both τ(A|a, σn) > 12 and τ(B|b, σn) >
1
2
.
Proof of Proposition 11:
Proof. Suppose σ is played. Clearly, E[U |a, σ] = E[U |b, σ] = 1
2
. This implies that
BRt(σ) = BˆRt(σ) for all t by Lemma 28. Further, note that b(b, σ) =
1
2
since
Pr(Pivc|a) = Pr(Pivc|b) for c ∈ {A,B} since the vote shares are equal in both states.
Since b(b, σ) ∈ [pt, qt], voters of type t are willing to play σ(t)(A) = sˆ(A, σ) = 12 .
Therefore, σ is an equilibrium.
Proof of Theorem 8:
Proof. This proof adapts the arguments of Myerson [1998] Theorem 2.
Relabel T = {1, 2, ..., T} so that minp∈Πi p(a) < minp∈Πi+1 p(a) for every i ∈
{1, 2, ..., T − 1}. Denote [h] = maxz∈Z z ≤ h and σ(h) for some h ∈ [1, T ] the strategy
profile such that if h is an integer then σ(t)(A) = 0 if t ≤ h and σ(t)(A) = 1 if t > h.
If h is not an integer then σ(h) is such that σ(t)(A) = 0 if t < [h] and σ(t)(A) = 1 if
t > h and σ([h])(A) = h− [h]. The proof will show that for all n high enough, there
is an h(n) so that σ(h(n)) is an equilibrium and that the expected winner in a is A
and the expected winner in b is B.
Define functions z : [1, T ]× N→ [0, 1] and β : [1, T ]× N→ [0, 1] by the formulas
z(h, n) :=

sˆ(A, σ(h), n) sˆ(A, σ(h), n) ∈ [0, 1]
1 sˆ(A, σ(h), n) > 1
0 sˆ(A, σ(h), n) < 0
where sˆ(c, σ, n) is sˆ(c, σ) when there are n expected players. Further, define β(h, n)
to be b(b, σ(h)) when there are n expected players.
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Let qt = maxp∈Πt p(a) and pt = minp∈Πt p(a). If sˆ(A, σ, n) < 0 then
E[U |b, σ]− E[U |a, σ] + 1
2
(Pr(PivB|b) + Pr(PivB|a)) < 0
so that E[U |a, vB, σ] > E[U |b, vB, σ]. Hence
BRt(σ) =

1 b(b, σ) > pt
[0, 1] b(b, σ) = pt
0 b(b, σ) < pt
by Lemma 28. Similarly, if sˆ(A, σ) > 1 then 1− sˆ(A, σ) < 0 which implies
E[U |a, σ]− E[U |b, σ] + 1
2
((Pr(PivA|a) + Pr(PivA|b))) < 0
and thus E[U |a, vB, σ] > E[U |b, vB, σ]. Hence
BRt(σ) =

1 b(b, σ) > qt
[0, 1] b(b, σ) = qt
0 b(b, σ) < qt
by Lemma 28. Otherwise, BRt(σ)(A) = BˆRt(σ)(A).
Given the above notes, Lemma 28 shows that σh is an equilibrium if β(h, n) ∈
η(h, n)
η(h, n) =

[qh, ph+1] h ∈ Z
q[h] h ∈ ([h] + z(h, n), [h] + 1)
[p[h], q[h]] h = [h] + z(h, n)
p[h] h ∈ ([h], [h] + z(h, n))
.
It’s clear that sˆ(·, σn) is continuous by construction. It follows that z(·, n) is contin-
uous since it can be written as the minimum of two continuous functions. Therefore
η(·, n) is upper hemi continuous, compact and convex.
There exists numbers I(a) 6= I(b) so that τ(A|ω, σI(ω)) = τ(B|ω, σI(ω)) for each
ω ∈ {a, b} and for every h ∈ (I(a), I(b)) (or (I(b), I(a)) if I(b) < I(a)) τ(A|ω, σh) 6=
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τ(B|ω, σh) for each ω because r(·|a) 6= r(·|b) and h 7→ τ(c|ω, σh) is a continuous
function with range equal to [0, 1]. Assume WLOG that I(a) < I(b). For n high
enough, ∃h(n) so that β(h(n), n) ∈ η(h(n), n) and h(n) ∈ (I(a), I(b)). This follows
from β(I(a), n) → 0, β(I(b), n) → 1, β(·, n) is continuous and η(·, n) is convex and
upper hemi continuous. Since h(n) ∈ (I(a), I(b)), τ(A|a, σh(n)) > τ(B|a, σh(n)) and
τ(B|b, σh(n)) > τ(A|b, σh(n)). Define σ∗n = σh(n) when n is large enough; otherwise, σ∗n
let σ∗n be an arbitrary equilibrium. Using the arguments of Myerson [1998] Theorem
2, the sequence of equilibrium vote shares from (σ∗n)
∞
n=1 must converge. Applying the
law of large numbers gives that the correct candidate is elected with arbitrarily high
probability in both states. Therefore, (Γn)
∞
n=1 satisfies FIE.
C.5 Proofs from Section 3.5
Theorem 9 follows from a special case of Theorems 11 and 12.
Theorem 11. Suppose Γn is an ambiguous voting game with abstention that has
voters who lack confidence and posteriors that respect likelihood ratios. If σn is an
equilibrium for Γn where the worst case scenario for all voters is not independent of
their vote and the expected vote share for A in state a is greater than 1
2
, then the
expected vote share for B in state b is less than 1
2
.
Proof. The proof will be by contradiction. Suppose σn is an equilibrium for Γn where
the worst case scenario for all voters is not independent of their vote and the expected
vote share for A in state a is greater than 1
2
and the expected vote share for B in
state b is also greater than 1
2
.
Begin by deriving the best response correspondence for voters when the worst
case scenario varies with the strategy played. For any strategy s ∈ ∆C, represent s
by the ordered pair ( s(A)
1−s(∅) , s(∅)) if s(∅) < 1 and (0, 1) otherwise. Note that there is
a bijection between these ordered pairs corresponds and each strategy profile. Now,
define a function sˆ : Ω× [0, 1)× (∆C)T → R by sˆ(A; s, σ) equals
2(E[U |b, σ]− E[U |a, σ]) + (1− s)[Pr(PivB|a, σ) + Pr(PivB|b, σ)]
(1− s)[Pr(PivB|a, σ) + Pr(PivB|b, σ) + Pr(PivA|a, σ) + Pr(PivA|b, σ)]
and s¯ : σ → [0, 1] implicitly by
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sˆ(A; s¯(σ), σ) =
1 if E[U |b, σ] > E[U |a, σ]0 if E[U |b, σ] < E[U |a, σ]
and s¯(σ) = 1 if E[U |b, σ] = E[U |a, σ]. Note that if σ(t)(∅) < s¯(σ), the voter’s worst
case scenario still changes with her vote. In this case, playing the strategy defined by
σ(t)(A) = sˆ(A;σ(t)(∅), σ) equalizes the voter’s expected utilities across states. On
the other hand, if σ(t)(∅) ≥ s¯(σ), the voter is abstaining enough that her vote will
no longer affect the worst case scenario.
Lemma 31. Suppose that the worst case scenario is not independent of the strategy
picked given σ and that the expected winner is correct in each state. If σ is an
equilibrium and b(b, σ) ∈ (pt, qt), then σ(t) ∈ BRt(σ) where
BRt(σ) =

{(0, 1)} if E[U |b, σ] = E[U |a, σ]
=

{(0, 1)} if qt
1−qt <
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ)
{1} × [s¯(σ), 1] if qt
1−qt =
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ)
{(1, s¯(σ))} if qt
1−qt >
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ)
if E[U |b, σ] > E[U |a, σ]
=

{(0, 1)} if pt
1−pt >
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ)
{0} × [s¯(σ), 1] if pt
1−pt =
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ)
{(0, s¯(σ))} if pt
1−pt <
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ)
if E[U |b, σ] < E[U |a, σ]
.
Proof. (I drop the subscript t for convenience).
Suppose p < b(b, σ) < q. If the voter plays strategy (s, θ), she gets
Vt(s, θ;σ) = min
pi∈[p,q]
pi{E[U |a, σ]
+(1− θ)[sPr(PivA|a, σ)− (1− s)Pr(PivB|a, σ)]}+
+(1− pi){E[U |b, σ]
+(1− θ)[(1− s)Pr(PivB|b, σ)− sPr(PivA|b, σ)]}.
Given a fixed θ < s¯(σ), consider vθσ : [0, 1] → R define by vaσ(s) = Vt(s, θ;σ).
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Note that ∂vaσ(s) is equal to

{(1− θ)[p[Pr(PivA|a, σ) + Pr(PivB|a, σ)]− if s > sˆ(A; θ, σ)
−(1− p)[Pr(PivB|b, σ) + Pr(PivA|b, σ)]]}
{(1− aθ)[pi[Pr(PivA|a, σ) + Pr(PivB|a, σ)]− if s = sˆ(A, θ, σ)
−(1− pi)[(Pr(PivB|b, σ) + Pr(PivA|b, σ)]] : pi ∈ [p, q]}
{(1− θ)[q[Pr(PivA|a, σ) + Pr(PivB|a, σ)]+ if s < sˆ(A, θ, σ)
+(1− q)[Pr(PivB|b, σ) + Pr(PivA|b, σ)]]}
.
As in Lemma 1, given p < b(b, σ) < q, 0 ∈ ∂vθσ(s) only if s = sˆ(A, θ, σ). Given
this, consider vσ : [0, 1] → R defined by vσ(θ) = Vt(sˆ(A, θ, σ), θ, σ). Write pcω =
Pr(Pivc|ω, σ). By construction
E[U |a, σ] + (1− θ)[sˆP r(PivA|a, σ)− (1− sˆ)Pr(PivB|a, σ)]] =
[E[U |b, σ] + (1− θ)[(1− sˆ)Pr(PivB|b, σ)− sˆP r(PivA|b, σ)]]
when sˆ = sˆ(A, θ, σ). So if θ < s¯(σ)
vσ(θ) = E[U |a, σ] + (1− θ)[sˆP r(PivA|a, σ)− (1− sˆ)Pr(PivB|a, σ)]]
∂vσ(θ) = { ∂∂θ [(1−θ)
2(E[U|b,σ]−E[U|a,σ])+(1−θ)[pBa+pBb]
(1−θ)[pAa+pBb+pBa+pAb] pAa−
−(1−θ) 2(E[U|a,σ]−E[U|b,σ])+(1−θ)[pAa+pAb]
(1−θ)[pAa+pBb+pBa+pAb] pBa]}
= { ∂
∂θ
[
2(E[U |b, σ]− E[U |a, σ])− 2(E[U |a, σ]− E[U |b, σ])
pAa+ pBb+ pBa+ pAb
+
+
(1− θ)[pBa+ pBb]pAa− pBa[pAa+ pAb]
pAa+ pBb+ pBa+ pAb
]}
= {pBa[pAa+ pAb]− [pBa+ pBb]pAa
pAa+ pBb+ pBa+ pAb
}
= { pBa(pAb)− pBb(pAa)
pAa+ pBb+ pBa+ pAb
}
Since FIE implies that Pr(PivA|A,σ)
Pr(PivB |A,σ) <
Pr(PivA|B,σ)
Pr(PivB |B,σ) , no σ(t)(∅) < s¯(σ) is optimal. There-
fore, the voter abstains enough that worst case scenario is independent of whether
she votes for A or B when she votes.
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We can think of her as a SEU voter that assigns either probability p to a (if
E[U |b, σ] < E[U |a, σ]) or q to a (if E[U |b, σ] > E[U |a, σ]). In this case, because
p < b(b, σ) < q, the voter votes for B (in the first case) or A (in the second case) for
sure conditional on voting. In the first case, she abstains for sure if p
1−p >
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ) ,
and abstains with probability s¯(σ) if p
1−p <
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ) . She is willing to abstain with
any probability between [s¯(σ), 1] if p
1−p =
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ) . In the second case, she abstains
for sure if q
1−q <
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ) , and abstains with probability a¯(σ) if
q
1−q >
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ) .
She is willing to abstain with any probability between [a¯(σ), 1] if q
1−q =
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ) .
This establishes the best response correspondence when p < b(b, σ) < q.
Lemma 32. Suppose that the worst case scenario is not independent of the strategy
picked given σ and that the expected winner is correct in each state. If σ is an
equilibrium and b(b, σ) ≤ pt, then σ(t) ∈ BRt(σ) where
BRt(σ) =

{(1, 0)} if pt
1−pt >
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ)
{1} × [0, s¯(σ)] if pt
1−pt =
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ)
B˜RA,t(σ) if
pt
1−pt <
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ)
and B˜RA,t(σ) is equal to

=

{(0, 1)} if qt
1−qt <
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ)
{1} × [s¯(σ), 1] if qt
1−qt =
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ)
{(1, s¯(σ))} if qt
1−qt >
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ)
if E[U |b, σ] > E[U |a, σ]
{(0, 1)} otherwise
Proof. She votes for A conditional on voting because b(b, σ) is low enough relative
to her priors. She never abstains if pt
1−pt >
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ) . If
pt
1−pt =
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ) , she’s
indifferent between abstaining and voting for B and so is willing to play any mixture
between voting and abstaining. She abstains at least enough that she can’t affect the
outcome with her vote if pt
1−pt <
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ) . If she abstains more than s¯(σ), she acts
as if she’s an SEU voter who assigns probability pt to a if E[U |a, σ] > E[U |b, σ] and
qt to a if E[U |b, σ] > E[U |a, σ]. Her best response correspondence is exactly as in
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Bouton and Castanheira [2009], establishing the result.
Lemma 33. Suppose that the worst case scenario is not independent of the strategy
picked given σ and that the expected winner is correct in each state. If σ is an
equilibrium and b(B, σ) ≥ qt, then σ(t) ∈ BRt(σ) where
BRt(σ) =

{(0, 0)} if qt
1−qt <
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ)
{0} × [0, s¯(σ)] if qt
1−qt =
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ)
B˜RB,t(σ) if
qt
1−qt >
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ)
and
B˜RB,t(σ) =

=

{(0, 1)} if pt
1−pt >
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ)
{0} × [s¯(σ), 1] if pt
1−pt =
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ)
{(0, s¯(σ))} if pt
1−pt <
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ)
if E[U |a, σ] > E[U |b, σ]
{(0, 1)} otherwise
Proof. She votes for B conditional on voting because b(b, σ) is high enough. She
never abstains if qt
1−qt <
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ) . If
qt
1−qt =
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ) , she’s indifferent between
abstaining and voting for B and so is willing to play any mixture between voting
and abstaining. She abstains at least enough that she can’t affect the outcome with
her vote if qt
1−qt >
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ) . If she abstains more than s¯(σ), she acts as if she’s
an SEU voter who assigns probability pt to a if E[U |a, σ] > E[U |b, σ] and qt to a if
E[U |b, σ] > E[U |a, σ]. Her best response correspondence is exactly as in Bouton and
Castanheira [2009], establishing the result.
Now, focus on the specific conditions at equilibrium. Because posteriors that
respect likelihood ratios and voters lack of confidence, p2 ≤ p1 < 12 < q2 ≤ q1
(perhaps after relabeling). These values partition [0, 1] into regions where the best
response correspondence of the voters has similar properties when b(·) is within that
region. Proceed by analyzing these regions separately.
Suppose now that b(b, σn) ∈ (p2, p1]. By assumption, σn is so that σn(1)(∅) < 1.
Since b(b, σn) < p1, Lemma 32 gives that σn(1)(B) = 0.
First, consider the case where σn(1)(∅) < s¯(σn) so p11−p1 ≥
Pr(PivA|b,σ)
Pr(PivA|a,σ) . Since
τ(B|b, σn) > τ(A|b, σn), it must be that σn(2)(A) = 0 and σn(1)(∅) < 1. By Lemma
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31, E[U |b, σn] > E[U |a, σn] and
q2
1− q2 ≤
Pr(PivB|b, σ)
Pr(PivB|a, σ)
. Because τ(B|b, σn) > τ(A|b, σn) and τ(A|a, σn) > τ(B|a, σn), it follows that
Pr(PivA|b, σn) > Pr(PivB|b, σn)
and
Pr(PivA|a, σ) < Pr(PivB|a, σ)
and
Pr(PivA|b, σ)
Pr(PivA|a, σ) >
Pr(PivB|b, σ)
Pr(PivB|a, σ) .
However, p1 < q2 so these are mutually impossible.
Now, consider the case where 1 > σn(1)(∅) ≥ s¯(σn). Since b(b, σn) ≤ p1, Lemma
32 gives that σn(1)(B) = 0 and σn(1)(A) > 0 implies that E[U |b, σn] > E[U |a, σn].
Since σn(1)(B) = 0, for the expected winner in state b to be correct it must hold that
σn(2)(B) > 0. But because E[U |b, σn] > E[U |a, σn] and p2 < b(b, σn) < q2, Lemma 31
gives that σn(1)(B) = 0, a contradiction.
Now suppose that b(b, σn) ∈ [q2, q1). By assumption, σn(2)(∅) < 1. Since
b(B, σn) > q2, Lemma 33 gives that σn(2)(A) = 0.
First, consider the case where σn(2)(∅) < s¯(σn). From Lemma 33, q21−q2 ≤
Pr(PivB |b,σ)
Pr(PivB |a,σ) . By assumption, it must be that σn(1)(A) > 0 so σn(1)(∅) < 1. Be-
cause b(b, σn) ∈ (p1, q1), Lemma 31 requires that E[U |a, σn] > E[U |b, σn] and p11−p1 ≥
Pr(PivA|b,σn)
Pr(PivA|a,σn) . Because τ(B|b, σn) > τ(A|b, σn) and τ(A|a, σn) > τ(B|a, σn), it follows
that Pr(PivA|b, σn) > Pr(PivB|b, σn) and
Pr(PivB|b, σ)
Pr(PivB|a, σ) <
Pr(PivA|b, σn)
Pr(PivA|a, σn) ,
which is impossible since p1 < q2.
Now, consider the case where 1 > σn(2)(∅) ≥ s¯(σn). By assumption and Lemma
33, σn(2)(B) > 0. From Lemma 32, E[U |a, σn] > E[U |b, σn]. But since p1 < b(b, σn) <
q1, Lemma 31 yields that σn(1)(A) = 0, a contradiction.
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If b(b, σn) ∈ [0, p1] ∪ [p2, q1] ∪ [q2, 1] it follows from Lemmas 31-33 that all voters
will vote for the same candidate whenever they do not abstain, a contradiction.
Assume WLOG that r(1|a) + r(1|b) ≥ 1 and that r(1|a) ≥ r(1|b) (otherwise,
relabel candidates and types).
Define τˆ : {A,B} × Ω→ [0, 1] by
τˆ(A|a) = (
√
r(2|a) +√r(2|b)√
r(1|a) +√r(1|b))2r(1|a)
τˆ(B|a) = r(2|a)
τˆ(A|b) = (
√
r(2|a) +√r(2|b)√
r(1|a) +√r(1|b))2r(1|b)
τˆ(B|b) = r(2|b)
which would be the limiting vote shares for each candidate in each state if voters were
expected utility.
Theorem 12. Fix any sequence (Γn)
∞
n=1 of AVGAs with voters who lack confidence
and posteriors that respect the likelihood ratio. If the inequalities
2 +
√
τˆ(B|b)
τˆ(A|b) +
√
τˆ(B|a)
τˆ(A|a) > 2(
τˆ(A|b)τˆ(B|b)
τˆ(A|a)τˆ(B|a))
1
4 − 1)
√
τˆ(A|b)
τˆ(B|b)
1−
√
τˆ(A|b)
τˆ(B|b)
(C.5.1)
and
2 +
√
τˆ(B|b)
τˆ(A|b) +
√
τˆ(B|a)
τˆ(A|a) >
√
τˆ(A|b)
τˆ(B|b)
1−
√
τˆ(A|b)
τˆ(B|b)
−
τˆ(B|a)√
τˆ(A|b)τˆ(B|b)
1− τˆ(B|a)√
τˆ(A|b)τˆ(B|b)
(C.5.2)
both hold and σn is an equilibrium for Γn where the expected votes in each state goes
to infinity and the expected winners are correct given σn, then for n sufficiently high,
the worst case scenario for all voters is independent of their vote in σn.
Proof. The proof will be by contradiction.
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Without loss of generality, suppose that r(1|a) + r(1|b) ≥ r(2|a) + r(2|b) and that
r(1|a)
r(1|b) >
r(2|a)
r(2|b) (which implies that r(1|a) > r(1|b)), so that p2 ≤ p1 < 12 < q2 ≤ q1.
Define σ(1)(∅) = a¯ = 1− (
√
1−r(1|a)+
√
1−r(1|b)√
r(1|a)+
√
r(1|b) )
2, σ(1)(A) = 1− a¯ and σ(2)(B) = 1.
Lemma 34. Suppose that (σ∗nk) is a convergent sub-sequence of equilibrium strategy
profiles to Γnk so that the worst case scenario for every voter is independent of her
strategy for every σ∗nk . Then σnk → σ. Moreover, τ(A|a, σ) ≤ τ(B|b, σ) and τ(A|b,σ)τ(B|b,σ) ≥
τ(B|a,σ)
τ(A|a,σ) , with equality only if r(1|a) + r(1|b) = r(2|a) + r(2|b).
Proof. This follows follows from Bouton and Castanheira [2009] Lemma 1 and The-
orem 1, noting that when the strategy profile is played all voters act as if SEU with
posterior pt or qt. At the limit, it must be that
µ(a) = µ(b) ⇐⇒ (
√
τ(A|a)−
√
τ(B|a))2 = (
√
τ(B|b)−
√
τ(A|b))2.
Rewriting, √
(1− a¯)r(1|a)−
√
r(2|a) =
√
r(2|b)−
√
(1− a¯)r(1|b)
where a¯ = σ(1)(∅). Solving for a¯ yields
1− (
√
1− r(1|a) +√1− r(1|b)√
r(1|a) +√r(1|b) )2.
The remaining results follow from algebra.
Note that τˆ(c|ω) = τ(c|ω, σ).
The worst case scenarios is independent of the strategy chosen given σ is played
if and only if either
E[U |b, σ]− 1
2
Pr(PivA|b, σ) ≥ E[U |a, σ] + 1
2
Pr(PivA|a, σ) (C.5.3)
or
E[U |a, σ]− 1
2
Pr(PivB|a, σ) ≥ E[U |b, σ] + 1
2
Pr(PivB|b, σ) (C.5.4)
as in Lemma 28. If r(1|a) = r(2|b), then it’s clear that neither of the equalities are
satisfied because E[U |b, σ, n] = E[Ua, σ, n]. Therefore, suppose r(1|a) 6= r(2|b) an
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Consider the limiting equilibrium strategy profile. At this strategy profile, neither of
these equations holds for n large enough.
Lemma 35. If
2 +
√
τ(B|b, σ)
τ(A|b, σ) +
√
τ(B|a, σ)
τ(A|a, σ) > 2(
τ(A|b, σ)τ(B|b, σ)
τ(A|a, σ)τ(B|a, σ))
1
4 − 1)
√
τ(A|b,σ)
τ(B|b,σ)
1−
√
τ(A|b,σ)
τ(B|b,σ)
then E[U |b, σ]−E[U |a, σ] < 1
2
(Pr(PivA|a, σ, n)+Pr(PivA|b, σ, n)) for n large enough.
Proof. For notational purposes, drop the dependence on σ. Lemma 34 shows that
τ(B|b)τ(A|b) > τ(A|a)τ(B|a) (C.5.5)
and
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b) >
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a) (C.5.6)
whenever the above conditions are satisfied. Set
µ(ω) = −τ(A|ω)− τ(B|ω) + 2
√
τ(B|ω)τ(A|ω)
noting that µ(A) = µ(B) = µ ∈ [−1, 0].
Since
E[U |a, σ] = 1− e−(τ(A|a)+τ(B|a))n{
∞∑
k=1
(
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a) )
k
2 Ik(2n
√
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))
−1
2
I0(2n
√
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))}
and
E[U |b, σ] = 1− e−(τ(A|b)+τ(B|b))n{
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
−1
2
I0(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)}
(where Ik(·) is a modified Bessel function of the first kind (see Myerson [2000], p.
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27)), the conclusion is equivalent to
e−(τ(A|a)+τ(B|a))n
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|a)τ(B|a)) (C.5.7)
−e−(τ(A|b)+τ(B|b))n
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
is less than
1
2
(Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivA|a) + I0(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))− I0(2n
√
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))).
Let φ(n) be the value of (C.5.7).
By Baricz [2010] equation (2.6) we have that if y > x > 0 and k > 0 is an integer
then
Ik(x) < e
x−y(
y
x
)
1
2 Ik(y). (C.5.8)
Using equations (C.5.5) and (C.5.8), we have that
e−(τ(A|a)+τ(B|a))n(
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))
< e(µ−2
√
τ(B|b)τ(B|b))n(
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))
1
4
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
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so we find that
φ(n)
e−2
√
τ(B|A)τ(B|B))n
< eµn(
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))
1
4
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
−eµn
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
< (
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))
1
4
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(B|b)
τ(A|b)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
−eµn
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
since τ(B|a)
τ(A|a) <
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b) . Setting
K¯(n) =
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)) > 0
and
θ = (
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))
1
4 − 1 > 0
yields that
E[U |b, σ]− E[U |a, σ] < θeµnK¯(n)e−2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
158
Note that
K¯(n) =
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
<
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
k
I0(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
≈
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
k
e
√
(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))2√
2pi
√
(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))2
=
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
1−
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
e2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
2
√
pin
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
by Abramowitz and Stegun [1972] equations (9.7.1) and (9.7.7) and that when k ≥ 0
it follows that Ik(x) > Ik+1(x). Therefore, for n large enough
φ(n) <
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
1−
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
θeµnI0(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))e−2n
√
τ(A|B)τ(B|B)
Since
1
2
[Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivA|a) + e−(τ(A|b)+τ(B|b))nI0(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
−e−(τ(A|a)+τ(B|a))nI0(2n
√
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))]
=
1
2
[e−(τ(A|b)+τ(B|b))n(2I0(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
+I1(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
√
τ(B|b)
τ(A|b) )
+e−(τ(A|a)+τ(B|a))nI1(2n
√
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a) ]
≈ e
µn
4
√
pin
(
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a)
(τ(A|a)τ(B|a)) 14 +
2 +
√
τ(B|b)
τ(A|b)
(τ(A|b)τ(B|b)) 14 ),
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it suffices to show that
[
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a)
(τ(A|a)τ(B|a)) 14 +
2 +
√
τ(B|b)
τ(A|b)
(τ(A|b)τ(B|b)) 14 ] >
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
1−
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
2( τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))
1
4 − 1)
(τ(A|b)τ(B|b)) 14 .
Note that √
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a)
(τ(A|a)τ(B|a)) 14 +
2 +
√
τ(B|b)
τ(A|b)
(τ(A|b)τ(B|b)) 14 >
2 +
√
τ(B|b)
τ(A|b) +
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a)
(τ(A|b)τ(B|b)) 14
because τ(B|b)τ(A|b) > τ(B|a)τ(A|a). Therefore, if
2 +
√
τ(B|b)
τ(A|b) +
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a) > 2(
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))
1
4 − 1)
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
1−
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
then the claim holds.
Lemma 36. If
2 +
√
τ(B|b, σ)
τ(A|b, σ) +
√
τ(B|a, σ)
τ(A|a, σ) >
√
τ(A|b,σ)
τ(B|b,σ)
1−
√
τ(A|b,σ)
τ(B|b,σ)
−
τ(B|a,σ)√
τ(A|b,σ)τ(B|b,σ)
1− τ(B|a,σ)√
τ(A|b,σ)τ(B|b,σ)
then E[U |a, σ]− E[U |b, σ] < 1
2
Pr(PivB|a, σ) + 12Pr(PivB|b, σ) for n large enough.
Proof. For notational purposes, drop the dependence on σ. As in Lemma 35, we can
write the claim as
e−(τ(A|b)+τ(B|b))n
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))− (C.5.9)
− e−(τ(A|a)+τ(B|a))n
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))
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is less than
1
2
(Pr(PivA|b) + Pr(PivA|a)− I0(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)) + I0(2n
√
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))).
Write φ(n) to be the value of (C.5.9). Note that
e−(τ(A|a)+τ(B|a))n
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|a)τ(B|a))
> e−(τ(A|a)+τ(B|a))n
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a)
k√
τ(A|a)τ(B|a)
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
k×
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))e2n
√
τ(A|a)τ(B|a)−2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
= eµn−2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
∞∑
k=1
τ(B|a)√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
since whenever k > 1
2
and y > x we have
Ik(x) > (
x
y
)kex−yIk(y) (C.5.10)
by equation (2.2) of Baricz [2010].
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We have that
φ(n) < e−(τ(A|b)+τ(B|b))n
∞∑
k=1
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))−
−eµn−2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
∞∑
k=1
τ(B|a)√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
k
Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
=
eµn
∑∞
k=1(
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
k
− τ(B|a)√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
k
)Ik(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b))
e2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
<
eµnI0(2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)∑∞k=1(√ τ(A|b)τ(B|b)k − τ(B|a)√τ(A|b)τ(B|b)k)
e2n
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
≈
eµn
∑∞
k=1(
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
k
− τ(B|a)√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
k
)
2
√
pin
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
=
eµn(
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
1−
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
−
τ(B|a)√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
1− τ(B|a)√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
)
2
√
pin
√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
so it suffices to show that
2 +
√
τ(B|b)
τ(A|b) +
√
τ(B|a)
τ(A|a) >
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
1−
√
τ(A|b)
τ(B|b)
−
τ(B|a)√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
1− τ(B|a)√
τ(A|b)τ(B|b)
which is the hypothesis.
Now, consider the specific conditions at equilibrium. Suppose that σ is an equi-
librium. If the election is not close, then it must be that either
E[U |a, σ]− E[U |b, σ] > 1
2
(Pr(PivB|b, σ) + Pr(PivB|a, σ))
or
E[U |b, σ]− E[U |a, σ] > 1
2
(Pr(PivA|b, σ) + Pr(PivA|a, σ)).
By Bouton and Castanheira [2009] Lemma 1, restrict attention to profiles indexed
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by θ ∈ [0, 1] defined by σθ(1)(∅) = θ, σθ(1)(A) = 1 − θ and σθ(2)(B) = 1. Let a¯ be
defined as in Lemma 1.
For n high enough, if σθ is an equilibrium then θ ∈ (0, 1). Therefore, it must be
the case that either
p1(Pr(PivA|a, σθ)) = (1− p1)Pr(PivA|b, σθ), (C.5.11)
p2
1− p2 <
Pr(PivA|b, σθ) + Pr(PivB|b, σθ)
Pr(PivA|a, σθ) + Pr(PivB|a, σθ) <
p1
1− p1 , (C.5.12)
and (C.5.3) all hold or
q1(Pr(PivA|a, σθ)) = (1− q1)Pr(PivA|b, σθ), (C.5.13)
q2
1− q2 <
Pr(PivA|b, σθ) + Pr(PivB|b, σθ)
Pr(PivA|a, σθ) + Pr(PivB|a, σθ) <
q1
1− q1 , (C.5.14)
and (C.5.4) all hold.
By Lemmas 35 and 36 above neither (C.5.4) nor (C.5.3) holds at σθ¯. The following
inequalities hold given the signal structure, as long as θ is so that τ(A|a, σθ) > 12 and
τ(B|b, σθ) > 12 .
• ∂
Pr(PivA|b,σθ)+Pr(PivB |b,σθ)
Pr(PivA|a,σθ)+Pr(PivB |a,σθ)
∂θ
< 0
• ∂
Pr(PivA|b,σθ)
Pr(PivA|a,σθ)
∂θ
< 0
• ∂
∂θ
(E[U |b, σθ]− 12Pr(PivA|b, σθ)) > 0
• ∂
∂θ
(E[U |a, σθ] + 12Pr(PivA|a, σθ)) < 0
• ∂
∂θ
(E[U |b, σθ] + 12Pr(PivB|b, σθ)) > 0
• ∂
∂θ
(E[U |a, σθ]− 12Pr(PivB|a, σθ)) < 0
Suppose that equations (C.5.11), (C.5.12) and (C.5.4) all hold for some σθ. It is the
case that
Pr(PivA|b, σθ¯)
Pr(PivA|a, σθ¯)
> 1
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for n large enough (using standard formulas for pivot probabilities). Since (C.5.11)
holds and p1
1−p2 < 1, it must be that θ > θ¯ because
∂
Pr(PivA|B,σθ¯)
Pr(PivA|A,σθ¯)
∂θ
< 0. However, this
implies that
E[U |a, σθ]− 1
2
Pr(PivA|a, σθ) < E[U |a, σθ¯]−
1
2
Pr(PivA|a, σθ¯))
and
E[U |b, σθ] + 1
2
Pr(PivB|b, σθ) > E[U |b, σθ¯] +
1
2
Pr(PivB|b, σθ¯).
Note therefore that
E[U |b, σθ] + 1
2
Pr(PivB|b, σθ) > E[U |a, σθ]− 1
2
Pr(PivA|a, σθ))
which means that (C.5.4) cannot hold.
Now, suppose that equations (C.5.13), (C.5.14) and (C.5.3) all hold for some σa.
It can be verified that
Pr(PivA|b, σθ¯) + Pr(PivB|b, σθ¯)
Pr(PivA|a, σθ¯) + Pr(PivB|a, σθ¯)
≤ 1
for n large enough using Myerson [2000] Equation 5.5, with equality holding only if
r(1|a) = r(2|b). Since (C.5.14) holds and q2
1−q2 > 1, since
∂ Pr(PivA|B,σθ)+Pr(PivB |B,σθ)
Pr(PivA|A,σθ)+Pr(PivB |A,σθ)
∂θ
< 0
it must be that θ < θ¯ for n large enough. However, this implies that
E[U |a, σθ] + 1
2
Pr(PivA|a, σθ)) > E[U |a, σθ¯] +
1
2
Pr(PivA|a, σθ¯))
and
E[U |b, σθ]− 1
2
Pr(PivA|b, σθ) < E[U |b, σθ¯]−
1
2
Pr(PivA|b, σθ¯).
Note therefore that
E[U |b, σθ]− 1
2
Pr(PivA|b, σθ) < E[U |a, σθ] + 1
2
Pr(PivA|a, σθ))
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which means that (C.5.3) cannot hold. Therefore, σθ is not an equilibrium, which is
a contradiction and completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 11:
Proof. Note that Pr(Pivc|ω, σ∗) = 1 for all ω, c and E[U |a, σ∗] = E[U |b, σ∗] since no
one votes. From there, the logic in Proposition 11 shows that a fixed voter would
prefer to randomize with equal probability between A and B rather than play any
other strategy that mixes between voting for A and B. On the other hand, since the
tie breaking rule is a coin-flip, she can induce the same distribution over outcomes by
abstaining. Hence, she weakly prefers to abstain rather than flip a coin and is thus
willing to play her strategy profile.
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